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Chapter 1
The Adaptive Belief System: theoretical
applications and empirical validations
Davide Bazzana
Lombardy Advanced School of Economic Research (LASER)
1.1 Introduction
The purpose of this survey is to highlight the fundamental contribution that
heterogeneous expectations and the adaptive belief system may bring to the
explanation of economic phenomena if systematically used in economic models.
Before describing these two approaches in detail, this introduction will illus-
trate the reasons why they should be preferred to the standard assumption of
homogeneous rational expectations.
The psychological human element is probably the key diﬀerence between
economics and the natural science. Individual beliefs about the future aﬀect
the decision of today, so any dynamic economic system can be deﬁned as an
expectation feedback system.
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For this reason the expectations on aggregate variables are the cornerstone
of several economic models. Since the seminal work of Muth (1961) and its
application in macroeconomics by Lucas (1972), the Rational Expectations Hy-
pothesis (REH) has become the leading approach on expectations formation
in economics. According to REH, expectations are model consistent, agents
are optimizers and have perfect knowledge of the market equilibrium equations
which are used to derive expectations. REH oﬀers an eﬃcient ﬁxed point solu-
tion to the economic expectations feedback system. Hence, in the absence of
exogenous shocks, the REH implies that agents have perfect foresight and make
no mistakes in their predictions. An important contributions to the popularity
of this framework have been the Lucas critique.1
This asserts that policy prescriptions are likely to aﬀect expectations. Moreover,
policy conclusions based on statistical relationships are potentially misleading
as do not take into account the changes in the decision rules that may inﬂuence
the aggregate structure.
In ﬁnance, the REH is related to market eﬃciency2: asset price and returns
are the outcomes of a competitive market with rational agents. The eﬃciency
of the market is the result of the arbitrage strategies of agents exploiting every
proﬁt opportunity to drive the prices to their correct and fundamental values.
Consequently, in an eﬃcient market there cannot be foreseeable structure in
asset returns and the value of a risky asset should be set at its fundamental
price.
Nevertheless, drawbacks of the rational expectations/optimizing agents paradigm
are widely recognized. First of all, it is not realistic to assume perfect and wide-
spread knowledge about the law of motion of the variables of interest. Moreover,
agents should have extremely strong computing abilities in order to calculate
1See Lucas (1976).
2See Fama (1965,1970).
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the equilibrium. This aspect becomes crucial if it is applied to heterogeneous
agents models, where rational agents are expected to have a full knowledge of
the market, including the expectations of all the other agents.
The standard reply to this criticism is based on the principle that this is the
asymptotic outcome of a learning process concerning the above mentioned law
of motion. In other words, considering a fast learning process, the agents are
able to converge to the rational solution. Accordingly, it becomes fundamental
to study dynamic models that take explicitly into account this learning process
in order to investigate whether a convergence to the rational equilibrium is
feasible. These conditions seem to have been proved by Fourgeaud et al. (1986),
while Schonhofer (1998) suggests that the forecasting errors never vanish in a
standard overlapping generations model with least squares learning ﬁnding non-
convergence.
Secondly, in a world of rational agents there will be no trade.3 Assuming
that all the agents are rational and this condition is common knowledge, even
if a trader has higher private information, e.g. on an asset, she cannot beneﬁt
from this because the other rational traders should be able to anticipate it.
Therefore, they will not sell the asset to her.4
Moreover, the survival argument of the FH has been criticized by many
authors5 proposing formal models where non-optimizing ﬁrms can survive under
certain hypothesis. Blume and Easley (1992) investigate the informational
eﬃciency of the market ﬁnding that if some agents have inaccurate beliefs,
dynamics may not converge to the rational expectations equilibrium allowing
3The Friedman hypothesis (Friedman: 1953) suggests that, in an evolutionary competition,
non-rational agents will be driven out of the market by rational agents who are capable to
avoid systemic errors. So, the Friedman hypothesis (FH) excludes from the economic modeling
the market psychology and the sentiment of the market that are considered irrational and
therefore inconsistent with the rational expectation hypothesis.
4For an exhaustive discussion about no trade theorems see Milgrom and Stokey (1982)
or Fudenberg and Tirole (1991).
5See for example Winter (1975), Machina (1989) or Koopmans (1957).
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the misinformed traders to survive in the market.
Looking back at the practical relevance of REH in ﬁnancial markets, Soros
(1987) introduces the concepts of fallibility and reﬂexivity to argue that the
standard paradigm of rationality is not the description of the market reality.
Fallability means that the agents have a view of the world that never perfectly
corresponds to the actual state, whereas reﬂexivity means that these imperfect
views inﬂuence but not determine the course of the events. Conversely the
course of the events inﬂuences but does not determine the participants' views.
So, there is a continuous feedback loop between imperfect view and state of the
events. These concepts ﬁnd validation both in laboratory and survey results.
Experimental sessions have shown that often the aggregate behaviour does
not converge to the rational expectations equilibrium and bubbles can emerge.6
Anticipating here some of the results presented in Sections 1.4, Hommes et
al. (2005) investigate expectations formation in a standard asset pricing model
asking to the subjects to predict the price and leaving the trade decisions to
an artiﬁcial agent (computer). The human subjects do not have knowledge on
the underlying market equilibrium equations but they know their predictions
and all past realized prices. In this framework, the authors observe both slow or
monotonic convergence to the fundamental price and regular oscillations around
it. Moreover, in most of the markets there is excess volatility and the assets
are under-valuated. Looking at the individual forecast strategies, Hommes et al.
ﬁnd that in the stable market the agents use naive, adaptive or AR(1) forecasting
strategies, whereas in the oscillatory markets the majority of the agents acts
according to trend-following strategies. Thus this paper seems to conﬁrm the
common hypothesis that in ﬁnance agents use simple rules of thumb. In a similar
framework which involves human agents only, Hommes et al. (2008) observe the
emergence of bubbles in 5 over 6 experiments. These bubbles are triggered by
6See for example Smith et al. (1988), the chapter of Duﬀy (2006) or Hommes (2011).
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trend-following behaviours with positive feedback expectations. This feedback
structure is based on: high expected prices leading to high level of demand
and high market equilibrium prices. So, the agents follow the bubble and are
not able to predict the fundamental price, contrary to the rational expectation
assumption.
In the 1980's, the strong depreciation experienced by the dollar7 and the
large ﬂuctuations in the S&P500 index8 have been considered evidences of ﬁn-
ancial markets excess volatility.9 In addition, survey data analyses10 show that
the ﬁnancial agents' behaviour is not fully rational, since they use diﬀerent
trading and forecasting strategies.
Over the last decades many economists have become aware of the unrealistic
assumptions behind the rational expectations, developing alternative approaches
based on bounded rationality. There are at least three reasons why bounded ra-
tionality should be incorporated in economic models, which can be summarized
in just three words: evidence, scarcity and success.
Firstly, there is empirical evidence that human beings have critical limits on
both cognition and computational capabilities. More precisely, many studies in
behavioural economics and psychology display that agents fail in understand-
ing statistical relationships or under/overestimate the data patterns producing
reasoning errors that are typically systematic. These systematic errors are of-
ten modelled as expectations with bias around the steady state value (SS).
Moreover, it is interesting to notice how the bias is not a complete depar-
ture from the rational approach, indeed, its magnitude and nature could be
related to the economic conditions in the maximization problem, like delibera-
tion cost, incentive or learning process. A vast literature has investigated the
7Frankel and Froot (1986).
8Cutler, Poterba and Summers (1989).
9See Shiller (1981,1989).
10See Frankel and Froot (1987 a,b and 1990 a,b)
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bias problem suggesting that biases do not easily disappear and can have strong
consequences.11
Secondly, given that Economics studies choices in a scarce resource frame-
work to satisfy unlimited wants, it is crucial to consider human cognition as
a scarce resource and here bounded rationality makes the diﬀerence. Models
should take seriously into account the cost of the decision process, especially if
it implies high calculation eﬀorts. On this point, Conlisk (1996) highlights the
inﬁnite regress problem: How can we formulate an optimization problem which
takes full account of the cost of its own solution?. According to Johansen
(1977), the answer is: at some point a decision must be taken on intuitive
grounds. In other words, deliberation costs and heuristics challenge the ra-
tional optimization as the ultimate logical basis for behavioural modelling.
Thirdly, models with bounded rationality provide interesting results in a
wide range of economic problems. The use of heuristic rules (often called rules
of thumb) is justiﬁed by psychological studies which show that agents compare
alternatives avoiding deliberation eﬀorts or excessively complicated computation
costs.12 Many economic models use these heuristics following an evolutionary
and dynamic approach, explaining the persistent distance from the rational solu-
tions. For example, according to the Adaptive Belief Systems (ABS) of Brock
and Hommes (1997), the agents endogenously update their strategy between
rational and naive expectations in compliance to the net proﬁt. Hence, taking
into account the population distribution and the learning process, the bounded
rational models are also useful to investigate whether in a dynamic system there
is convergence to perfectly rational solutions.
All this considered, bounded rationality can be modelled following a great
variety of approaches. Indeed, if there is only one way to be rational, there
11Some examples are Smith (1991), Smith and Walker (1993) or Slonim (1994).
12See Conlisk (1980).
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are million ways to make mistakes.13 For example, Adam (2005) and Guse
(2005) develop models with heterogeneous expectations, where agents use one
of the possible rules of thumb. The main limitation of their approach is that
the fractions of agents using the forecasting rules are determined exogenously
and therefore they cannot choose the most performing rule.
Diﬀerently, in order to cope with this problem and with the wilderness of
bounded rationality, the adaptive learning approach assumes that agents act
as econometricians or statisticians using econometric forecasting models. The
learning process is translated into updating model parameters over time. Fol-
lowing this approach, agents are aware of the underlying structural model but
do not know the value of the parameters.14 For example, Grandmont (1998)
develops a model with adaptive learning related to the uncertainty principle.
According to this model, agents are willing to know the position of the equilib-
rium, they are able to extrapolate regularities and trends, but are uncertain on
the system dynamics. The system converges to temporary unstable equilibrium
when the expectations are strong enough.
Another interesting approach to bounded rationality is the behavioural learn-
ing based on the Restricted Perception Equilibrium15 or the Misspeciﬁcation
Equilibrium. As in adaptive learning, agents are considered econometricians
but it is recognized that in practice econometricians often misspecify the model.
So, agents base their expectations on simple heuristics with parameters pinned
down by simple requirements between beliefs and realizations. On the same line
Branch and Evans (2005) assume that agents underparameterize the forecast-
ing model neglecting a variable or a lag. Accordingly, the optimal parameters
value of each misspeciﬁed frame depends on the proportion of agents using the
diﬀerent forecasting rules.
13See Sims (1980).
14For extensive surveys see Evans and Honkapohja (2001, 2011).
15Hommes and Zhu (2014).
10
Concluding, there is one other approach worth to be mentioned which is
based on the assumption that agents do not know the correct model under-
lying the economic dynamics. In Brock and Hommes (1997) and Branch and
Evans (2006) agents have heterogeneous expectations and endogenously switch
between rules of thumb according to their relative performance. It is interest-
ing to notice how this leads to complex expectations feedback systems that can
produce either the REH equilibrium or, more often, self-fulﬁlling behavioural
learning equilibria manifesting excess volatility and persistent discrepancies from
the rational solutions.
This literature review aims to analyse one speciﬁc dimension of the bounded
rationality with heterogeneous expectations: Adaptive Belief Systems models.
These are indeed able to face the wilderness problem through the expectations
updating mechanism and to generate some important stylized facts in many
ﬁnancial and economical series, such as unpredictable returns and fat tails.
Section 1.2 presents the most popular rules of thumb and the discrete choice
model, while Section 1.3 presents their diﬀerent applications in three domains:
in a macroeconomic model, in the asset pricing model and in the exchange rate
framework. In section 1.4 are discussed some empirical and experimental valid-
ations supporting the use of bounded rationality. Finally, section 1.5 concludes
presenting the recent development of ABS in the literature.. The literature on
bounded rationality is vast and growing, so I have decided to analyse few canon-
ical examples in each section. Therefore, the inclusion or exclusion of speciﬁc
papers should not be considered in qualitative terms.
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1.2 Bounded rationality and heterogeneous ex-
pectations
The Adaptive Believe System (ABS) proposed by Brock and Hommes (1997,
1998, 1999) is based on expectations rules and the discrete choice models. In
this framework agents are heterogeneous and switch between diﬀerent rules ac-
cording to an evolutionary performance measure.
Agents are bounded rational, in other words, in each period they choose
the strategy with higher ﬁtness measure. Brock and Hommes deﬁne the con-
sequential coupling between dynamic equilibria and expectations as Adaptive
Rational Equilibrium Dynamics (ARED). The heterogeneity of expectations
among agents introduces non-linearity into the market dynamics and can be
source of potential market instability ﬂuctuations. The discrete choice mechan-
ism generates a link among the market equilibrium dynamics and the evolution
of the heterogeneous expectations which co-evolve over time. In other words, the
market realization depends on the sentiment of the market and on the heuristics
considered, i.e. the distribution of the agents among them.
This heterogeneous approach challenges the traditional rational agent frame-
work because it is closely related to the Keynesian view claiming that expecta-
tions matter. Consequently, the investors' sentiment and the market psychology
play important roles in the market dynamics
In most of the heterogeneous expectations models agents can be rational,
fundamentalists, biased, chartists and adaptive.
Considering the asset price as reference variable and the simple linear fore-
casting rule of the type:
pet = p
∗ + fh(xt−1, xt−2, xt−3, ..., xt−L),
12
where p∗ represents the fundamental price and fh(·) the forecasting rule selected
by agent h. The perfect forecasting rule or the perfect rational rule can be
written as follows:
pet = p
∗ + (pt − p∗) . (1.1)
It should be noticed that Equation (1) assumes perfect knowledge of the market
equilibrium. Particularly, this means that, in each period, in a heterogeneous
framework the agent has full knowledge about the belief of all the others. Con-
sidering now the linear forecasting rule with one lag:
pet = p
∗ + g (pt−1 − p∗) + b, (1.2)
where g and b represent the trend and the bias parameter respectively. Despite
its extreme simplicity, Equation (1.2) allows to study at least four interesting
rules of thumb. For example, if g and b are both equal to zero, the linear rule
is reduced to the fundamentalist forecast. Fundamentalists base their beliefs
about future realization upon market fundamentals, so
pet = p
∗. (1.3)
Other interesting cases covered by the forecasting rule (1.2) are the biased
belief and the trend-follower behaviour:
pet = p
∗ + b, (1.4)
pet = p
∗ + g (pt−1 − p∗) . (1.5)
The simple biased rule of equation (1.4) represents every possible positive
or negative constant price above or below the fundamental value. Hence, the
biased rule may describe optimistic and pessimistic agents. In the trend-follower
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forecasting rule of Equation (1.5), if g > 0 it represents trend chaser agents
expecting stability in the sign of price changes. Conversely, if g < 0 the heuristic
describes contrarians expecting a reversal in the trend related to the last price
change. Finally, if g = 1 it considers the standard naive agents who simply base
their expectation on the past observed value.
Extending the lag in the forecasting rule and assuming that agents do not
know the fundamental price, it possible to observe the following behaviour:
pet = pt−1 + g (pt−1 − pt−2) . (1.6)
Heuristic (1.6) describes technical analysts or chartists, who adopt simple trend
extrapolating rule upon observed historical pattern in prices using the last ob-
served price as an anchor. It is interesting to note how this rule is completely
time varying, because it does not consider the ﬁxed point of the fundamental
value as anchor. This rule ﬁnds deep support both in laboratory experiments
and in theoretical analyses.16
1.2.1 Discrete choice mechanism and adaptive belief sys-
tem
In their seminal paper, Brock and Hommes (1997) assume that an evolutionary
selection drives the agents. Accordingly, traders choose the most successful rule
among the diﬀerent forecasting heuristics.
This selection mechanism represents the evolutionary part of the model de-
scribing how the fractions nh,t of agent types evolve over time, i.e. how the
agents update their beliefs. The performance measures are available to every-
16See for example Shiller (2000) or Vissing-Jorgensen (2003).
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one, but subject to noise. The ﬁtness is described by the random utility model:
U¯h,t = Uh,t + εi,h,t, (1.7)
where Uh,t and εi,h,t represent the deterministic part and the individual error
term respectively. By assumption, the noise error is independent and identically
distributed across agents i and types h and it is drawn from a double exponential
distribution. So, if the number of agents goes to inﬁnity, the evolutionary selec-
tion will be given by the following discrete choice mechanism with multinomial
logit probability:17
nh,t =
eβUh,t−1
H∑
h=1
eβUh,t−1
. (1.8)
The main insight of the choice mechanism is that the strategies with higher
ﬁtness measure will attract more agents than the lower performing rules. The
parameter β is the intensity of choice and measures how sensitive are the agents
to the optimal strategy, i.e. it represents the degree of rationality. This term
is inversely related to the error term εi,h,t. Lower is the noise term, i.e. more
rational are the agents, higher is their capability to select the best rule. For
example, when β = ∞ the agents can perfectly observe the deterministic part
of the ﬁtness measure because there is no noise, so all the agents will choose the
optimal forecasting rule. In the opposite case, when β = 0, the variance of the
noise term is inﬁnite and the agents are not able to observe the diﬀerence in the
ﬁtness measures among the heuristics. Consequently, the share of agents which
choose the diﬀerent strategies will be ﬁxed over time and equal to 1/H.
It has to be highlighted that the market equilibrium variables and the frac-
tions of diﬀerent rules coevolve following an interesting time pattern. Indeed,
the market equilibrium in period t is function of the strategies shares selected in
17See Manski and McFadden (1981) for an extensive analysis.
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the previous period. Consequently, the equilibrium equations will aﬀect the per-
formance measure in the current period which will determine the new fraction
for the period t+ 1. Again, these new fractions will establish the equilibrium in
period t+ 1 and so on.
Common extensions of the simple versions of equations (1.7) and (1.8) may
consider weighted average of the ﬁtness measures or asynchronous updating of
the strategies. In models like Hommes (2013), a natural candidate for ﬁtness
measure is the weighted average of realized proﬁts. So the performance measure
is given by:
Uh,t = ωUh,t−1 + (1− ω)pih,t − Ch, (1.9)
where 0 ≤ ω ≤ 1 represents the memory parameter and it measures how fast
past realized performance is discounted.18 According to Conlisk (1980), Ch is
the cost per period of the forecasting rule. It is assumed that more sophisticated
rules require more eﬀort or higher cost compared to the simple heuristics that are
freely available. Equation (1.8) represents the case of synchronous updating of
the strategies, i.e. in each period all the agents can switch to better strategies.
On the contrary, following the studies of Diks and van der Weide (2005) or
the literature about the habits in economics, it could be interesting to extend
equation (1.8) to the asynchronous updating case:
nh,t = (1− δ) e
βUh,t−1
H∑
h=1
eβUh,t−1
+ δnh,t−1. (1.10)
It is straightforward that if δ = 0, Equation (1.10) simpliﬁes to the syn-
chronous case. If δ > 0, the upgrade of the strategy is more gradual, indeed
in every period only a fraction (1− δ) of the agents can reconsider the strategy
18See Hommes et al. (2012) for a deep analysis of the memory's eﬀects on the choice
dynamics.
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according to the new performance information.
1.2.2 The cobweb example
Before moving to the description of the ABS applications to more complex scen-
arios, it is worth to brieﬂy summarize how this approach can generate interest-
ing results in a simple cobweb model considering only two diﬀerent strategies.
The cobweb model describes ﬂuctuations of equilibrium prices in a market of
nonstorable goods that takes one time to produce. Assuming a demand D(pt)
linearly increasing, a linear supply S(peh,t) and two types of producers (naive
and rational), it is possible to write:
D(pt) = a− dpt, d > 0, (1.11)
S(peh,t) = sp
e
h,t, s > 0. (1.12)
The market equilibrium can be derived through the market clearing condition:
D(pt) =
H∑
h=1
nh,tS(p
e
h,t).
It can be proved that this model presents only one non-linearity, which is
given by the fractions, i.e. by the updating mechanism. Indeed, substituting
equations (1.11) and (1.12) in the market equilibrium formula, this becomes:
a− dpt =
H∑
h=1
nh,tsp
e
h,t,
and considering explicitly the two types of agent, the previous equation can be
written as:
a− dpt = nR,tspt + nN,tspt−1, (1.13)
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where nR,t and nN,t denote the fractions of rational and naive agents respect-
ively. Equation (1.13) can be explicitly solved for the price:
pt =
a− nN,tspt−1
d+ nR,ts
. (1.14)
These agents update their expectations according to a public performance
measure based on the realized net proﬁt:
pih,t = ptS
(
peh,t
)− c (S(peh,t))− Ch = s2peh,t(2pt − peh,t)− Ch, (1.15)
where Ch is the per period information cost that has to be paid to obtain the
forecasts. This cost is positive for the perfect foresight rule, whereas it is equal
to zero in the naive case.
The fractions of the two types are updated following the standard discrete
choice mechanism without stickiness.19 Hence, the fraction of agents using the
rational forecasting rule equals to:
nR,t =
exp
(
β
(
s
2p
2
t − C
))
exp
(
β
(
s
2p
2
t − C
))
+ exp
(
β
(
s
2pt−1(2pt − pt−1)
)) , (1.16)
while the fraction of naive agents is nN,t = 1− nR,t.
In order to investigate the local (in)stability of the steady state and the
dynamic evolution, it is convenient to reformulate some of the main equations
using the diﬀerence of the two fractions, xt = nR,t − nN,t, and the diﬀerence in
the realized proﬁts, piR,t − piN,t = s2 (pt − pt−1)2. At this point, it is possible to
write the Adaptive Rational Equilibrium Dynamics as:
19 See Equation (1.8).
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pt =
2a− (1− xt−1) spt−1
2d+ (1 + xt−1) s
, (1.17)
xt = tanh
(
β
2
[s
2
(pt − pt−1)2 − C
])
. (1.18)
It should be noticed that xt = −1 describes the situation where all the agents
are naive, on the contrary when xt = +1 all the agents are rational.
Therefore, the model has a unique steady state (SS) (p∗, x∗) =
(
2
d+s , tanh
(
−βC
2
))
.
It is worth to underline that if C = 0, i.e. if there is no additional cost for the
perfect foresight strategy, the agents will move to the two strategies in equal
shares. Since at the SS both strategies must have identical forecasts, if C > 0,
most of the agents will choose the cheapest strategy between the two, which is
the naive rule.
The stability properties of the steady state are determined by the ratio of
the derivatives of supply and demand at the SS price. Given that the traditional
cobweb stability requirement is | S′(p∗)D′(p∗) | = | sd | < 1, it can be easily proved that
the SS of this model is globally stable. To allow possible unstable steady state
and endogenous ﬂuctuations in the heterogeneous model, Brock and Hommes
(1997) assume that when all the agents are naive the market is locally unstable:
S′(p∗)
D′(p∗) = − sd < −1.
Under this assumption, it is possible to assert that, if C = 0 the steady
state will be globally stable for all the possible values of β, whereas when the
information costs are positive there is a critical value of β1 over which the system
becomes unstable presenting a period-doubling bifurcation at β = β1.
Brock and Hommes (BH) illustrate how in the neoclassical case, i.e. when
β = ∞, all the time paths converge to the steady state where the price is
the fundamental SS, p∗, and all the agents are naive. Indeed, until the proﬁt
losses due to error of the naive strategy are lower than the information cost for
perfect foresight expectations, all the agents will choose the cheapest forecasting
strategy. As long as all the agents are naive, the price dynamic follows a linear
19
unstable oscillation around the fundamental value. This oscillation presents an
increasing divergence from the steady state. Therefore, at some point, the naive
error will generate lower gain than the net proﬁt of the rational strategy. At this
stage, all the agents would pay the information cost in order to obtain higher
returns, they use rational expectations and the price jumps to its SS value. In
the following periods, all the agents will switch to the naive forecasting rule
because they will be able to predict the true fundamental value without bearing
the cost of the rational expectations. For this reason, the dynamics will converge
to the stable path.
Almost the same line of reasoning applies in the ﬁnite intensity of choice
cases with the diﬀerence that, when all the agents become rational, the price
is not driven onto the true fundamental price, but only close to it. Being the
price close enough to the steady state, the agents will switch to the costless rule
of thumb, hence the price will start to move away from its SS value and the
complete process will occur again. The bounded rational model shows irregular
price ﬂuctuations. Moreover, for high intensity of choice, BH prove that the
ABS-cobweb model exhibits strange attractors for a positive set of β, implying
chaotic price ﬂuctuations.
These results have been extended by Branch (2002) who proposes a model
including another unsophisticated predictor: the adaptive expectations belief.
The author considers this rule type because the diﬀerence between adaptive and
naive expectations consists in the weight of the adaption parameter, i.e. the
value of parameter g mentioned in Section 1.2. In this framework the results
suggest that adding a second costless unsophisticated choice, if the memory is
suﬃciently high, the steady state may be locally stable at the asymptote. On
the contrary, if the adaptive rule is costly and the intensity of choice parameter is
large enough, the steady state will become an unstable saddle point. However, it
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is interesting to notice how increasing the range of the expectation rules rises the
critical value of β, which turns the path from stable to unstable. In conclusion,
the intensity of choice has no eﬀect on the stability conditions as demonstrated
by Brock and Hommes model (1997).
1.3 Adaptive Believe System in Economics and
Finance: some examples
This section presents some applications of the ABS framework in three dif-
ferent domains: the analysis of the animal spirits in an exchange rate market,
the study of the ﬁnancial market and the stability analysis in a macroeconomic
context.
Certainly, the adaptive belief system can be applied to many other ﬁelds,
indeed, in economics and ﬁnance there are a lot of witnesses of paradigm switch
from the perfect rational expectation hypothesis to bounded rational approach.
Another example might be the overlapping generations monetary economy de-
veloped by Brock and De Fontnouvelle (2000). As in Brock and Hommes (1997),
the agents adopt a discrete choice mechanism to select between the strategies ac-
cording to the lowest past squared forecast error. The dynamics of the model are
strongly inﬂuenced by the value of the intensity of choice. When the parameter
β increases, the monetary steady state becomes unstable. Also Chiarella and
Khomin (1999) have worked on the adaptive evolving expectation of Brock and
Hommes (1997) developing a basic Cagan monetary model with fundamentalist
and chartist agents. In this framework, they conﬁrm that greater complexity
can arise and the share of agents distributed over the two rules of thumb may
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widely ﬂuctuate.20
1.3.1 Biased agents in an exchange rate model
Considering the empirical evidence,21 De Grauwe and Kaltwasser (2012)
present an exchange rate model in which agents are unable to observe the fun-
damental value. However, agents have beliefs on it, and use them in order to
position themselves in the market. Starting from this assumption, De Grauwe
and Kaltwasser (2012) develop three possible versions of the model, which allow
to replicate interesting phenomena of the exchange rate market, as the discon-
nession puzzle or the excess volatility puzzle.
The ﬁrst version assumes two biased agents: optimist and pessimist. The
optimist (pessimist) systematically over (under) estimates the fundamental rate.
The model postulates the following linear excess demands:
dopt,t = α [(e
∗ + a)− et] , α > 0, (1.19)
dpes,t = α [(e
∗ − a)− et] , α > 0, (1.20)
where et is the market exchange rate and dopt,t and dret,t represent the optimistic
and pessimist excess demand respectively. It should be noticed that the agent's
beliefs are deﬁned as constant diﬀerences over or under the steady state value
e∗t . The law of motion of the market value is given by:
et+1 = et + µ
H∑
h
nh,tdh,t,
where, as stated in the referred literature, dh,t and nh,t are the excess demand
20See Hommes (2006) for further examples.
21For example the popular work of Kindleberger and Aliber (2005) on 'Manias, panics and
crashes'.
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and the number of agents using the h-Th forecasting rule respectively. Following
Beja and Goldman (1980), µ > 0 represents the speed according to which the
value of the market exchange rate is adjusted. Deﬁning xt = nopt,t − npes,t, as
in Section 1.2.2, and substituting the pessimistic and optimistic demands in the
previous equation, it is possible to rewrite the law of motion as follows:
et+1 = et + αµ (e
∗ − et + axt) . (1.21)
Equation (1.21) demonstrates how the exchange rate dynamics is determ-
ined by two diﬀerent factors: a convergence factor and a distribution factor.
According to the ﬁrst one, if the market level is below (above) its fundamental
in period t, in the next period the exchange rate will increase (decrease). The
second factor is related to the share of optimists in the market. For example,
if xt > 0 there will be more optimists than pessimists, therefore the exchange
rate will increase between the periods. It is straightforward that the amplitude
of this eﬀect depends on the belief bias a. Being this an ABS framework, the
agents choose the forecasting rule according to the discrete choice mechanism:
nh,t =
exp (βpih,t)
2∑
h
exp (βpih,t)
, (1.22)
where the performance measures are the realized proﬁts: pih,t = dh,t−1 (et − et−1).
Combining equations (1.21) and (1.22) it is possible to write the diﬀerence
between the fractions as:
xt = tanh
(
1
2
βpiopt,t − pipes,t
)
. (1.23)
Now, it is reasonable to derive the unique steady state of the 2-dim map: S =
(e∗, 0). According to the value of the intensity of choice, the model can present
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diﬀerent dynamic behaviours: if (αµ− 2) /α2µa2 < β < 1/α2µa2, the unique
steady state is asymptotically stable, if β > 1/
(
α2µa2
)
the dynamic converges
to a stable limit cycle, if β = 1/
(
α2µa2
)
there is the Neimark-Sacker bifurcation,
whereas if β < (αµ− 2) /α2µa2 the unique steady state becomes unstable and a
two-cycle steady dynamic emerges. In other words, the steady state is reached
only when the two opposite shares are equal. Since both pessimist and optimist
are fundamentalist agents, when their fractions are equal the two diverging
forces will nullify each others.
Looking at the stability conditions, as in the cobweb model example, if the
value of β becomes too large it has a destabilizing eﬀect on the steady state. This
is because agents are more sensitive to the best forecasting rule and therefore
they raise the self-fulﬁlling nature of the expectations. Hence, increasing the
sensibility of the agents decreases the space of the other parameters value under
which the system is stable. Nevertheless, the stability condition depends also
on other variables. For example, for small values of α, the agents exercise a low
convergence force on the exchange rate to the fundamental value. Conversely, if
a is low, the beliefs of optimist and pessimist are close and do not imply a high
pressure on the stable steady state.
De Grauwe and Kaltwasser (2012) have managed to design an exchange rate
model with endogenous ﬂuctuations even if the fundamental value is stable. In
addition, it should be noticed that, given the assumption of time invariance of
the fundamental, every persistent ﬂuctuation in the market implies the discon-
nect puzzle and the excess of volatility.22 In other words, the exchange rate is
disconnected from its fundamentals most of the time and its volatility exceeds
the volatility of the underlying economic variables.
22 See Obstfekd and Rogoﬀ (2000).
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The choice to consider only biased traders in the market could be the reason
why the market cannot converge to the steady state solution beyond the stabil-
ity space. De Grauwe and Kaltwasser (2012) analyze two possible extensions of
the model: in the ﬁrst case, they allow for the existence of an unbiased funda-
mentalist type, whereas in the second case they add to the ﬁrst extension also
a trend following (chartist) forecasting rule.
The excess of demand functions of the unbiased agents duf,t and the chartists
dch,t can be written as follows:
duf,t = γ (e
∗ − et) , (1.24)
dch,t = δ (et − et−1) . (1.25)
It can be seen how equation (1.24) is the simpliﬁed version of (1.19) or of
equation (1.20) for a = 0. In equation (1.25) δ is the extrapolation parameter
on the past movements. Adding the ﬁrst new expectation rule in the previous
framework it is possible to rewrite the law of motion of the exchange rate as:
et+1 = et + [αµ (e
∗ − et − axt)] (1− nuf,t) + γµ (e∗ − et)nuf,t, (1.26)
with nuf,t + nopt,t + npes,t = 1.
The new dynamic of the exchange rate depends on the previous level, on
the weighted sum of the non-fundamentalist agents eﬀect, as in equation (21),
and on the unbiased agents impact. Indeed, if nuf,t = 0 the augmented law of
motion is reduced to the original one.
Considering both additional rules of thumb (unbiased and chartist), the law
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of motion of the exchange rate becomes:
et+1 = et+µ [α (eopt,t − et)nopt,t + α (epes,t − et)npes,t + γ (e∗ − et)nuf,t + δ (et − et−1)nch,t] .
(1.27)
Analysing separately the two extensions, the model presents some interest-
ing insights. On the one side, the existence of unbiased agents increases the
region where the model is locally asymptotically stable. In other words, the
unbiased agent enhances the range of the β values under which the system is
stable. However, it seems that the presence of the unbiased agents leads to
a diﬀerent type of complex attractor, i.e. when γ is high, the exchange rate
dynamic may be driven by strange attractors. This is a counter intuitive res-
ult, not only the chaos can be due to biased fundamentalist traders but also to
their interaction with unbiased agents. On the other side, the chartist agents
may act as destabilizing force, their destabilization power is proportional to the
amplitude of the parameter δ.
Concluding, in an exchange rate model with two heterogeneous types, the
ABS allows to generate a cyclical movement of biased agents even if the fun-
damental does not change over time. Moreover, if the model is extended by
introducing further belief types, the dynamics will become more unpredictable
and will be able to replicate some well-known phenomena as the disconnect and
the excess volatility puzzles. These results seem to be consistent with the mod-
els elaborated by De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2005, 2006). These authors provide
examples of exchange rate frameworks with transaction costs where the ABS
generates multitude of ﬁxed-point attractors. Furthermore, the authors show
how the eﬀect of a permanent shock on the fundamental exchange rate may
be chaotic depending on the exact timing of its occurrence. De Grauwe and
Grimaldi suggest that history matters, i.e. the market has a memory. It should
be noticed that this statement contrasts with the eﬃcient market assumption.
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However, using the ABS framework, it is possible to replicate many market
evidences: the disconnect puzzle, the presence of the excess volatility or the non
normal distribution of the returns, i.e. the existence of fat-tails.
1.3.2 Macroeconomic stability under heterogeneous ex-
pectations
This subsection discusses the frictionless dynamic stochastic general equilib-
rium (DSGE) model with heterogeneous expectations introduced by Anufriev,
Assenza, Hommes and Massaro (2013). It analyses the dynamics of commit-
ting to an interest rate feedback rule in a framework with endogenous switching
between heterogeneous inﬂation forecasting rules. This analysis consists of two
parts: the ﬁrst can be linked to the frictionless models of Cochrane (2005, 2011),
the second applies the ABS approach.
As in standard macroeconomics models, consumers maximize their utility
function:
max Et
∞∑
j=0
δju (Ct+j) , 0 < δ < 1,
where δ represents the discount factor and EtCt+j is the expectation of the
agents in period t concerning consumption in period t+ j.
The maximization problem is subject to a budget constraint:
PtCt +Bt = (1 + it−1)Bt−1 + PtY,
where Pt, Bt, it and Y represent the price of the good, the bonds hold by
the agent, the nominal interest rate and the constant nonstorable endowment
respectively.
From the consumption Euler's equation and the market-clearing condition,
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it is possible to obtain the linearised Fisher relation of the interest rate:
it = r + Et (pit+1) , (1.28)
where r is the constant real interest rate and pit+1 represents the inﬂation rate.
Assuming that the central bank adjusts the interest rate according to the follow-
ing Taylor rule: it = r+ φpipit, it is possible to obtain the equilibrium condition
of the model:
pit =
1
φpi
Et (pit+1) , (1.29)
therefore the actual inﬂation rate depends on the inﬂation expectations of the
agents.
Now, postulating that the agents are heterogeneous and choose their inﬂa-
tion forecasts from a set H of diﬀerent rules of thumb, equation (1.29) can be
rewritten as:
pit =
1
φpi
H∑
h=1
nh,tEh,t (pit+1) . (1.30)
The agents rank the possible forecasting rules according to the past squared
forecast error:
Uh,t = − (pit−1 − Eh,t−2 (pit−1))2 − Ch, (1.31)
where Ch is the information cost per period of the h-Th expectation rule.
As De Grauwe and Kaltwasser (2012), Anufriev et al. start their analysis
investigating a framework with biased (optimist and pessimist) and fundament-
alist agents. The forecasting heuristics are:
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Efun,t (pit+1) = 0, (1.32)
Eopt,t (pit+1) = b, (1.33)
Epes,t (pit+1) = −b. (1.34)
Equation (32) represents the belief that the inﬂation rate will remain at its
fundamental level, whereas equations (1.33) and (1.34) describe expected inﬂa-
tion rates above or below the fundamental value. Supposing a discrete choice
mechanism, as in equation (1.8), and substituting these last three equations in
(1.30) and (1.31), it is possible to write the new inﬂation law of motion and the
switching mechanism as following:
pit =
1
φpi
(nopt,tb− npes,tb) , (1.35)
nfun,t =
exp
(−β (pi2t−1 + C))
exp
(−β (pi2t−1 + C))+ exp(−β (pit−1 − b)2)+ +exp(−β (pit−1 + b)2) .
(1.36)
It can be demonstrated that the one-dimensional map described in (1.35)
has a SS in pi∗ = 0. The macro-stability and the dynamics depend on the set
of belief parameters and on the aggressiveness degree of the monetary policy.
Its local and global stability depends on: the biased parameter (b), the cost of
the sophisticated rule (C ), the intensity of choice β and the reaction coeﬃcient
φpi in the monetary policy. Investigating the stability properties, it is possible
to understand how the monetary policy plays a relevant role when the cost
of the sophisticated rule is suﬃciently low, i.e. when C < b2. On the one
hand, under very aggressive ﬁnancial policy the system converges to the rational
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steady state whatever is the value of the intensity of choice. On the other hand,
gradually decreasing the reaction coeﬃcient of the monetary policy leads the
system to more complex dynamics increasing the β parameter. For example, if
the monetary policy is weak and there is a low value of β, the result will be a
single, rational and stable SS. Increasing the intensity of choice, the SS looses
its stability and this leads to the emergence of two other non fundamental stable
steady states. Raising again the intensity of choice will stabilize the RE steady
state and will generate two unstable SS, hence, the system will present three
stable steady states and two unstable steady states. This is why the compliance
with the Taylor principle is not suﬃcient to reach the stable RE steady state.
Instead, when the intensity of choice is high it is required to have a stronger
monetary policy, otherwise the system will present three stable and two unstable
steady states.
This result seems to conﬁrm the main insights presented by Massaro (2013).
Massaro designs a micro-founded DSGE model and examines the monetary
policy ﬁnding that, in a framework with heterogeneous beliefs, the Taylor prin-
ciple does not imply the existence of a unique and stable equilibrium. Thus,
central Banks should take into account the presence of bounded rational agents
in designing their policies, otherwise they risk to destabilize the system.
Concluding, the model of Anufurev et al. (2013) investigates the role of
heterogeneous expectations in a frictionless DSGE. According to the stability
analysis, when the monetary policy is weak, the main result is that agents receive
misleading signals from the market. As a consequence of the learning process,
a cumulative process of rising inﬂation is created. This process is reinforced
by self-fulﬁlling expectations on high inﬂation. When the central bank reacts
aggressively to change in inﬂation it induces convergence to the stable RE steady
state because it sends correct signals to the agents.
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1.3.3 An asset price model example
This subsection discusses the asset pricing model presented in Brock and
Hommes (1998), henceforward BH98. The framework assumes one risky asset
and one risk free asset which is perfectly elastically supplied at ﬁxed rate of
return r. Let pt and yt be the risky asset price per share and the stochastic
dividend process respectively. The dynamic of wealth can be written as:
W˜t+1 = (1 + r)Wt + [p˜t+1 + y˜t+1 − (1 + r) pt] zt, (1.37)
where the tilde denotes random variables and zt is the number of asset shares
purchased. Assuming that the agents have the same belief about the conditional
variance of excess returns and that this belief is :
Vh,t [p˜t+1 + y˜t+1 − (1 + rt) pt] ≡ σ2.
The agents are myopic mean variance maximizer, so the demand for the risky
assets is solved as follows:
Maxz
{
Eh,t
(
W˜t+1
)
− a
2
Vh,t
(
W˜t+1
)}
, (1.38)
where a is the risk aversion parameter. Therefore the demand for the risky
assets is:
zh,t =
Eh,t [p˜t+1 + y˜t+1 − (1 + r) pt]
aVh,t [p˜t+1 + y˜t+1 − (1 + r) pt] =
Eh,t [p˜t+1 + y˜t+1 − (1 + r) pt]
aσ2
. (1.39)
Let the supply of outside risky asset zs be constant and equal to zero. In a
heterogeneous framework the equilibrium of demand and supply implies:
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(1 + r) pt =
H∑
h=1
nh,tEh,t [p˜t+1 + y˜t+1] , (1.40)
where dividends can be interpreted as risk adjusted. Before investigating the
competition among the rules of thumb, some assumptions should be enumerated.
Firstly, all the traders have a common and constant conditional variance on the
excess return. Secondly, all the agents are able to compute the fundamental
price p∗t that prevails in a full rational world. Thirdly, the agents believe that in
a heterogeneous framework the price may deviate from the fundamental price
following some functions fh,t.
The evolutionary part of the model is given by the standard discrete choice
mechanism:
nh,t =
eβUh,t−1
H∑
h=1
eβUh,t−1
,
where the ﬁtness measure Uh,t represents the realized proﬁt for the forecasting
rule type h. The ﬁtness measure in the deterministic dividends dynamic case is
deﬁned by:
Uh,t = [pt + yt − (1 + r) pt−1] Eh,t−1 [p˜t + y˜t − (1 + r) pt−1]
aσ2
. (1.41)
Rewriting the ﬁtness measure in deviation from the steady state xt = pt−p∗t
and establishing the gross risk free rate of return 1 + r = R, equation (1.41) can
be reformulated as:
Uh,t = [xt −Rxt−1]
(
fh,t−1 −Rxt−1
aσ2
)
. (1.42)
In equation (1.42), fh,t represents the belief types. The model investigates
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the emerging dynamics assuming three diﬀerent frameworks: some examples
with two expectation rules, one using three rules of thumb and one with four
competing heterogeneous expectations. In general terms, the expectations are
described by the simple linear function:
fh,t = ghxt−1 + bh,
where gh and bh represent the trend and the bias parameter respectively as in
Section (1.2).
The ﬁrst example analysed considers fundamentalists with positive inform-
ation cost and trend chaser agents, the derived forecasting rules are:
ffun,t = 0, (1.43)
ftra,t = ghxt−1, g > 0. (1.44)
Equation (1.43) describes fundamentalist agents, predicting that the price
will be equal to the fundamental value. In order to obtain information about
the true fundamental level, agents have to pay a positive cost C. In equation
(1.44) the agents believe that prices will rise by a constant rate. Therefore the
equilibrium equation (1.40) in deviation term from the steady state is:
Rxt = ntra,t−1gxt−1.
Substituting equations (1.43) and (1.44) in (1.42) and in the choice mechan-
ism, it is possible to obtain the share of fundamentalist agents:
nfun =
exp
[
β
(
1
aσ2Rxt−1 (Rxt−1 − xt)− C
)]
exp
[
β
(
1
aσ2Rxt−1 (Rxt−1 − xt)− C
)]
+ exp
[
β
(
1
aσ2 (Rxt−1 − xt) (gxt−2 −Rxt−1)
)] .
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Exploring the stability conditions and the dynamics of the system, BH98
obtain the following result: when the extrapolation parameter g is very low, the
system has a unique globally stable steady state whatever is the value of the
intensity of choice. On the contrary, when agents extrapolate very strongly, i.e.
for high values of g, the dynamic of the system may be unstable according to
the value of intensity of choice. For low values of β, the fundamental SS remains
stable, whereas increasing the intensity of choice the steady state becomes un-
stable and a pitchfork bifurcation emerges. For very high values of the intensity
of choice the two unstable SS exhibit Hopf bifurcation. In presence of the in-
formation cost, when the intensity of choice is high, the fundamentalists can
not drive the trend followers out from the market. For this reason, persistent
deviation from the fundamental steady state can emerge. It should be noticed
that this result can also be found by replacing the fundamentalists with rational
agents. Hence, the model analyses the dynamic of the system with fundament-
alists and contrarians. As deﬁned in Section 1.2, the contrarian agents believe
that prices will reverse their trend in the next period.
Summarizing, BH98 studies an asset pricing model with heterogeneous agents
who update their expectations according to the past realized proﬁts. In this
heterogeneous framework, the dynamics exhibit persistent deviations from the
fundamental steady state with irregular and chaotic price ﬂuctuations when the
value of the intensity of choice is high. This case presents results in line with
the previous analysis with weaker contrarians. However, when the agents be-
come strong contrarians a two cycle period emerges. This happens also when
there is no informative cost for the fundamentalists. When costs are positive,
as the intensity of choice increases, the system presents a period doubling bi-
furcation. By further increasing the value of β, the stable two-cycle loses its
stability presenting a Hopf bifurcation. Evidence of these results can be found
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in Chiarella and He (2001), where wealth dynamics are incorporated into the
heterogeneous asset pricing model, allowing also variation of the extrapolation
parameter over time. This model is able to generate some well-known phenom-
ena of the ﬁnancial market, such as volatility clustering, skewness or the asset
price oscillations around a geometrically growing trend.
After the analyses of the competition between two diﬀerent belief types,
BH98 extends the dynamic evolution in a framework with three and four dif-
ferent expectations rules. The ﬁrst case considers fundamentalists and opposite
biased agents. Assuming positive and negative biases and no information costs
for the fundamental prediction, the adaptive belief system can be written as:
Rxt = nopt,t−1bopt + npes,t−1bpes,
nj,t =
exp
[
β
aσ2 (bj −Rxt−1) (xt −Rxt−1)
]
Zt−1
,
where Zt−1 =
H∑
h=1
eβUh,t−1 represents a normalization factor. Since the optimists
(bopt > 0) and the pessimists (bpes < 0) are symmetrically opposite, i.e. bopt =
−bpes, it can be proved that the fundamental steady state is stable for low value
of intensity of choice. However, as in the analysis concerning the two forecasting
rules, when the intensity of choice increases the system becomes unstable and
after a Hopf bifurcation the dynamics can be described by cycles around the
unstable steady state. In addition, even if the sophisticated rule is costless,
the fundamentalists can not drive out from the market the biased agents. The
same result is obtained using four types of rules of thumb. Indeed,BH98 consider
fundamentalist traders and three diﬀerent types of simple linear rules as follows:
f2,t = 1.1xt−1 + 0.2,
35
f3,t = 0.9xt−1 − 0.2,
f4,t = 1.21xt−1.
Types 2 and 3 are trend-followers with an upward and downward bias re-
spectively, whereas type 4 follows a strong trend chaser rule with one lag. As
before, the rise of the intensity of choice destabilizes the system dynamics and,
after a threshold, a strange attractor emerges. Chaos is characterized by switch-
ing between two phases, one closer to the stable fundamental steady state and
one described by an increasing price trend due to the fact that most of agents
are of Type 2.
According to the rules of thumb dominating the market, the model can dis-
play manifold bifurcations. For example, when trend chasers dominate, the
system presents a stable steady state plus two unstable steady states, one above
and one below the fundamental. If the dominant type is the contrarian agent, a
period doubling bifurcation arises, whereas when the main strategy is the oppos-
ite biased rule, this leads to a Hopf bifurcation with quasi-periodic ﬂuctuations
around an unstable steady state.
Concluding, it should be underlined that the irregular ﬂuctuations in as-
set prices are the consequence of a rational choice, they are the result of the
switching choice based upon the realized proﬁts, i.e. they are Rational Animal
Spirits.
Starting from this seminal paper, further interesting analyses have been de-
veloped in the last years. For example, Brock et al. (2005) develop an extension
of this framework considering many diﬀerent agent types. They introduce the
notion of large type limit (LTL). This is a type of ensemble limit that can
be obtained replacing sample moments by population moments. Brock et al.
(2005) prove that the large type limit describes the dynamics of a market with
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many expectations rules. This extension conﬁrms one of the main results of
the original paper: a bifurcation route to chaos occurs in an asset price with
many agent types when the agents become less risk adverse (the parameter a
decreases) or the intensity of choice β increases.
Boswijk et al. (2007) reformulate the asset pricing model in term to cash
ﬂows with the aim to estimate its performance on yearly S&P500 data. Ac-
cording to their estimations, agents believe that in the long run the dynamic
of prices is driven by fundamentals, however they interpret diﬀerently the de-
viations from the steady state in the short run. For example, when deviations
from the SS occur, a trend follower agent reacts in a diﬀerent way respect to a
fundamentalist. In other words, they ﬁnd signiﬁcant evidence for behavioural
heterogeneity. Hence, the model is able to explain the irrational exuberance in
the stock market in the late '90s. In those years the market was dominated by
optimistic and bounded rational agents motivated by short run proﬁtability, so
their high cash ﬂows expectations reinforced the rise in the stock market prices
inﬂating the dot-com bubble.
The evidence that heterogeneous bounded rational agents can reproduce the
ﬂuctuations of the asset prices seems also conﬁrmed by Hommes and in't Veld
(2015). They extend the analysis around two benchmark models: one with
constant risk premium, the dynamic Gordon model, and one with time-varying
risk premium, the Campbell-Cochrane model. Moreover, this paper introduces
agent's memory of realized excess return with the aim to make the switching
mechanism consistent with the frequency of the quarterly data.
Considering chartists and agents believing in mean-reversion of stock price
to its fundamental, the model is able to give better predictions than the homo-
geneous model in periods before both the dot-com bubble and the ﬁnancial
crisis. Furthermore, the predictions of dot-com crisis period seem to be com-
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patible with the available surveys, indeed agents were aware that the diﬀerence
between the stock prices and their fundamentals was too high. Hommes and
in't Veld suggest two interpretations on the price dynamics of the 2008 ﬁnan-
cial crisis. According to the Campbell-Cochrane model, it seems that the price
dynamic was in line during all the period so the 2008 crash could be explained
as an overreaction to the unexpected bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. On the
contrary, in the constant risk premium model the stock prices seem to have
overvalued the Gordon fundamental since 1995. Hence, the crash of 2008 could
be seen as a temporary correction and after that a new bubble started to inﬂate.
1.4 Experimental analyses
Usually, in the real world, we observe the agents' aggregate behaviours, while
it is harder to obtain information about the individual expectations. Neverthe-
less, there are at least two ways to collect data on the expectations process
creation of the individuals: the ﬁrst is by survey data, the second by performing
laboratory experiments.
As underlined by Duﬀy (2006) or Hommes (2013), experiments may be useful
as source of empirical regularities that can be used to calibrate the models.
Moreover, these regularities may be helpful to handle the problem of wilderness
of bounded rationality, i.e. what types of rules of thumb should be considered
in a model. In addition, data from human experiments can be used to check
the macro and microeconomics external validity of models.
This section analyses the results of experimental investigations in three
frameworks: cobweb models, heterogeneous new Keynesian models and asset
pricing models. It is important to underlined that expectations in the experi-
ments often do not have a direct and unambiguous relationship with the results.
So, in order to avoid jointly hypothesis testing, a literature of experimental ana-
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lysis designed to test only the expectations hypothesis has been growing in the
last years.
Hommes (2011) focuses on the so-called learning-to-forecast experiments (Lt-
FEs). In these types of investigation, the subjects are required to forecast the
level of a variable for a number of periods. At the beginning of each period, the
subjects receive some qualitative information about the market and then they
have to make the forecast. This is the only action required, indeed, in these
experiments forecasting decisions are separated from trading operations.
Hommes et al. (2007) investigate the expectation formation in a cobweb
model. The research questions investigate: 1) if agents are able to learn the
average RE steady state; 2) if expectations matter and may cause excess price
volatility; and 3) if price evolution has a foreseeable structure. In the experi-
mental environment, the subject is required to predict the next periods prices for
ﬁfty consecutive sessions. The subjects do not receive information about either
the underlying model or the distribution of the shocks, they only know the mar-
ket price bounds. The realized market price is function of the prediction of 6
participants with a small random shock. The whole experiment sample consists
of 108 participants. They form 18 markets divided over 3 diﬀerent treatments:
a stable, an unstable and a strongly unstable treatment. As in Section 1.2, the
realized price in the experiment is determined by the cobweb market equilibrium
that is:
D (pt) =
K∑
i=1
S (pet ) .
The authors assume a ﬁxed linear demand and a nonlinear supply func-
tion increasing in the expected price, pe, according to the proﬁt maximization
behaviour. Hence, the demand and the supply functions are respectively:
D (pt) = a− bpt + ηt,
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S (pet ) = tanh
[
λ
(
pei,t − 6
)]− 1,
where a, b, λ > 0 and η is a normally distributed demand random shock. The
parameter λ sets the non-linearity of the supply function and the stability of the
cobweb model. Accordingly, the three diﬀerent treatments depend on the value
of the parameter λ. It also aﬀects the stability of the market, higher is its value
more unstable becomes the system. Each λ implies a stationary experimental
environment with diﬀerent ﬁxed and constant RE steady states. Given the
previous equations on demand and supply and the individual forecasts by all
the subjects, the equilibrium price will be:
pt =
a−
k∑
i=1
S
(
pei,t
)
b
+
ηt
b
.
The experimental results are compared with the aggregate ﬂuctuations of
a benchmark cobweb model under some standard expectation rules: rational,
naive, adaptive expectations, learning by average and sample autocorrelation
learning.
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Figure 1: Time series of realized prices of the 18 groups, 6 groups for each
treatment: strongly unstable (left panel), unstable (middle panel) and stable
treatment (right panel).
As Figures 1 illustrates, the stable and the unstable treatments, right and
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central panels, present small ﬂuctuations close to the rational expectation bench-
mark or a decreasing ﬂuctuation amplitude over time. On the contrary, the
strongly unstable treatment, represented in the left panel, exhibits sharp ﬂuctu-
ations suggesting excess price volatility. Some interesting results are found by
testing the null hypothesis, i.e. the three treatments have the ﬁrst two moments
equal to the results under RE expectations. Firstly, in the stable treatment
presents the mean and the variance are in line with those of the RE analysis,
whereas the two unstable treatments have only the average of the sample com-
parable to the rational expectations ﬁrst moment. Secondly, the unstable and
the strongly unstable treatments exhibit statistically signiﬁcant excess volatility
even if the subjects are able to learn the correct price level. Thirdly, the exper-
iments perform non-signiﬁcant autocorrelation, therefore the prices evolutions
are not predictable. Concluding, given that the results of unstable and strongly
unstable treatments are diﬀerent from the rational expectations benchmark but
the price structure is not exploitable, the agents are not irrational, they are
bounded rational.
Moving to the asset pricing model, Hommes et al. (2005) investigate the
formation of expectations with the aim to classify individual forecasting rules.
In this environment, subjects are required to give their expectations on the
price of a risky asset in the next period. From the submitted forecast, a com-
puter program calculates the associated aggregated demand and consequently
the market equilibrium price. It should be noticed that one of the key feature of
the controlled environment is the possibility to keep the economic fundamentals
constant over time. At the beginning of the experiment, it is explained that
agents should act as advisor to a pension fund which can invest in risky or risk
free assets. The risk free asset has a rate of return R = 1 + r, whereas the risky
asset pays uncertain i.i.d. dividends around a given mean. The subjects do not
42
know either the true model underlying the market equilibrium or the fact that
the price depends on their own prediction and on the other agents' expectations.
However, they know that higher is their forecast, higher will be the demand for
stocks. The experiment environment consists of 60 subjects divided in 10 asset
markets/groups and a fraction of fundamentalist computerized traders acting as
a stabilizing force pushing prices towards the fundamental price and excluding
the raising of speculative bubbles.
In the experiment, the realized prices are generated using the standard the-
oretical asset pricing model, hence from equation (40):
pt =
1
1 + r
[
(1− nt) p¯et+1 + ntp∗ + y¯ + εt
]
,
where p¯et+1 =
1
6
6∑
h=1
peh,t+1 is the mean of predictions by the 6 participants.
The risk free return rate is equal to 5% and the fundamental price is p∗ = 60
(with y¯ = 3) in 7 groups, whereas for the other 3 groups the fundamental price
is p∗ = 40 (with y¯ = 2) .
Therefore, the asset price is determined as a weighted sum of the subjects'
average forecasts and the fundamental predictions of the robot traders with
an extra noise term. The weight of these fundamentalist computerized agents
is given by:
nt = 1− exp
(
− 1
200
| pt−1 − p∗ |
)
.
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Figure 2: Realized asset prices in the 10 groups of the experiment. The
horizontal lines represent the fundamental price levels.
The realized asset prices of the experiments represented in Figure 2 allow
to extrapolate three diﬀerent patterns: 2 groups show a monotonic convergence
from below to the fundamental value; 3 groups ﬂuctuate around the steady
state but the amplitude decreases over time, generating a convergence; 4 groups
present persistent oscillations around the steady state price.
From Figure 3, it is possible to draw an important conclusion comparing the
sample mean and the sample variance of the groups with the mean and variance
of theoretical examples. The expectations rules which give better descriptions
of the experimental results are not the unbounded rational but are the naive
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expectation and the AR(2) showing both excess volatility with under and over-
evaluation of the asset prices.
Figure 3: Sample mean and sample variance of 10 diﬀerent groups () and
3 benchmark rules ().
Furthermore, in a similar framework, Hommes et al. (2007) investigate the
individual expectations in each of the 10 markets. First of all, they ﬁnd a
coordination on a common strategy, as it is represented in Figure 4. It is in-
teresting to notice how the coordination is not on the fundamental value but
there is correlation among the subjects' mistakes. For this reason, it seems that
the agents' behaviour and the coordination within the market are self-fulﬁlling.
Secondly, even if the participants are not rational, the errors are unbiased and
without autocorrelation within two lags, also, the subjects' returns are high.
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This result supports the hypothesis that agents use simple rules of thumb when
their heuristics are enough successful.
Figure 4: Time series of the 6 individual predictions of the subjects.
In a more recent paper,23 the same authors analyse the expectations forma-
tion in an asset pricing experiment with a sample of 36 participants divided in
6 groups. The framework of the experiment diﬀers from the previous because
the model does not inhibit the rise of bubbles, i.e. there are not fundamental-
ist computer traders which push the forecasts toward the fundamental steady
state. As consequence, the laboratory experiments exhibit the endogenous rise
of speculative bubbles. The explanation of this price evolution can be found in
23Hommes et al. (2008)
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the positive feedback of the expectations. Indeed, when the subjects observe
a change in price, they try to extrapolate trends aﬀecting their predictions.
Due to the selfconﬁrming nature of the model, these predictions lead to the
rise of the actual price and so on. Even if the evolution of prices is far from
the rational predictions, it should be noticed that the bubbles do not present
a signiﬁcant autocorrelation structure, i.e. the market seems informationally
eﬃcient. Moreover, this analysis seems to conﬁrm the previous results on the
coordination among subjects. The participants make structural forecasting er-
rors and deviate from the rational prediction, however it seems that they follow
a common path in deviation from the fundamental value.
Heemeijer et al. (2009) ideally extend the previous investigations considering
positive and negative expectations feedback. Therefore, the pricing behaviours
are derived by an asset pricing model and by a cobweb model respectively. The
experiment environment consists of 13 markets, 6 with negative and 7 with pos-
itive feedback, with 6 participants each one. The ﬁrst interesting result is that
in the negative feedback model, after an initial phase of high volatility, all the
market prices quickly converge to the fundamental level. On the contrary, the
positive feedback experiments reproduce ﬂuctuations around the equilibrium
price and do not exhibit convergence to the fundamental level. Nevertheless,
both models exhibit little dispersion between subjects' forecasts within experi-
mental markets. Hence, in the positive feedback frame there is consensus on the
future price that, however, it is not the fundamental price. After the analysis of
these aggregate market behaviours, the authors estimate the single individual
forecasting rule in the two frameworks. In the asset pricing model, it seems
that the trend following strategies are more important. The participants base
their forecast on a weighted average of the last price and the last prediction,
then extrapolate the trend without considering the fundamental value. They
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could be labelled as naive and adaptive learning followers. Diﬀerently, when the
feedback is negative some subjects behave as contrarians and the predictions
are a weighted average between the last observed price and the equilibrium
price. In this case the expectations of the participants may be described as
adaptive-average price expectations.
Moving to the macroeconomic framework, it is diﬃcult to test the expecta-
tion hypothesis empirically. Branch (2004) develops a model with agents who
forecast one-year ahead inﬂation rate choosing among a sample of forecasting
rules. These rules are: naive, adaptive expectation and VAR forecast. The
proportion of agents selecting a rule depends on the mean squared error (MSE)
and on a ﬁxed cost for the predictor. Hence, the author infers empirically the
heuristics testing the ARED approach using survey data. These data are taken
from the Michigan Survey of the Survey Research Center of the University of
Michigan and consist in households forecasts on price levels.
When maximum likelihood is used to investigate a new choice mechanism,
agents dynamically switch among heuristics and the portion of those using a
forecasting rule is inversely related with its MSE. So, two other interesting
empirical insights should be pointed out. Firstly, the Michigan data seem to
suggest that the expectations formation is not based on a rational choice among
the alternatives, but rather there is a positive predisposition to one prediction
rule over another. Secondly, it seems that there is a kind of stickiness in the
mechanism. More precisely, the forecast error has to cross a threshold to induce
the agents to change their forecast rule. This result is in line with the status
quo-eﬀect analysed in economic psychology.24
Considering another empirical application of the ABS frame, Bolt et al.
(2014) use an OECD housing data set to search evidence on the heterogeneous
expectations in a standard housing market model. The aim of their paper is
24See for example Kahneman et al. (1991).
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to develop a theoretical model with endogenous switching between two diﬀer-
ent heuristics. They try to estimate the model using data on rents and house
prices from 8 countries (United States, Japan, United Kingdom, the Nether-
lands, Switzerland, Spain, Sweden and Belgium). These countries have been
selected because 1) they have recently experienced a housing bubble, 2) they
are quite at the peak of a bubble or 3) they are in a house-price corrective
regime.
The switching mechanism between a mean-reverting and a mean-diverting
rule inserted in the model displays booms and bursts in the prices evolution
around the fundamental level. These dynamics are triggered by stochastic
shocks and ampliﬁed by the self-fulﬁlling nature of the expectations. All the
countries show a house price bubble driven and intensiﬁed by the trend extra-
polation. It seems that when the housing bubble burst, the agents ampliﬁed
the downward price correction switching to the fundamental-reverting forecast
strategy. Moreover, the model gives a few policy suggestions. For example,
decreasing the mortgage interest rate or rising the housing rents may lead the
system closer to instability. On the contrary, stabilizing policies include an
increase in the tax rate for home owners or a reduction in the mortgage tax
deduction rates. Policy makers should use the market sentiment as a warning
indicator on the evolution of the system to prevent bubbles and bursts.
Switching now to laboratory experiments in the macroeconomics framework,
Assenza et al. (2013) study the formation of expectations and their interaction
with diﬀerent monetary policies. The theoretical model underlying is the stand-
ard New Keynesian model. Hence, the main equations of the model are:
yt = y¯
e
t+1 − ϕ
(
it − p¯iet+1
)
+ gt,
pit = λyt + ρp¯i
e
t+1 + ut,
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it = φpi (pit − p¯i) + p¯i,
where x¯et+1 =
1
H
H∑
i=1
x¯ei,t+1 is the average of the participants' predictions.
The authors run experiments using 3 diﬀerent treatments. In the ﬁrst and
second ones the output gap expectations are ﬁxed and set as fundamentalist
and naive respectively, so the agents have to forecast only the inﬂation level.
Conversely, in the third analysis there are 2 groups of subjects and each one
forecasts one variable.
At this point, an experimental session is ran twice for each treatment. The
aim of these repetitions is to investigate the stabilization properties with two dif-
ferent monetary policies, weak (φpi = 1) and aggressive (φpi = 1.5). The agents
entitled to forecast only the inﬂation level are divided into 6 groups of 6 sub-
jects: 3 groups for each policy. The third treatment consists only of 4 groups:
2 for each policy.
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Figure 5: Time series of Treatment 1: Treatment 1a is the weak monetary
policy case, Treatment 1b the aggressive monetary policy. The thick lines in
the plots represent the realized variables, the thin lines the individual forecasts
for the two variables.
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Figure 5 illustrates that the ﬁrst treatment exhibits convergence to a non-
fundamental steady state for 2 over 3 groups when the policy is weak, whereas
the aggressive monetary policy is able to reach the inﬂation target in 2 over 3
groups.
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Figure 6: Time series of Treatment 2; Treatment 2a is the weak monetary
policy, Treatment 2b is the aggressive monetary policy. The thick lines represent
the realized variables and the thin lines the individual predictions.
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Figure 6 shows how, in case of weak monetary policy, 3 diﬀerent patterns
emerge under the assumption of naive expectations for output gap. The ﬁrst
group exhibits convergence to a non-fundamental steady state. The second one
performs an increasing oscillatory path with high convergence of the forecasts.
The third group has a more unstable behaviour with an initial oscillation fol-
lowed by a drop to the zero lower bound. On the contrary, the evolution of the
groups subject to aggressive policy is quite similar to the previous case, in 2
over 3 samples the experiment converges to the steady state level.
Figure 7: Time series of Treatment 3: Treatment 3a is the weak monet-
ary policy case, Treatment 3b the aggressive monetary policy. The thick lines
represent the realized variables and the thin lines the individual predictions.
When the policy is weak and the realized inﬂation and output gap de-
pend both on individual forecasts (Figure 7), there is convergence to a non-
fundamental steady state. On the contrary, when the policy is aggressive, after
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initial ﬂuctuations the price path converges to the fundamental level in both
groups. Summarizing, it seems that a central bank which implements a strong
monetary policy can lead the economy to the target results in all the treatments.
After the analysis of the aggregate behaviour, the authors characterize the
individual forecasting. First of all, they ﬁnd a persistent heterogeneity in the
forecasting rules used by the participants. In addition, the learning process of
the subjects consists in the switch from one heuristic to another. Having found
empirical evidence for heterogeneous expectations and switching processes, As-
senza et al. (2013) introduce four diﬀerent rules of thumb and a discrete choice
mechanism with asynchronous updating in order to simulate the experimental
data.
The four heuristics are:
adaptive rule : xe1,t+1 = 0.65xt−1 + 0.35x
e
1,t,
weak trend− following rule : xe2,t+1 = xt−1 + 0.4 (xt−1 − xt−2) ,
strong trend− following rule : xe3,t+1 = xt−1 + 1.3 (xt−1 − xt−2) ,
anchoring and adjustment rule : xe4,t+1 = 0.5
(
xavt−1 − xt−1
)
+ (xt−1 − xt−2) .
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Figure 8: Experimental data (blue points) and one-period ahead simulations
(red lines).
The paper proceeds with the empirical validation of the model. As Figure
8 shows, the one-period ahead simulation results ﬁt quite well in the experi-
mental data. So, it seems that subjects tend to base their prediction on past
observations by following simple heuristics. The learning process undertaken
by participants is simply reduced to switching from one rule to another. It is
interesting to notice how in the same economy there can be coordination on
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diﬀerent heuristics for both the output and the inﬂation levels. Agents may be-
have in a naive way when forecasting inﬂation but they may follow the adaptive
rule in the output prediction. Moreover, the forecasting and the out-of-sample
forecasting performances of the model have been evaluated ﬁnding that this
frame outperforms models with homogeneous expectations, both rational and
heuristic. Concluding, this paper evidences empirically the relevance of consid-
ering the heterogeneous expectations together with bounded rationality in the
macroeconomic modelling.
1.5 Final Remarks
This review presented the general theoretical framework of the Adaptive Be-
lief System showing how it may be used to investigate diﬀerent research ques-
tions. The Hommes's notion of ABS describes a framework where heterogen-
eous agents switch among expectations rules according to some ﬁtness measures
determining the evolution of the actual variables. The switching process in-
troduces in the model non-linear interactions and creates room for sensitive
dependence on initial condition. The dynamics generated by this approach are
highly non-linear systems and can produce a wide range of behaviours according
to the dominant heuristic: from simple convergence to a steady stable to very
irregular and unpredictable ﬂuctuations.
Markets are described as complex adaptive systems, so prices, volumes and
the expectations population co-evolve over time. Within the ABS approach, the
problem of the wilderness of bounded rationality is disciplined by parsimony
and simplicity of strategies and their relative performance but a problem may
persist. Indeed, this approach maintains too many degrees of freedom and too
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many parameters in the model which can make diﬃcult to assess the main causes
of the observed results at the aggregate level. For this reason there is the need
for empirical works aimed to reduce the parametrization problem by estimating
the economic and ﬁnancial parameters as well as the rule of thumbs.
Unfortunately, although this literature is still growing, this is mainly com-
putational and theoretically oriented, hence there should be a further, and fun-
damental, eﬀort to estimate economic and ﬁnancial data using survey and ex-
perimental evidence. Firstly, laboratory analyses give empirical validation to
the importance of heterogeneity in the theory of expectations and in the evolu-
tion of the economic system. Indeed, heterogeneity allows to explain the path
dependence and the complex evolution. It can illustrate diﬀerent aggregate
outcomes across diﬀerent market settings. Moreover, the empirical results pro-
duced by heterogeneous agents models can validate the theoretical frameworks.
Conversely, the estimates can be substituted as parameters in the theoretical
models in order to have outcomes empirically validated from the bottom.
In the last years, the literature has investigated also some interesting the-
oretical extensions of the ABS, as the structural heterogeneity in the learning
process, i.e. the possibility that diﬀerent agents use diﬀerent algorithms. For
example, Honkapohja and Mitra (2006) study an overlapping generation model
focusing attention on econometric learning with inﬁnite memory. Another inter-
esting extension is proposed by Anufriev, Hommes and Makarewicz (2015) who
investigate the generating expectations process using a Genetic Algorithm (GA)
optimization procedure derived by biology. Through the genetic algorithm the
authors do not have to specify the heuristics because these are the results of
a simple optimization process of the agent. Hence, the wilderness problem is
regulated by the algorithm. Therefore, the results of the GA approach can be
used to design and validate simple heuristic switching models.
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Concluding, the Adaptive Belief System seems to be useful to describe a wide
range of economic problems. Its performance is in many cases even better than
the one of the standard homogeneous and fully rational approach. The main
persisting problem is the extreme freedom given by heuristics, thus, further re-
search should try to ﬁnd the simplest behavioural heterogeneous hypotheses able
to reproduce the observed stylized facts. The eﬀort to discipline the wilderness
of this approach may be done by searching empirical validations in laboratory
experiments and/or in survey data series.
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Chapter 2
The complex eﬀect of bankruptcy in a
ﬁnancial accelerator framework
Davide Bazzana
Lombardy Advanced School of Economic Research (LASER)
2.1 Introduction
The Bernanke Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) model is a Dynamic Stochastic new
Keynesian model incorporating credit-market imperfections (the ﬁnancial ac-
celerator1) which can amplify both real and nominal shocks to the economy.
This ﬁnancial accelerator is rooted in the link between the external ﬁnance
premium (the diﬀerence between the cost of external and internal founds) and
the net worth of the borrower.
Starting from the analysis of the ﬁnancial accelerator framework, this paper
will focus the investigation on the eﬀects of bankruptcy in the credit market.
1Other models of ﬁnancial accelerator are for example Bernanke and Gertler (1989,1990).
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Representative-Agent macroeconomic models with ﬁnancial frictions2 take into
account the probability of default, however actual bankruptcies never occur
in these models otherwise, by assumption, the entire corporate sector would
collapse. Indeed, the representative agent assumption makes it impossible to
distinguish between ﬁnancially fragile and ﬁnancially robust agents. The het-
erogeneity of ﬁnancial conditions is a key to introduce actual bankruptcy in
macroeconomic models and to explain the eﬀects of default both on aggreg-
ate demand and on aggregate supply. For this reason, in this paper, the credit
market relationships will be described using the Agent Based (AB henceforward)
approach.3
More precisely, this paper will investigate the indirect eﬀects of bankruptcies
on the ﬁnancial intermediaries' balance sheet showing how changes in the net
worth of the lender can amplify and propagate ﬂuctuations to the whole system.
Hence, with the goal to consider these delinquencies' eﬀects on the ﬁnancial in-
termediary's behaviour, the paper will explicitly model the share of bankrupt
agents who leave the market introducing some real consequences on the lender-
borrower relationship. Summarizing, the ﬁnal purposes of this paper are to
investigate: the real eﬀect of bankruptcy on the system ﬂuctuations, the cor-
porate sector and the ﬁnancial intermediary net worth; the propagation and
persistence of unexpected shocks in a model with actual bankruptcies.
The paper can be ideally divided in two main parts: the next two sections
describe the ﬁnancial accelerator model and its possible weaknesses, whereas the
last two sections introduce an Agent Based ﬁnancial accelerator and perform
some simulations.
In the second section, I will summarize the main non-standard contribu-
tions of the Bernanke Gertler and Gilchrist (BGG henceforward) model. In the
2For example see Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Christiano et al. (2010) or Gertler and
Karadi (2011).
3For a thorough analysis on this approach see Delli Gatti et al. (2011).
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third section, I will look at the two main problems which do not seem properly
solved by BGG model. The ﬁrst shortcoming is the exogeneity of the share
of entrepreneurs going bankrupt and leaving the market. The second weak-
ness is that banks are always willing to lend to entrepreneurs even if they have
gone bankrupt. These two aspects are closely linked to the representative agent
assumption. More precisely, given that banks are able to perfectly diversify
the risk, they are always willing to lend, also to entrepreneurs who have gone
bankrupt in the past. Moreover, the model assumes that these individuals are
risk-neutral and have ﬁnite horizons. Each entrepreneur must have a constant
probability of surviving to the next period for two diﬀerent reasons, ﬁrst of all
to preclude the possibility that the entrepreneurial sector will ultimately accu-
mulate enough wealth to be fully self-ﬁnanced, secondly because in this way the
authors are able to explain the ﬁnancial accelerator. In the fourth section, I
will present an agent based variant of the BGG model with the aim to ﬁnd a
signiﬁcant role for bankruptcy clarifying its role on credit network relationships.
With the new speciﬁcation, I investigate the face-to-face relationship between
the ﬁnancial intermediary and each single entrepreneur. The AB approach al-
lows to consider explicitly the bankruptcy adding in the ﬁnancial contract a
premium to the risk-free rate. This premium is equivalent to the diﬀerence
between the amount received when the default occurs and the expected return
on loan. Hence, this paper ﬁts in the reference literature4 investigating both
the direct bank-ﬁrm credit relationship and the indirect eﬀect of defaults on the
ﬁnancial intermediary network.
The aim of this part of the paper is to model the ﬁnite debt possibilities,
i.e. the scenario in which after some episodes of default the ﬁnancial intermedi-
ary shrinks his credit supply. Indeed, consequently to some borrower defaults,
the bank suﬀers some losses due to the default of the borrower, for the same
4See for example Delli Gatti et al. (2010), Battiston et al. (2012) or Vitali et al. (2015).
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reason the entrepreneur's net worth decreases. Hence, the probability that the
entrepreneur will be able to repay a more expensive contract debt, due to the
willingness of the bank to cover losses, decreases growing the number of past
defaults. This evolution brings the probability of repayment to zero and to a
stage in which the ﬁnancial intermediary is no more willing to lend. Through
this mechanism the model should be able to endogenise the share of entrepren-
eurs that exit from business. Moreover, considering heterogeneous ﬁrms, I am
able to show the consequences of the defaults of some ﬁrms on the balance
sheet and on the credit policy of the bank. The ﬁfth section proposes some sim-
ulations of the system with three diﬀerent bounded rational expectation rules
with the aim to illustrate how bankruptcy aﬀects the business cycle dynamics
of the system and to perform some policy evaluations. The last part (Section
6) concludes suggesting possible future extensions.
2.2 The Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist Model
The BGG framework is quite standard according to the related DSGE literat-
ure. There are ﬁve types of agents (households, entrepreneurs, capital goods
producers, ﬁnancial intermediary and retailers) and the public sector (the cent-
ral bank and the government) which implements monetary and ﬁscal policies.
Households work, consume and save over an inﬁnite time horizon. Moreover,
they can hold money or ﬁnancial assets which pay interest. Entrepreneurs are
the core agent of the model. At the beginning of each period the entrepreneur
has a net worth. With this worth entrepreneurs purchase physical capital from
capital goods producers ﬁnancing the diﬀerence through loans from the bank.
The accumulated net worth plays an important role because it aﬀects the cost
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of external ﬁnance and the agency problem. Indeed, there is a conﬂict between
the interests of the lender and the borrower. The ﬁnancial contract is set from
the bank in order to minimize the expected agency cost. Entrepreneurs combine
physical capital with labour in order to produce wholesale output in the follow-
ing period. The retailers buy wholesale output from entrepreneurs and re-sell
the good to households setting in a monopolistic competition. This introduces
nominal stickiness in prices in the economy.
2.2.1 The demand for capital and the ﬁnancial contract
At the end of period t the entrepreneur who manages the j-th ﬁrm buys capital
to be used in t+1, Kjt+1. The price of capital is denoted by Qt. By assumption
capital is homogeneous. Therefore, the ﬁnancial constraints apply to the whole
capital of the ﬁrm and not just to investment.
The entrepreneur purchases capital goods QtK
j
t+1using the available net
worth N jt+1 and bank loans B
j
t+1:
Bjt+1 = QtK
j
t+1 −N jt+1. (2.1)
Bank loans are extended by a ﬁnancial intermediary (henceforward a bank)
who faces an opportunity cost equal to the risk free gross rate, Rt+1. Entre-
preneurs are risk neutral and households are risk averse, so the entrepreneur
absorbs any risk. In order to motivate a non-trivial ﬁnancial structure, BGG
assume a costly state veriﬁcation (CSV) framework as Townsend (1979) in
which lenders pay an auditing or monitoring cost in order to observe the realiz-
ation of the entrepreneurial return. This monitoring cost can be interpreted as
a cost of bankruptcy.
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The return on invested capital is subject to aggregate and idiosyncratic
risks. The individual (ﬁrm-speciﬁc) return to capital is ωjRkt+1, where R
k
t+1
is the average gross return (uniform across ﬁrms) and ωj is the idiosyncratic
risk, a stochastic variable, i.i.d. across time and ﬁrms, with a continuous and
one-diﬀerentiable c.d.f. F (ω) over a non-negative support and E(ωj) = 1.
Given the choices of the entrepreneur on Kjt+1, B
j
t+1 and given the aggregate
return on capital Rkt+1, the optimal contract is characterized by a non-default
ﬁrm-speciﬁc interest rate, Zjt+1, and by a threshold value of the idiosyncratic
shock, ω¯t+1 such that the borrower is able to fulﬁl her repayment.
ω¯t+1R
k
t+1QtK
j
t+1 = Z
j
t+1B
j
t+1. (2.2)
If ωjt+1 ≥ ω¯t+1 the lender obtains Zjt+1Bjt+1 and the borrower gets ωjt+1Rkt+1QtKjt+1−
Zjt+1B
j
t+1 ≥ 0, whereas if ωjt+1 < ω¯t+1 the borrower cannot validate the debt
commitment and declares default. In this case the bank pays the auditing cost
obtaining (1 − µ)ωjt+1Rkt+1QtKjt+1, where µ is the fraction of the return on
capital spent monitoring the borrower.5
The lender should receive an expected return on lending at least equal to the
opportunity cost of lending his funds. Therefore, his participation constraint is
[1− F (ω¯t+1)]Zjt+1Bjt+1+(1− µ)
ω¯t+1ˆ
0
ωjt+1f(ω
j
t+1)dω
j
t+1R
k
t+1QtK
j
t+1 ≥ Rt+1(QtKjt+1−N jt+1),
(2.3)
5
Monitoring cost occurs only when the borrower defaults but with probability one (i.e. with
certainty). In Bernanke and Gertler (1989) monitoring was stochastic: the ﬁnancial interme-
diaries would audit only when the entrepreneur declared default but with a probability lower
than one.
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where F (ω¯t) =
´ ω¯t+1
0
ωjt+1f(ω
j
t+1)dω
j
t+1 is the bankruptcy probability and
(1− µ) ´ ω¯t+1
0
ωjt+1dF (ω
j
t+1)R
k
t+1QtK
j
t+1 is the expected return for the lender
if the borrower defaults. The LHS of inequality (3) is the total expected return
on lending while the RHS is the total opportunity cost of lending Bjt+1.
Combining equations (2.1), (2.2) and (2.3), through simple algebra, the par-
ticipation constraint can be expressed as follows:
[1− F (ω¯t+1)] ω¯t+1 + (1− µ)
ω¯t+1ˆ
0
ωjt+1f(ω
j
t+1)dω
j
t+1
Rkt+1QtKjt+1 ≥ Rt+1(QtKjt+1−N jt+1).
(2.4)
The expression in brackets is the expected return on lending per unit of
capital, i.e. the fraction of proﬁts that the ﬁrm gives to the lender per unit of
capital (the fraction of the rate of proﬁt going to the lender). An increase in
the cutoﬀ value has three eﬀects on the expected return: (i) the non-default
payoﬀ ω¯t+1R
k
t+1QtK
j
t+1 will increase; at he same time (ii) the probability of de-
fault rises reducing the expected payoﬀ; (iii) the expected return for the lender if
the borrower defaults (1−µ) ´ ω¯t+1
0
ωjt+1f(ω
j
t+1)dω
j
t+1R
k
t+1QtK
j
t+1 also increases.
Eﬀects (i) and (iii) imply an increase of the expected return while eﬀect (ii) im-
plies a reduction. Deﬁning the expressions Γ(ω¯t+1) ≡
´ ω¯t+1
0
ωjt+1f(ω
j
t+1)dω
j
t+1 +
ω¯t+1
´∞
ω¯t+1
f(ωjt+1)dω
j
t+1 the expected gross share of proﬁts going to the lender
and µG(ω¯j) ≡ µ ´ ω¯t
0
ωjt f(ω
j
t )dω
j
t the expected monitoring costs, thence the in-
equality (2.4) can be rewritten as:
[Γ(ω¯t+1)− µG(ω¯t+1)]Rkt+1QtKjt+1 = Rt+1(QtKjt+1 −N jt+1). (2.5)
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2.2.2 The optimal choice of capital
The optimal debt contract is deﬁned by the following optimization problem
max [1− Γ(ω¯t+1)]Rkt+1QtKjt+1,
subject to [Γ(ω¯t+1)− µG(ω¯t+1)]Rkt+1QtKjt+1 ≥ Rt+1(QtKjt+1 −N jt+1).
BGG assume: Rkt+1(1 − µ) < Rt+1 in order to avoid unbounded proﬁts
for ﬁrms (being h(ω¯) = f(ω¯)1−F (ω¯) the hazard rate) and that ω¯h(ω¯) is increasing
in ω¯. All this has two implications: ﬁrst of all the net payoﬀ to the lender
reaches a maximum at a certain level ω¯∗, secondly there is the guarantee of a
non-rationing outcome.
Deﬁning the premium on external funds st+1 = R
k
t+1/Rt+1 and rewriting
kt+1 = QtKt+1/Nt+1 (the capital/wealth ratio) as a choice variable and remov-
ing the time pedix and the j suﬃx for the sake of simplicity, the problem can
be rewritten as:
max
ω¯,k
[1− Γ(ω¯)] sk,
subject to [Γ(ω¯)− µG(ω¯)] sk ≥ (k − 1).
The ﬁrst order conditions to this problem can be written as:
ω¯ :→ Γ′(ω¯)− λ [Γ′(ω¯)− µG′(ω¯)] = 0,
k :→ [(1− Γ(ω¯)) + λ (Γ(ω¯)− µG(ω¯))] s− λ = 0,
λ :→ [Γ(ω¯)− µG(ω¯)] sk − (k − 1) = 0, where λ is the Lagrange multiplier.
Assuming an interior solution ω¯ ≤ ω¯∗; from the ﬁrst F.O.C., the Lagrange
multiplier can be written as a function of ω¯:
λ(ω¯) =
Γ′(ω¯)
[Γ′(ω¯)− µG′(ω¯)] .
The participation constraint is binding, so that
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λ′(ω¯) =
µ [Γ′(ω¯)G′′(ω¯)− Γ′′(ω¯)G′(ω¯]
[Γ′(ω¯)− µG′(ω¯)]2 > 0,
this is due to the assumption that ω¯h(ω¯) is increasing.
Now deﬁning ρ(ω¯) = λ(ω¯)[(1−Γ(ω¯))+λ(Γ(ω¯)−µG(ω¯))] , from the F.O.C. we infer that
the cutoﬀ ω¯ satisﬁes
s = ρ(ω¯), (2.6)
where ρ(ω¯) is the wedge between the expected rate of return on capital and
the safe return demanded by the ﬁnancial intermediaries. Equation (2.6) shows
the monotonically increasing relationship between default probabilities and the
premium on external funds.
Inverting (2.6), we obtain the relationship ω = ω(s), where ω¯′(s) > 0. So
the cutoﬀ value is increasing with the wedge between expected rate of return
on capital and the risk-free interest rate.
Now deﬁning Ψ(ω¯) ≡ 1 + λ(Γ(ω¯)−µG(ω¯))1−Γ(ω¯) , given the cutoﬀ ω¯ ∈ (0, ω¯∗), the
F.O.C. imply a capital/wealth ratio:
k = Ψ(ω¯). (2.7)
Combining equations (2.6) and (2.7), the authors establish a relationship
between capital expenditure and entrepreneur's ﬁnancial conditions. The cap-
ital/wealth ratio may be express as the increasing function of the premium on
external funds k = Ψ(ω¯(s)) and given that k = QKN , I can rewrite:
QtK
j
t+1 = ψ(st+1)N
j
t+1, (2.8)
where ψ′(·) > 0 and ψ(1) = 1.
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Capital expenditure is proportional to the entrepreneur's net worth, with
a proportionality factor which is increasing in the expected discounted rate of
return. Consequently the higher is the wedge between expected return on capital
and risk free rate, the higher is the capability of the ﬁrm to borrow from the
ﬁnancial intermediary. The entrepreneur is constrained from raising indeﬁnitely
the size of her ﬁrm by the fact that increasing the amount of capital borrowed,
she also increases the expected default costs. Indeed for non-fully self-ﬁnanced
entrepreneur, the return on capital will be equal to the marginal cost of external
ﬁnance in equilibrium.
2.2.3 General Equilibrium
At this point, BGG incorporate the contracting problem within a dynamic gen-
eral equilibrium framework. The capital purchased by the entrepreneur is com-
bined with labour in order to produce wholesale output through the following
Cobb-Douglas production function
Yt = AtK
α
t L
(1−α)
t , (2.9)
where Yt represents the aggregate production in period t, Kt is the aggregate
amount of capital purchased by all the entrepreneurs, Lt is the labour input
and A is an exogenous technology parameter. The evolution of capital is
Kt+1 = Φ
(
It
Kt
)
Kt + (1− δ)Kt, (2.10)
where δ is the depreciation rate of capital, It is the aggregate investment ex-
penditure which yields a gross output of new capital goods Φ
(
It
Kt
)
Kt. By
assumption Φ(·) is increasing and concave and Φ(0) = 0. Assuming competitive
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capital producing ﬁrms, the cost of capital Qt in term of the numeraire good
will be
Qt =
[
φ′
(
It
Kt
)]−1
. (2.11)
Given that entrepreneurs sell their output to retailers who have market
power, the relative price of wholesale goods will be 1/Xt where Xt =
Pt
Pwt
is
the gross markup of retail goods over wholesale goods. Consequently, the ex-
pected rate of return of capital between two periods can be written as
E
{
Rkt+1
}
= E
{
1
Xt
αYt+1
Kt+1
+Qt+1(1− δ)
Qt
}
, (2.12)
where the ﬁrst term in brackets is the rent paid to one unit of capital and the
second is the capital gain due to the fact that entrepreneurs resell underpreciated
capital to the capital producing ﬁrms. Through simple substitutions of (2.9) and
(2.11) into (2.12) the authors ﬁnd the conventional demand curve for new capital
where the return on capital depends inversely on the level of investment:
E
{
Rkt+1
}
= E

Pwt
Pt
αAt+1L
(1−α)
t+1
K1−αt+1
+ (1− δ)
[
Φ′
(
It+1
Kt+1
)]
[
Φ′
(
It
Kt
)]
 .
Taking the mean of both sides of (2.8), which expresses the link between
expenditure and net worth of the single entrepreneur, it is possible to obtain the
supply curve of investment ﬁnance. This shows the dependence of the external
cost of funds with the aggregate ﬁnancial condition of the entrepreneurs of the
whole economy. From equation (2.8) it can be written QtKt+1Nt+1 = ψ(st) and
st = ψ
−1
(
QtKt+1
Nt+1
)
, therefore
E
{
Rkt+1
}
= s
(
Nt+1
QtKt+1
)
Rt+1 s
′(·) < 0, (2.13)
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where s(·) is the ratio of the costs of external and internal ﬁnance and it is
decreasing in N t+1/QtKt+1, i.e. it depends inversely on the share of the ﬁrm's
invested capital that is ﬁnanced by the net worth of the entrepreneur.
Besides purchased capital, technology requires labour as an input. The total
labour supply of the economy is composed of households and entrepreneurial
labour (Ht and H
e
t respectively).
Lt = H
Ω
t (H
e
t )
1−Ω.
The demand curves for labour in a competitive market imply that the real
wage equates marginal product, therefore it will be
(a) (1− α)Ω YtHt = XtWt,
(b) (1−α)(1−Ω) YtHet = XtW
e
t , where Wt and W
e
t are the real wage rate
for the household and the entrepreneur respectively.
The evolution of the aggregate entrepreneurial net worth Nt+1 is described
by the following law of motion:
Nt+1 = γVt +W
e
t , (2.14)
where Vt represents the equity held by entrepreneurs and γ is the fraction of
entrepreneurs which survives in each period. Hence γVt is the net worth of
entrepreneurs still in business in the following period. This equity is the residual
part of the return of the investment after the repayment of the loans to the
ﬁnancial intermediaries.
Vt = R
k
tQt−1Kt −
(
Rt +
µ
´ ω¯t
0
ωjtdF (ω
j
t )R
k
tQt−1Kt
Qt−1Kt −Nt
)
(Qt−1Kt −Nt), (2.15)
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where the term
µ
´ ω¯t
0 ω
j
tdF (ω
j
t )R
k
t+1QtKt+1
QtKt+1−Nt+1 reﬂects the premium for external ﬁnance
and ω¯t the state-contingent value of ω¯ set in period t.
2.2.4 Households, government sector and retailers
In order to close the model, in this section will be brieﬂy described the household
optimization problem, the retail sector and the government budget constraint.
Households have an inﬁnite horizon, they work, consume, hold money and
invest their savings in ﬁnancial assets which pay the risk free interest rate. The
household maximization problem is therefore:
max
Ct,
Mt
Pt
,Ht,Dt+1
Et
∞∑
k=0
βk
[
ln (Ct+k) + ζln
(
Mt+k
Pt+k
)
+ ξln (1−Ht+k)
]
,
s.t. Ct = WtHt − Tt + Πt + RtDt −Dt+1 + (Mt−1−Mt)Pt , where Ct is the
consumption of the households, Wt is the household wage, Ht is the supply of
labour, T t are lump sum taxes, Πt are the dividends of the retail ﬁrms, Dt are
the deposits held at banks and MtPt is the real money balances between periods.
From the ﬁrst order conditions, the following equations can be derived:
1
Ct
= Et
{
β
1
Ct+1
}
Rt+1,
Wt
Ct
= ξ
1
1−Ht ,
Mt
Pt
= ζCt
(
Rnt+1
Rnt+1 − 1
)
,
where it+1 = R
n
t+1
Pt+1
Pt
− 1 with Rnt+1 the gross nominal interest rate.
Moving to the government budget constraint, the basic assumption is that
its expenditures are ﬁnanced by lump sum taxes and money creation, therefore,
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the government budget will be Gt = Tt +
(Mt−1−Mt)
Pt
.
The retail sector is characterized by monopolist competition and costs ad-
justing nominal prices à la Calvo (1983). Each nth retailer sells the quantity of
output Y t(n) at the nominal price P t(n). The total ﬁnal goods and their price
are therefore the combination of the individual retailer sales:
Y ft =
[ˆ 1
0
Yt(n)
(−1)/dn
]/(−1)
, (2.16)
with  > 1 and Pt =
[´ 1
0
Pt(n)
(1−)dn
]1/(1−)
.
To introduce stickiness in the prices, in each period a share of ﬁrms faces
the probability (1− θ) of being able to reoptimise its price. In every phase a
retailer faces a demand curve:
Yt(n) =
(
Pt(z)
Pt
)−
Y ft , (2.17)
therefore denoting with: P ∗t the price set by retailers able to reoptimise and
Y ∗t (z) the consequent demand given this price, the n-Th retailer sets the price
in order to maximize his expected discount proﬁts:
∞∑
k=0
θkEt−1
{
Λt,k
(
P ∗t
Pt
)−
Y ∗t (n)
[
P ∗t
Pt
−
(

− 1
)
Pwt+k
Pt+k
]}
. (2.18)
In Equation (2.18) Λt,k = βCt/Ct+k represents the discount rate equal to
the shareholders intertemporal marginal rate of substitution, Pwt = Pt/Xt is
the nominal price of the wholesale goods and θk is the probability that the price
is ﬁxed for k periods.
Given that the share θ of retailers is not able to reoptimise in period t, the
evolution of the price will be:
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Pt =
[
θP 1−t−1 + (1− θ) (P ∗t )1−
]1/(1−)
. (2.19)
Finally, according to the standard literature,6 the model is closed considering
the short-term nominal interest rate as the main instrument of the monetary
policy. The central bank adjusts the nominal interest rate according to the
following Taylor Rule:
rnt = ρr
n
t−1 + τpit−1 + ε
n
t ,
therefore the monetary authority reacts to the lagged inﬂation and the lagged
interest rate.
For the sake of ﬂuency and given that it is not central for the development
of the following sections, the complete standard log-linearized model will be
presented in Appendix A.
2.3 Shortcomings of the model
The two main ingredients of the ﬁnancial accelerator model are the equations of
the investment funds supply, Equation (2.13), and the law of motion of aggregate
entrepreneurial net worth, Equation (2.14).
It may be useful to recall them for the reader's convenience:
E
{
Rkt+1
}
= s
(
Njt+1
QtK
j
t+1
)
Rt+1,
N jt+1 = γV
j
t +W
e
t .
Bankruptcy is an important ingredient of the ﬁnancial accelerator story as
6 See for example Clarida et al. (2000) or Galì (2008).
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it motivates the ﬁnancial contract. In the BGG model, however, there is no
explicit modelling of the share of entrepreneurs who goes bankrupt and leaves
the market. Moreover, delinquency, i.e. the self-fulﬁlment of debt repayment,
has no direct impact on the relationship between lender and borrower. Indeed, in
the model, ﬁnancial intermediaries are always willing to supply loans regardless
of the history of debt repayment of the borrower. Even if the entrepreneur
defaults on her repayment, she does not exit from the market because her net
worth will always be positive. In order to show this paradoxical implication
of the BGG model, notice that if the j-th agent defaults - i.e. ωjt < ω¯t- then
V jt = 0. In this case the net worth in t+1 will be
N jt+1 = 0 +W
e
t . (2.20)
In this example the borrower is not able to repay her debt obligation, the
investment yields ωjt+1R
k
t+1QtK
j
t+1 and is entirely appropriated by the bank.
Taking into account monitoring costs, the bank obtains (1−µ)ωjt+1Rkt+1QtKjt+1.
However, the net worth of the entrepreneur is still positive. This is due to the
fact that (i) the entrepreneur is working for the ﬁrm and gets a wage W et ; (ii)
the entrepreneur devotes her wage to increase the net worth of the ﬁrm. The
net worth of the defaulting ﬁrm is equal to the entrepreneur's wage. Since the
net worth is positive, the possibility for the entrepreneur to borrow also in the
following period cannot be ruled out. Moreover, in the next period the bankrupt
entrepreneur will not have any additional penalty for defaulting on her payment.
Suppose now that in the previous period ωt−1 > ω¯t−1, so the net worth at
the beginning of period t is:
N jt = γV
j
t−1 +W
e
t−1,
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where V jt−1 = (ω
j
t−1 − ω¯t−1)Rkt−1Qt−2Kjt−1 is the net share of proﬁt going to
the entrepreneur after having paid her debt in the previous period.
Two important aspects emerge observing the evolution of these variables.
First of all, after two consecutive defaults, the net worth becomes stable and
equal to the equilibrium wage. Indeed, from equation (20), it can be noticed
that even if in every period the j-th entrepreneur is not able to fulﬁl her debt
payment, she receives anyhow a wage which maintains her net worth positive.
Secondly, even if the entrepreneur is defaulting in each period, from equations
(2.1) and (2.20) her net worth remains positive and so does her borrowing
capacity, hence she can continue to stay in business: Bjt+1 = QtK
j
t+1 −W et .
Rewriting here the log-linearized form of the equation of the entrepreneurial
wage, the law of motion of capital and the expected gross return to hold a unit
of capital respectively:
wet = yt − xt − ct, (2.21)
kt+1 = δit + (1− δ) kt, (2.22)
rkt+1 = (1−$) (yt+1 − kt+1 − xt+1) +$qt+1 − qt, (2.23)
where in equation (2.21) it is assumed inelastic entrepreneurial labour supply,
Het = 1. Substituting Equation (2.22) and (2.23) in the log-linearized version
of the equation (8), it can be obtained the following equation;
Υbbt+1 = ψ {(1−$)Et (yt+1 − kt+1 − xt+1) +$Etqt+1 − qt − rt}+
(
1−Υwe
)
wet ,
(2.24)
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where 0 < Υ < 1. In equation (2.24), the terms Υb and Υw
e
represent the ratios
of debt and entrepreneurial wage with the total purchased capital at their steady
state level. From equation (2.24) it can be seen that the optimal level of debt
in equilibrium depends positively from the depreciation rate of capital and from
the production function, whereas it depends negatively on the market power of
the retailers. It has to be noticed that the debt and consequently the capital
purchased will be always positive, since in the steady state wet > 0. This shows
that, even if all the ﬁrms default, they always have access to the credit system.
Summarizing, the main goal of the BGG model is to clarify the role of
credit market frictions. The framework exhibits a ﬁnancial accelerator that
ampliﬁes and propagates the shocks. This ﬁnancial accelerator links inversely
the external ﬁnance premium and the net worth of the borrower. In doing
this the model assumes that ﬁrms are risk-neutral and have ﬁnite horizons, each
entrepreneur must have a constant and exogenous probability of surviving to the
next period. In this way the authors are able to explain the ﬁnancial accelerator.
Hence, even if the bankruptcy has a key role in the ﬁnancial accelerator story, the
model does not explicitly represent the number of bankrupt entrepreneurs who
leave the market but deﬁnes them exogenously. Moreover, the self-fulﬁlment of
debt repayment has no direct impact on the relationship between lender and
borrower.
The remainder of this section will try to overcome this shortcoming incor-
porating an extra cost in the ﬁnancial contract of the bankrupt entrepren-
eur. Suppose that the entrepreneur is not able to fulﬁl the repayment oblig-
ation, hence the bank obtains a lower return than expected and registers losses:
Lost+1 = Zt+1Bt+1 − (1 − µ)ωjt+1Rkt+1QtKjt+1. For this reason, the ﬁnancial
intermediary adds an additional cost to the defaulted entrepreneur interest rate
in the following period. The new participation constraint of the ﬁnancial inter-
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mediary becomes:
[Γ(ω¯t+2)− µG(ω¯t+2)]Rkt+2Qt+1Kjt+2 = Rt+2(Qt+1Kjt+2−N jt+2)+
[
Zt+1Bt+1 − (1− µ)ωjt+1Rkt+1QtKjt+1
]
,
where the left hand side of the equation represents the expected return on
lending and the right hand side represents the risk-free rate plus a premium equal
to the losses. With the new framework, the optimal choice for the entrepreneur
will be:
max [1− Γ(ω¯t+2)]Rkt+2Qt+1Kjt+2,
s.t. [Γ(ω¯t+2)− µG(ω¯t+2)]Rkt+2Qt+1Kjt+2 = Rt+2(Qt+1Kjt+2−N jt+2)+Lost+1.
Recalling here that the premium on external funds is deﬁned as s = Rk/R
and the capital-wealth ratio is k = QK/N . Assuming: uniform distribution for
the idiosyncratic shock; constant risk free interest rate, Rt+1 = Rt and that the
wealth of the defaulted entrepreneur is Nt+2 = w
e
t+1 = Nt+1,
7 the ﬁrst order
conditions can be written as:
ω¯ :→ Γ′(ω¯)− λ [Γ′(ω¯)− µG′(ω¯)] = 0,
k :→ [(1− Γ(ω¯)) + λ (Γ(ω¯)− µG(ω¯))] s− λ = 0,
λ :→ [Γ(ω¯)− µG(ω¯)] sk − 2∆ (k − 1− L) = 0,
where L =
ω¯t+1R
k
t+1QtK
j
t+1−(1−µ)G(ω¯t+1)Rkt+1QtKjt+1
Rt+2Nt+2
. Solving, the optimal
level of capital-wealth ratio is:
kt+2 =
2∆− (2∆ω¯ − ω¯2 − µω¯2) sk
2∆− s [2∆ (1− ω¯) + (1− µ) ω¯2] . (2.25)
Assuming a fraction of proﬁt lost in bankruptcy, µ, to 0.2 and an initial risk
7The assumptions of constant interest rate and constant net worth across the periods in
case of default are taken for the sake of simplicity. According to the model, the defaulted
entrepreneur net worth should be lower than the initial level. In this case, the negative term
in the nominator of Equation (25) will be higher empowering the argument that this type of
model may not be optimal to investigate the real eﬀect of bankruptcy.
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spread, Rk−R, equal to 2%, it is possible to represent the relationships between
the external ﬁnance premium (s) and the threshold of the idiosyncratic risk (ω¯)
and between external premium and the capital-wealth ratio (k). From the ﬁrst
order conditions of the two speciﬁcations, it can be seen how both the threshold
of the idiosyncratic risk and the capital-wealth ratio are function of the external
ﬁnance premium. In the left panel, Figure 1 shows how the existence of the
extra premium on the relationship between lender and defaulted borrower af-
fects neither the positive relationship between s and ω¯(s) nor the shape of the
function. On the contrary, as displayed in the right panel, the losses registered
by the ﬁnancial intermediary completely change the relationship between the
external ﬁnance premium (s) and the capital-wealth ratio (k(s, ω¯)). Firstly, it
should be noticed that, in the standard model with uniform distribution, in-
creasing the external ﬁnance premium decreases the optimal investment-wealth
ratio. This shape can be explained by the fact that for high level of external
ﬁnance premium, the threshold of the idiosyncratic risk is higher. Consequently,
this increases the cost of loans (Z) and therefore reduces the amount of optimal
debt. Conversely, in the framework with real losses for the bank, the optimal
level of capital-wealth ratio is function of ω¯, s and L (the losses-wealth ratio)
and, as it is displayed in the ﬁgure, its exhibits a reverse U-shaped slope. Fi-
nally, the investment-ratio function of the second speciﬁcation is deﬁned in the
negative vertical axis. In other words, the consequence of a ﬁnancial contract
that adds an extra cost for the defaulted entrepreneur is the collapse of the
credit market (or the invested capital), given that by deﬁnition N is positive.
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Figure 1: Relationship between external ﬁnance premium, threshold of idio-
syncratic risk (left panel); relationship between external ﬁnance premium and
capital wealth ratio (right panel). Thick line: original model; dashed line:
framework with losses.
As shown, this approach investigates the credit market frictions but it does
not seem optimal to analyse the bankruptcy and to modelling explicitly its ef-
fects on the credit market and total investments. Indeed, in the standard model,
the default of entrepreneur has no direct impact on her future relationship with
the lender, she always has access to the loans. On the contrary, in the speciﬁc-
ation with losses in the ﬁnancial contract, the credit market collapses after the
ﬁrst bankruptcy. In order to investigate the eﬀects of the entrepreneurs bank-
ruptcies, from the next section I will introduce an Agent-Based approach.8 This
frame, abandoning the representative agent assumption, will allow to introduce
heterogeneity in the ﬁrms wealth and on the shocks that hit the productivity.
Moreover, analysing the one-to-one relationship in the ﬁnancial contract, it will
also be possible to introduce a premium on the external ﬁnance cost for the
entrepreneurs defaulted in the past. Despite the change of paradigm, the Agent
Based version of the ﬁnancial accelerator is as close as possible to the original
one in its main characteristics, e.g. the relationship between external premium
8 See for example Delli Gatti et al. (2011), Fagiolo and Roventini (2012) or Assenza and
Delli Gatti (2013).
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and net worth or the evolution of the entrepreneurial wealth.
2.4 The Agent Based version of the ﬁnancial ac-
celerator
This section discusses the new agent based speciﬁcation of the ﬁnancial ac-
celerator explaining the main assumptions that depart from the original model.
Leave the representative agent assumption opens the possibility to analyse the
eﬀect of a bankruptcy chain,9 indeed the AB speciﬁcation allows to investigate
the interactions among the ﬁnancial intermediaries and heterogeneous ﬁrms.
Moreover, following the growing literature which recognizes the drawbacks
of the rational agent paradigm, the bounded rational expectations will be intro-
duced in the agent based speciﬁcation. According to survey data analyses10 the
ﬁnancial agents are not fully rational: they use diﬀerent trading and forecasting
strategies. Moreover there is empirical evidence that the human being has crit-
ical limits on both cognition and computational capabilities and the use of rules
of thumb is held by psychological studies which show how agents compare al-
ternative heuristics avoiding deliberation eﬀorts and complicated computational
costs.11
2.4.1 The heterogeneous ﬁnancial intermediaries
Conversely, to the original model, the AB speciﬁcation hypotheses the ex-
istence of many lenders and not only a representative ﬁnancial intermediary.
Given the choices of the entrepreneur on Kjt+1, B
j
t+1 and given the risk free
9Interesting examples are Delli Gatti et al. (2003) and Delli Gatti et al. (2005).
10See Frankel and Froot (1987 a,b and 1990 a,b).
11See Conlisk (1980).
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interest rate Rt+1, loans are extended by a ﬁnancial intermediary. The external
ﬁnance cost for a non-default ﬁrm is Zjt+1, such that:
Zjb,t+1 = Rt+1 + µ
b
(
Dt
Nb
)α
+ ρ
Bjt+1
N jt+1
. (2.26)
µb is a bank speciﬁc parameters, DtNb is a ﬁnancial soundness measure of the
bank given by the ratio between deposits, Dt, and net worth, Nb, whereas
Bjt+1
Njt+1
is the ﬁrm speciﬁc leverage ratio. This new mechanism for the interest rate on
loans has the same ﬂavour of the original external ﬁnance cost but adds some
important features. As in BGG model, the ﬁrm-speciﬁc interest rate on loans is
a mark-up on the risk free interest rate and depends positively on the leverage
ratio
(
Bjt+1
Nh,t+1
)
. Besides the ﬁrm-speciﬁc mark-up, also the ﬁnancial soundness
of the ﬁnancial intermediary has a role in the credit policy decision for at least
two reasons. First, as point out also by Delli Gatti et al. (2010), bank with
higher ﬁnancial strength, i.e. higher
(
Dt
Nb
)
, will be able to extend credit at more
favourable terms. Second, when a ﬁnancial intermediary increase its net worth a
too big to fail problem can arise. In other words, big banks do not consider the
extreme hypothesis of their default, as consequence of low cost loans to ﬁrms
with high debt. This because they expect that, if a negative ﬁnancial shock
should hit them, they will be bail-out from the public authority.
The entrepreneur investment return is aﬀected by idiosyncratic risk, ωjt . This
risk is a stochastic variable with an uniform distribution. When the idiosyncratic
shock is such that
ωjt+1R
k
t+1QtK
j
t+1 ≥ Zjt+1Bjt+1,
the lender obtains Zjt+1B
j
t+1 and the borrower earns the diﬀerence between the
investment return and the debt cost.
88
Conversely, if
ωjt+1R
k
t+1QtK
j
t+1 < Z
j
t+1B
j
t+1,
the borrower cannot validate her debt contract, therefore the entrepreneur de-
faults and the bank obtains (1− µ)ωjt+1Rkt+1QtKjt+1.
In this case, the balance sheet of the ﬁnancial intermediary should be neg-
atively aﬀected by the default of the entrepreneurs. Now, suppose that in the
period t, the bank's total amount of lending is:
Bbt =
1
γb
N bt , (2.27)
N bt represents the total wealth of the bank γ
b represents a capital requirement
share.
The evolution of the bank wealth can be described by the following law of
motion:
N bt+1 = N
b
t +
J∑
j=1
(Πjt )− α
J∑
j=1
Losjt − rtDt + rt∆t, (2.28)
where
J∑
j=1
(Πjt ) is the sum of return on entrepreneurs' loans of the previous period,
J∑
j=1
Losjt =
J∑
j=1
[
ZjtB
j
t − (1− µ)ωjtRktQt−1Kjt
]
is the sum of the total unexpec-
ted losses, α is a dummy parameter, it is zero if in the previous period the
entrepreneur fulﬁlled her debt obligation, one otherwise, Dt are the deposits
and ∆t are non risky assets investment.
Introduce the wealth of the ﬁnancial intermediary implicitly means to insert
in the model a deﬁned amount of available funds. The existence of many ﬁnan-
cial intermediaries does not ensure that the credit is bound in all the periods,
i.e. in some periods there could be accessible funds that are not borrowed. From
the balance sheet of the ﬁnancial intermediary, it should be noticed that ∆t>0
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only when all the allocable funds are not hold as reserves or required by the
entrepreneurs, i.e. Rt +B
b
t < Dt +N
b
t where Rt = δ
bDt.
Nevertheless, it can happen that after some periods the credit may be con-
strained. In this case the ﬁnancial intermediary gives priority in lending to
entrepreneur with higher net worth. This rule of thumb can be justiﬁed by two
reasons: ﬁrst of all by the assumption that higher net worth is taken by the
banks as a proxy of success of the ﬁrms in the previous periods; secondly, higher
net worth represents higher collateral for the bank in case of defaults.
2.4.2 Entrepreneurial behaviour
Introducing heterogeneity in the heuristic forecasting rules the expectations
assume a crucial role in the investment decision of the single entrepreneur. At
time t, each entrepreneur forms her one-step-ahead expectation on her own cap-
ital return and on inﬂation level. It should be noticed that the model assumes
expectations on the real capital return, i.e. in their decision process the entre-
preneurs consider their own return of capital, ωjRk, and not the general return
of capital of the whole economy Rk.
Given the expectations, in the ﬁrst period the optimization problem of the
j-th entrepreneur is:
max
B
Ejt
{
Rkt+1
}
QtK
j
t+1 −Zjb,t+1Bjt+1 st Zjb,t+1 = Rt+1 + µb
(
Dt
Nb
)α
+ ρ
Bjt+1
N jt+1
,
and from the ﬁst order condition of the maximization problem the optimal level
of debt is:
Bjh,t+1 =
Ejt
{
Rkt+1
}− [Rt+1 + µb (DtNb)α]
2ρ
N jt+1. (2.29)
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In Equation (2.29), the capital expenditure of the entrepreneur is propor-
tional to her ﬁnancial condition, with a proportionality factor which increases
according to the own capital return expectation. The expected return is by
deﬁnition ﬁrm-speciﬁc whereas the mark up on the risk free interest rate is bank
speciﬁc depending both on its ﬁnancial soundness and on its lending propensity
µb. Hence, even if some ﬁrms have the same net worth, they may borrow
diﬀerent amount of funds according to their expectation and the ﬁnancial inter-
mediary which supplies the loans.
As, explained in Subsection 2.3.1, the entrepreneur's return at the end of
every period is equal to the diﬀerence between the investment return and the
debt cost, ωjt+1R
k
t+1QtK
j
t+1 − Zjt+1Bjt+1. Therefore, it is straightforward that
this return depends by: the idiosyncratic shock, what lender supplies the credit
and how the entrepreneur forms her own expectations.
Supposing h forecasting rules, the j-th entrepreneur updates her beliefs ac-
cording to a performance measure of the investment. The evolutionary per-
formance measure is publicly available but it is subject to noise, it could be
expressed as follows:
U ′h,t = Uh,t + 
j
h,t, (2.30)
where the performance of the entrepreneur following the h-Th heuristic is deﬁned
as the average return on investment (ROI) using the h-Th rule of thumb, i.e.
Uh,t =
J∑
j=1
ROIj,h,t
Eh,t
where ROIj,h,t =
ωjtR
k
tQt−1K
j
t−ZjtBjt
Qt−1K
j
t
and Eh,t is the number of
entrepreneurs of the h type in period t. The performance measure deﬁned before
has the feature to avoid that the choice of switching is exclusively determined
by the ﬁrm speciﬁc shock, hence to be randomly deﬁned. Considering two
heuristics, h = 1, 2, the entrepreneur of type 1 will switch to the other rule of
thumb if her own return on investment will be lower to the return on investment
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of her own type, given that this one is lower to the average ROI of the other
type. More precisely, the j-th entrepreneur changes her expectations rule if:
U1,t < U2,t and ROIj,1,t < U1,t.
This switching mechanism has the ﬂavour of the Adaptive Belief Systems (ABS)
of Brock and Hommes (1997, 1998, 1999), indeed the agents endogenously up-
date their strategy between heuristic according to the performance measure.
However, the second inequality introduces in the evolution of expectations a
positive predisposition to one prediction rule over another. In other words,
there is a stickiness in the mechanism in line to the status-quo eﬀect.12
2.4.3 The consequences of Bankruptcy
This sub-section analyses in detail the problem of bankruptcy and how this
aﬀects the credit and the investment.
The evolution of the entrepreneurial net worth can be written as:
N jt+1 =

W et + V
j
t V
j
t =
(
ωjt+1R
k
t+1QtK
j
t+1 − Zjt+1Bjt+1
)
(S1)
W et (S2)
,
Equation (S1) describes the case of non-defaulted entrepreneur, the net worth
at the beginning of the next period is given by the wage plus the net return of
capital. The second equation (S2) describes the defaulted entrepreneur. In this
case the entrepreneur looses all the invested capital and her net worth in the
next period will be equal to the wage.
Supposing the case of entrepreneur defaults, the bank obtains (1−µ)ωjtRktQt−1Kjt ,
12For example, see the analysis in economic psychology of Kahneman et al. (1991).
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this can be rewritten as:
(1− µ)ωjtRkt
(
Bjt+1 +N
j
t
)
= (1− µ)ωjtRkt (V jt−1 +W et−1 +Bjt ),
therefore the lender registers a net loss in t. Supposing that the bank does not
take any strategical action after the ﬁrst default of the ﬁrm, in the following
period the defaulted entrepreneur has access to credit and therefore she could
not be able to fulﬁl the debt contract once again. In this case, the ﬁnancial
intermediary records loan return lower than expected in both periods, by deﬁn-
ition:
(1−µ)ωjtRkt (V jt−1+W et−1+Bjt )+(1−µ)ωjt+1Rkt+1(W et +Bjt+1) < ZtBjt+Zt+1Bjt+1.
(2.31)
Hence, it seems quite reasonable to expect that, after a default, the bank
changes its credit policy towards the bankrupt entrepreneur. This aspect is
completely absent in the BGG model, indeed in that framework the bank di-
versiﬁes his risk among entrepreneurs and does not take any action against the
insolvent entrepreneurs, i.e. the bank has not memory of the past.
Conversely, this ABM version of the ﬁnancial accelerator introduces in the
ﬁnancial contract an additional cost to external funds for the defaulted entre-
preneurs. This premium increases the cost of credit and alters consequently the
amount of available funds. As described in equation (2.31), when an entrepren-
eur defaults the bank suﬀers some losses. Therefore, in the following period, the
available credit to the default entrepreneur will be at higher cost. This because
for the defaulted entrepreneur the bank will set an interest rate on loan able to
recover the losses of the past period.
The ﬁnancial contract for the bankrupt entrepreneur becomes:
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Zjt+1 = Rt +
[
µb
(
Dt
Nb
)α
+ ρ
Bjt+1
N jt+1
]
+
[
ZjtB
j
t − (1− µ)ωjtRktQt−1Kjt
]
. (2.32)
In equation (2.32), the interest rate on loans is a mark-up on the risk free
interest rate and the ﬁnancial soundness of the bank, as in equation (2.26),
plus a premium equal to the losses due to non performing loans of the previous
period. For the sake of tractability, the ﬁnancial contract considers a temporal
horizon of two periods, i.e. for each defaulted borrower the bank expects to
smooth its losses of t in the next period.
The new optimization problem of the entrepreneur is
max
B
Ejt
{
Rkt+1
}
QtK
j
t+1−Zjb,t+1Bjt+1 st Zjb,t+1 = Rt+1+µb
(
Dt
Nb
)α
+ρ
Bjt+1
N jt+1
+Losst.
Solving the maximization problem, the ﬁrst order conditions may be written
as:
Bjt+1 =
Et
{
Rkt+1
}− [Rt+1 + µb (DtNb)α + Losst]
2ρ
N jt+1. (2.33)
It can be easily seen that if the entrepreneur is not defaulted, Losst = 0,
hence equation (2.33) becomes equation (2.29). However, the new ﬁnancial
contract is designed with the aim to take into account the possibility of stop
lending. This happens when the spread between the expected return and the
mark-up on risk free interest rate is lower or equal to zero. This could have
two diﬀerent reasons. The ﬁrst occurs if the expectation are too low due to bad
entrepreneur's past performances whereas the second takes place if the amount
of past losses is huge.
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At this point, supposing that the ﬁnancial intermediary stops lending to the
entrepreneur, Bjt = 0, and it registers a negative variation in its wealth for the
unexpected losses. From equation (S2), the amount of available funds that the
bankrupt entrepreneur may invest in the following period consist only in her
wage:
QtK
j
t+1 = N
j
t+1 = W
e
t .
The new participation constraint of the entrepreneur does not take into
account the external ﬁnance cost but concerns the ratio between the expected
realization of investment and the risk-free rate:
Et
{
Rkt+1
}
W et = Rt+1W
e
t . (2.34)
The entrepreneur invests her capital only if her expectation on capital return
is such that:
Et
{
Rkt+1
}
Rt+1
≥ 1. (2.35)
Since the risk-free rate is given, the entrepreneur's choice depends on the
expected return on capital, therefore the expectation formation mechanism plays
a crucial role in the investment decisions. If Equation (2.35) is not veriﬁed, the
entrepreneur does not invest and uses her wealth for consumption.
Through these variations, the ﬁnancial accelerator model is able to explain
the fraction of entrepreneurs which does not receive loans, i.e. the share of them
whose total wealth is given by the wage. Within this share of entrepreneurs there
is a portion γ that leaves the market. With the aim to hold oﬀ the problem that
after few periods there are no more entrepreneurs in the market, diﬀerent types
of mechanisms could be set. Instead of supposing a mechanism à la Gertler
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and Kiyotaki (2010) which settles the number of the entrepreneurs entering
in the market as a parameter maintaining constant the number of ﬁrms, this
ﬁrst version of the model does not ﬁx any inactivity period for the bankrupt
entrepreneurs before to obtain again access to the credit market. In other words,
if an entrepreneur defaults and drops out of the market in period t she can
borrow in the following period.
2.4.4 Aggregate Variables
The entrepreneurs purchase capital and combine it with labour following a
standard Cobb-Douglas production function:
Yt = AtK
αL
(1−α)
t ,
where Yt represents the aggregate production, whereas At,Kt and Ltare the
technology parameter, the purchased capital and the hired labour respectively.
The total amount of capital purchased in the economy is the sum of the capital
invested by the non-defaulted entrepreneurs and by the self-ﬁnanced one. The
price Qt of this capital is
Qt = Qt−1 + φ
(
∆Kt+1
Kt
)
, (2.36)
where the term in brackets represents the percentage variation of purchased
capital between two periods and φ(·) is the elasticity coeﬃcient of the capital
price respect to this change.
At the end of the period, the entrepreneurs sell their output to retailers
who have market power. Assume that the relative price of wholesale goods is
1/Xt where Xt =
Pt
Pwt
is the gross markup of retail goods over wholesale goods.
Consequently, the market gross return to holding a unit of capital between two
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periods is
Rkt+1 =
αAt+1K
α
t+1
XtKt+1Qt
+ (1− δ)Qt+1
Qt
.
The return of capital is the sum between the value of the marginal pro-
ductivity of capital and the capital gain due to the change of its price.
Besides capital, the production function requires labour. Its supply is com-
posed by households and entrepreneurial labour but, conversely to Bernanke
et al., the model assumes an inelastic supply with a full employment economy.
These assumptions are functional to the aim of the paper: investigate the bank-
ruptcy eﬀects on the credit market leaving aside the feedbacks on the real eco-
nomy.
The real wages for the two categories are:
Wt = (1− α)Ω Yt
Xt
,
W et = (1− α) (1− Ω)
Yt
Xt
,
where (1− α) Ω represents the share of households labour share.
In this new framework households have an inﬁnite horizon, they work, con-
sume and invest their savings in ﬁnancial assets that pay the risk free interest
rate. These households follow a simple Keynesian rule in determining their con-
sumption path instead of the standard maximization problem. Each period they
consume a fraction of their wealth and deposit to the ﬁnancial intermediary the
rest. More precisely:
Ct = a1(Wt +Rt−1Dt−1),
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Dt = (1− a1) (Wt +Rt−1Dt−1),
with a1 ≤ 1. Aggregating, the demand curve can be written as:
Yt = Ct +Kt + C
e
t +Gt,
where Ct is the households consumption, Kt the total purchased capital andC
e
t
the consumption of the defaulted entrepreneurs that leave the market. As in
the original model, the public expenditure follows a stationary auto-regressive
process,Gt = ρgGt−1 + ε
g
t .
The aggregate supply can be interpreted as a New Keynesian hybrid Phillips
Curve derived from the staggered Calvo price scheme:
pit = κpiEt {pit+1}+ κy y˜t + εpit . (2.37)
As in Bernanke Gertler and Gilchrist, the actual inﬂation is driven by two
components: it depends positively on the inﬂation expectations and on the
output gap. In this version the output gap is deﬁned as the deviation of the
actual output from a forecast level. This level is based on the previous output
level augmented by a constant rate and it can be interpreted as the output
potential level in absence of bankruptcies.
Finally, the short risk free interest rate is adjusted by the Central Bank re-
acting with a strict inﬂation targeting according the following non-linear Taylor
instrumental rule:
Rt =
(
1 + piT
)
(1 +Rnt )
(
1 + pit
1 + piT
)φpi
, (2.38)
where piT represents the inﬂation target and φpi > 0 is the parameter concerning
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the inﬂation reaction as in Salle et al. (2013).
2.5 Simulations
This section shows the results of quantitative experiments to illustrate how
bankruptcy aﬀects the business cycle dynamics of the system. In subsections
2.5.2 and 2.5.3, are considered the results concerning two diﬀerent scenarios
performing simulations including in the economy the idiosyncratic shock on the
return of capital and the aggregate government expenditure shocks. These sim-
ulation scenarios separately consider competition in the market between entre-
preneur types: naive and following trend agents, naive and biased expectation.
Moreover, subsection 2.5.3 will investigate a framework considering naive and
following trend agents applying diﬀerent interest rate rules with the aim to ﬁnd
policy suggestions.
According to the reference literature13 the agents have cognitive limitations
or computational limits, hence the model assumes the following diﬀerent fore-
casting rules:
xet = gxt−1, (2.39)
xet = xt−1 + w (xt−1 − xt−2) , (2.40)
xet = xt−1 + bias, (2.41)
where x is the reference variable, g = 1, 0 ≤ w ≤ 1 and bias > 0.
These heuristics introduce a backward-looking components in the system dy-
13See for example in Hommes et al. (2005).
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namics. Indeed, in all these rules of thumb, the expectation on future variable is
based on the past realization, even if with diﬀerent degree of freedom. Equation
(2.39) represents the naive expectations. This rule prescribes that the entre-
preneurs form their expectations on future variable rank using the last observed
level.14 Indeed, using the words of Keynes (1936), it is sensible for producers
to base their expectations on the assumption that the most recently realised
results will continue. Equation (2.40) represents the chartist rule. Following
this heuristic, the entrepreneurs base their actions on the past variable move-
ments. This rule ﬁnd empirical evidence on the analysis on the ﬁnancial market
trading rules and in laboratory experiments, see Frankel and Froot (1990) and
Hommes (2011) respectively. Equation (2.41) describes biased expectations, as
in Brock and Hommes (1998). These entrepreneurs have a positive and constant
disposition on the trend of the variable.
2.5.1 Model parametrization
The proposed parametrization is quite standard and ﬁnds ample validation
in the literature. The quarterly discount factor β is 0.98, the capital share α
is 0.45, the household labour share (1− α) Ω is 0.64 and the depreciation rate
for capital δ is 0.025. Besides these parameters, even if there is not consensus
in the literature,15 the value of elasticity of the price of capital respect to the
investment capital ratio ϕ(·) is 0.01. Looking at the ﬁnancial sector, the natural
risk free interest rate Rt required of the economy is ﬁxed to 2%, the shock on
investment has a homogeneous distribution with E(ω) = 1 and it can reduce or
increase the ﬁrm speciﬁc return of capital by 20%. The share of proﬁt lost in case
of default µ is constant at 0.6. The last ﬁnancial parameters are the percentage
14See Hommes et al. (2012) for a thorough discussion on how memory aﬀects the dynamics
of the system.
15See for example King and Wolman (1996).
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of deposits required by the regulator as reserves requirement is ﬁxed to 2%, and
the capital requirement in extending loans, according to the Basel regulation
it is equal to 8%. Let the probability θ that ﬁrms are not able to reoptimise
their price within a period equal to 0.75 and the mark-up of the retail sector
with respect to the wholesale market is of 1.1. The last parameters selected
are related to the monetary policy role, the inﬂation targeting is 2% and the
reaction coeﬃcient on inﬂation is 0.8. At this point it should be highlighted that
the steady state variables concerning the percentage of entrepreneurs that leaves
the market or the probability of default of the entrepreneurs must not be deﬁned
ex-ante as inputs like in the Bernanke Gertler and Gilchrist model but they will
be the results of the simulations, indeed this speciﬁcation allows to endogenise
these variables. For each experiment the economy has j = 30 entrepreneurs,
two ﬁnancial intermediary and T = 800 periods (quarters). As the model is not
deterministic, each simulation is repeated 20 times in order to take into account
the randomness of the shock. Moreover the graphical analysis deletes the ﬁrst
and the last 25 period in order to handle the initialization problem of the initial
conditions.
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Parameter Legend Parameter Legend
T = 800 Periods j = 30 Number of ﬁrms
n = 20 Monte Carlo Simulations α = 0.35 Capital share
b = 2 Number of banks β = 0.98 Quarterly discount factor
δb = 0.02 Reserve requirement X = 1.1 Retailers mark up
γb = 0.08 Capital requirement δ = 0.025 Depreciation rate of capital
ρ = 0.5 Mark-up on ﬁrm's leverage pipi = 2% Inﬂation target
µb = [0.02; 0.05] Mark-up on the risk free rate φpi = 0.8 Reaction coeﬃcient on inﬂation
µ = 0.6 Share of proﬁt lost in default Y = 5% Output long run growth rate
κpi = 0.925 Phillips curve coeﬃcient on pi κy = 0.075 Phillips curve coeﬃcient on y˜
Table 1: Calibration.
2.5.2 Scenario 1: Naive vs Trend following agents
In the model the dynamic endogenously arises from two sources: one is
the heterogeneity in the expectations rule, the other is due to the bankruptcy
eﬀect on the credit policy. The ﬁrst simulations performed in order to un-
derstand the bankruptcy eﬀects consider only naive and weak trend followers
entrepreneurs. Following the empirical evidence,16 the model hypothesizes that
the trend-follower entrepreneurs behave using the same heuristic in forecasting
both inﬂation and return to capital, but they adopt diﬀerent weights for the
trend parameters (wpi = 0.1 and wRk = 0.3).
Analysing the results of the ﬁrst scenario, Figure 2 shows the time series
of output (upper panel), total investment (middle panel) and inﬂation (bot-
tom panel). The thick lines in the ﬁgures represent the average among the
16See Assenza et al. (2013).
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simulations of the variable, whereas the shadow area illustrates the standard
deviation. For the sake of clarity argumentation, the ﬁrst diﬀerences plot of
output and capital are in appendix B. Looking at the long-run dynamic, it is
possible to notice a growing trend for the output and the total investment. On
the contrary inﬂation presents a path with low volatility. This stable evolution
of the system can be found also in the low average growth of rate of output and
capital, respectively 0.25% and 0.21%. Moving the analysis to the short-run
evolution, it is possible to notice how all the three series present perturbation
in the dynamics. The existence of entrepreneurs which can make mistakes in
the expectations formation, and therefore can default, explains the evolution of
the invested capital. Consequently, this aﬀects the evolution of the output and
the inﬂation dynamic.
Figure 2: Time series of output (upper panel), total investment (middle
panel) and inﬂation (bottom panel). Blue tick line: average level; grey shadow
area: standard deviation.
Moving to the evolution of the core of the agent based speciﬁcation, Figure
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3 illustrates the time series of the diﬀerence in the average performance between
the rules of thumb17 (upper panel), the number of naive agents (middle panel)
and the number of entrepreneurs which does not invest and leaves the market
(bottom panel). The ﬁrst plot illustrates how none heuristic performs better
than the other for all the period but there is as sinuous evolution of the diﬀer-
ence between the ROI. When the graph illustrates positive spikes this means
that the naive agents perform, on average, better than the type agents, whereas
when there are negative spikes trend-follower entrepreneurs register on average
higher performance. This evolution partially drives the the switching mechan-
ism. The upper and the middle plots would have had the same dynamics if
the share of agents that chooses each strategy would be updated only according
to this diﬀerence. On the contrary, the model presents a stickiness in choice
of heuristics. This explains the non-perfect correspondence between the two
dynamics. Investigating the auto-correlation of the diﬀerence in performance
(Figure 11 in Appendix B), the variable exhibits a negative auto-correlation in
the ﬁrst quarter that may be due by the nature of the two heuristics. For ex-
ample, extracting the reasoning by the default problem and supposing a positive
diﬀerence in performance, some agents would change their forecasting rule to
the naive behaviour. Given the implicit pro-trend nature of the heuristics,18 in
the next period the following trend behaviour will register higher performance
because, in average, exploits better the positive trend. The bottom panel ex-
hibits an oscillating dynamic around the average number of agents leaving the
market. It is interesting to notice how: this level is not high, around 7 (6.82),
and also the ﬂuctuations are moderate, between 4 and 9 agents. This explains
the smoothed trends of the total investment and output of Figure 1 and the
17This is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the naive average performance minus the trend-
following one, UN,t − UTF,t.
18Notice that the naive heuristic is equal to the trend-following rule when the weight of the
trend is null, w = 0.
104
absence of wide negative spikes. Indeed, leaving the market the defaulted entre-
preneurs aﬀect negatively the purchased capital and the total output but, as the
panel shows, entrepreneurs stay in the market and, whatever they have access
to the credit market or not, they invest sustaining the growing capital trend.
Figure 3: Time series of the diﬀerence in performance measure (upper panel),
number of naive agents (middle panel) and number of entrepreneurs which leaves
the market (bottom panel). Blue tick line: average level; grey shadow area:
standard deviation.
Concluding the analysis of scenario 1, Figure 4 presents the variation between
periods of the net worth of the ﬁnancial intermediary. It is interesting to high-
light that: the net worth evolution of the two banks is almost identical; this
evolution is strictly linked to the bottom panel of Figure 3. Indeed, these en-
trepreneurs are defaulted agents and, if they leave the market, the ﬁnancial
intermediary has to register their non-collectable credits.
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Figure 4: Evolution of the bank net worth (log-scale).
2.5.3 Scenario 2: Naive vs Biased expectations
This subsection describes the results of the simulation concerning naive and
biased agents. As in the previous subsection, entrepreneurs behave using the
alternative heuristic adopt diﬀerent values for the bias in forecasting inﬂation
and return to capital, for the ﬁrst variable the bias is 0.5% whereas it is 5% for
the expected return on investment.
Figure 5 depicts the time series of output (upper panel), total capital (middle
panel) and inﬂation (bottom panel) for the scenario 2. The dynamics of out-
put and total investment presents a long-run positive trend with growth rate
of 0.13% and 0.12% respectively along the 750 quarters. The inﬂation evolu-
tion exhibits a series ﬂuctuation around an average positive level equal to 3.5%.
Looking at the short-run dynamics, all the variables register positive and negat-
ive spikes due to the expectations heterogeneity of the model combined with the
positive number of bankrupt entrepreneurs which leaves the market generate.
Indeed, all these perturbations are the consequences of the real eﬀect of bank-
106
ruptcy on the economy and the credit market. The default of an investor aﬀects
negatively the total amount of invested capital and the output. The eﬀect on
capital could be alleviate if in the following period the entrepreneurs invest al-
though they may not have access to the credit market. Besides, if entrepreneurs
do not invest, they have a positive weight in the aggregate output through the
consumption channel.
Figure 5: Time series of output (upper panel), total investment (middle
panel) and inﬂation (bottom panel). Blue tick line: average level; grey shadow
area: standard deviation.
Figure 6 illustrates the evolution of the diﬀerence in the average heuristic
performance (upper panel), the number of naive entrepreneurs (middle panel)
and the number of entrepreneurs which quits the market (bottom panel). The
upper plot shows how in this case the biased heuristic performs, on average,
better than the naive rule. All this aﬀects the evolution of the naive agents in
the markets, more precisely the average level (12) of agents around which the
serie ﬂuctuates. However, the middle plot does not exhibit a stable decreasing
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trend even if the naive performances on average are worst. This is due by the fact
that in the switching mechanism has a crucial role the own return on investment.
Indeed, It may happen that, even if the average performance measure of biased
type is higher than the naive, the j-th entrepreneur registers higher ROI than
her average type and therefore she does not switch the forecasting rule. In
this scenario, the auto-correlation of the diﬀerence in heuristic performance
presents a negative and statistically signiﬁcant auto-correlation for the ﬁrst two
lags. This could be explained by the fact that given a diﬀerence in return, on
average negative, the number of biased entrepreneurs should increases. This
majority of biased agents registers higher levels of purchased capital respect to
the naive agent and therefore enhances also the total output and the return
on its own investment. Indeed, it should be noticed that the naive and the
biased expectations are equal when the bias is null, b = 0. Moreover, taking
as given all the other variables, when b>0, the expected return of the biased
agent is higher than the naive expected return and therefore also the amount of
investment. The lower panel represents the evolution of the entrepreneur share
which leaves the market. As in the previous scenario, the dynamic displays
noisily ﬂuctuation around an average level between 6 and 7 which can partially
explain the smoothed trends of capital and output.
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Figure 6: Time series of the diﬀerence in performance measure (upper panel),
number of naive agents (middle panel) and number of entrepreneurs which leaves
the market (bottom panel). Blue tick line: average level; grey shadow area:
standard deviation.
Figure 7 reproduces the evolution of the bank net worth. The positive num-
ber of the entrepreneurs which defaults and leaves the market in each period
aﬀects the wealth of the ﬁnancial intermediary. It is worthwhile to stress how
the positive spikes could have three explanations: high proﬁts, low losses from
the non-performing loans or a low level of credit, i.e. an high level of non-risky
investment (high level of ∆t). Indeed, the possibility of default of the entre-
preneurs does not ensure to the bank that higher level of extended loans will be
follow by higher net worth growth than a scenario with lower level of credit.
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Figure 7: Evolution of the bank net worth (log-scale).
Finally the analysis compares the levels and the volatility between the two
scenarios. As displayed in ﬁgures 2 and 5, capital and output exhibit comparable
levels at the end of the period even if the two scenarios present diﬀerent level
of growth. However, the scenario 2 registers higher initial level for both the
variable. These levels could be explained by a lower standard deviation in the
number of entrepreneurs which leaves the market (γ) and consequently in a lower
volatility in the invested capital. The volatility of γ also aﬀects the level of the
bank net worth. As shown by ﬁgures 4 and 7, the lower volatility in the scenario
2 allows to reach higher bank net worth. Looking at the average level of inﬂation
(ﬁgures 2 and 5), in the ﬁrst scenario it is around 0% whereas in the second
it is 3.5%. This diﬀerence is related with the nature of the expectations rules.
Indeed, in the naive-bias simulations, the expected inﬂation is the mean between
the forecast levels of naive and biased agent. Therefore, even if in one period the
inﬂation rate is null, it is straightforward that the expectations for the future
level will be positive given that the expectations of one heuristic are positively
110
biased.19Moreover, the volatility of the number of entrepreneurs which leaves
the market and the mechanism of the expectation formation explain the ﬂatter
paths in the time series of the second scenario. Comparing the two alternative
heuristics (trend-following and bias), by deﬁnition, the ﬁrst alternative rule of
thumb, following the evolution of the variables, can generate waves that allows
both higher rates of growth and higher volatility. On the contrary, biased agent
always forecast a constant path growth reducing the volatility of the invested
capital and therefore of the total output. Concluding, a monetary authority
should take into account the sentiment of the market, i.e. the shares of agent
types, when designing its policy. Indeed, as shown in this section, applying
the same monetary policy may have diﬀerent consequences on the economic
ﬂuctuations when the expectations are non-identical. For this reason, in order to
conclude the analysis, in the next subsection will be performed some simulations
applying diﬀerent monetary policies in the Scenario 1.
2.5.4 Monetary policy Evaluation
This subsection presents some simulations using diﬀerent monetary policies
considering weak-trend followers and naive entrepreneurs. The analysis ﬁrstly
presents the results comparing two empirically founded interest rate rules, then
will be investigate a more theoretical problem concerning the eﬀects of policies
non-conforming to the Taylor principle. The ﬁrst two Taylor rules are designed
with the aim to represent the Federal Reserve's reaction function and the
European Central Bank behaviour. Conversely to the previous Taylor rule,
equation (2.38), in this subsection the monetary authority will respond to the
19Supposing pit = 0, the expectation for the next period inﬂation will be:
piet+1 =
(
nn,tpi
e
n,t+1+nb,tpi
e
b,t+1
)
H
=
[nn,t0+nb,t(0+b)]
H
=
nb,tb
H
> 0 with b > 0, nb.t > 0.
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inﬂation rate and the output oscillations according to the following rule:
Rt =
(
1 + piT
)
(1 +Rnt )
(
1 + pit
1 + piT
)φpi (
1 + Ŷt
)φY
, (2.42)
where Ŷt =
log(yt)−log(Y )
log(Y ) represents the logarithmic variation of the output.
Figure 8 shows the time series of output, total investment and inﬂation.
The left row of panels shows the evolution of the variables implementing a
monetary policy according to the Fed weight parameters of the Greenspan period
(φpi = 0.54 and φy = 0.99),
20 whereas, in the right side of the ﬁgure, it is
applied a Taylor rule in line with the ECB policy (φpi = 2.73 and φy = 1.44).
21
Comparing the long run results, the two policies exhibit very similar dynamics in
all the variables. However, analysing more in details, it is possible to notice how
the Fed scenario displays higher economic growth, 0.22% per quarter compared
to 0.15% per quarter of the ECB simulation. Despite of this higher economic
growth, the Fed scenario registers lower average level of output with higher
volatility. The same result is found looking to the total investment, higher
volatility associated with a lower average value (around 63% of the ECB scenario
level). This is a foreseeable result, given that the main determinant in the output
composition is the invested capital. From this analysis, it seems that the ECB
policy, even if it may not be able to reach the same rate of growth of the Fed
scenario, being more reactive it allows to reduce the volatility of the output
reaching the same inﬂation level and higher average level of total investment.
20For the choice of the parameters in the Fed Taylor rule see Judd and Rudebusch (1998).
21See Gerlach-Kristen (2003) for the explanation of the choice of parameter values.
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Figure 8: Time series of output (upper panel), total investment (middle
panel) and inﬂation (bottom panel). Left column: Fed Treatment, right column:
ECB Treatment. Purple tick line: average level; grey shadow area: standard
deviation.
From Figure 9, which illustrates the evolution of the number both of naive
agents (upper panels) and of entrepreneurs leaving the market (lower panels), it
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seems that the diﬀerent monetary policies do not have any eﬀects on the switch-
ing mechanism. Indeed, the dynamics of the ﬁrst variable present comparable
average levels and volatility in both the scenarios. On the contrary, it may be
very interesting analyse the number of entrepreneurs leaving the market after
some defaults. The lower panels of the ﬁgure show how the ECB monetary
policy, adopting a more reactive policy and stabilizing the economy, reduces
by 40% the number of entrepreneurs which does not invest leaving the market.
Indeed, this scenario exhibits a lesser average interest rate likened to the Fed
simulation reducing the possibilities for the investment return to be lower than
the loans interest rate. This aﬀects the investment choice allowing to the en-
trepreneurs to purchase capital in the following period avoiding their exit from
the market.
Figure 9: Time series of the number of naive agents (upper panel) and
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number of entrepreneurs which leaves the market (lower panel). Left column:
Fed Treatment, right column: ECB Treatment. Purple tick line: average level;
grey shadow area: standard deviation.
Having described the results of two peculiar and empirically founded interest
rate rules, the inﬂation parameter (φpi) set value will be expanded considering a
wider range of values with the aim to ﬁnd some general insights, from a weaker
and non-obeying Taylor principle value to stronger ones. The analysis considers
four possible parametrizations: Scenario A (φpi = 0.5, φy = 1), Scenario B
(φpi = 1, φy = 1), Scenario C (φpi = 1.5,φy = 1) and Scenario D (φpi = 2,φy = 1).
Scenario A B C D
(φpi, φy) (0.5, 1) (1, 1) (1.5, 1) (2, 1)
YA 1.8114e
3 1.9411e3 2.1354e3 2.4115e3
σy (772.176) (715.469) (708.972) (719.463)
KA 1.4284e
3 1.5452e3 1.7210e3 1.9731e3
σk (694.796) (645.636) (644.771) (657.344)
pi −2.77% −2.84% −2.81% −2.88%
σpi (0.46%) (0.35%) (0.37%) (0.32%)
γ 6.5499 6.0673 5.6155 5.1150
σγ (0.8967) (0.8304) (0.9135) (0.8376)
Table 2: Average levels and standard deviations of output, capital, inﬂation
and number of entrepreneurs leaving the market for the four scenarios.
Table 2 depicts the average and the standard deviation of output, total cap-
ital, inﬂation and non-investing entrepreneurs of the four scenarios. From a
general overview, it can be noticed how the weaker inﬂation response policy
(Scenario A) exhibits the lowest levels both of output and capital with the
highest levels of standard deviation. Moving from this policy to the others
respecting the Taylor principle, it seems that greater is the response to the in-
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ﬂation, higher will be the average investment and therefore the average output.
This increase in the total capital may be explained by the decreasing value of
the number of entrepreneurs leaving the market, γ. Indeed, the entrepreneurs
leaving the market are those agents which do not invest. So, lower is their num-
ber, higher will be the total investment and therefore the output of the economy.
Hereafter in this subsection, will be compared more deeply the policies on the
two extremes, Scenario A and Scenario D, leaving the intermediate scenarios
time series in Appendix B.
Figure 10: Scenario A: time series of output (upper-left panel), total invest-
ment (upper-right panel), inﬂation (bottom-left panel) and number of entre-
preneurs which leaves the market (lower-right panel). Blue tick line: average
level; grey shadow area: standard deviation.
116
Figure 11: Scenario D: time series of output (upper-left panel), total invest-
ment (upper-right panel), inﬂation (bottom-left panel) and number of entre-
preneurs which leaves the market (lower-right panel). Blue tick line: average
level; grey shadow area: standard deviation.
Figures 10 and 11 show the time series of the main variables for the two
scenarios. Comparing the trends in these ﬁgures, it is possible to see how the
policies exhibit similar both dynamics and ﬁnal levels for all the variables. How-
ever, Scenario A (φpi < 1) registers: higher economic growth, 0.21% per quarter
compared to 0.15% per quarter of the obeying Taylor principle policy, but lower
average values of total investment and output. As in the previous Fed-ECB
analysis, this ﬁnding may be justiﬁed by the higher volatility registered by the
weaker policy.22 Indeed, the stronger policy, being more reactive (φpi > 1), is
able to stabilize better the oscillations of the variables. Besides to reduce the
volatility, the scenario with a strong policy exhibits on average lower interest
rates. This combination of outcomes reduces the possibilities for the investment
return to be lower than the loans interest rate and therefore entails a lower prob-
22This can also be seen in the output ﬁrst diﬀerence plot, Figure 16 in Appendix B, showing
how Scenario D registers lower ﬂuctuations than Scenario A.
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ability of entrepreneurs to be insolvent. Indeed, as Table 1 illustrates, Scenario
D displays a number of bankrupt entrepreneurs leaving the market lower than
22% compared to the weak policy scenario. As a consequence, this lower num-
ber of non-investor entrepreneurs positively aﬀects the average levels of the total
investment and the output explaining their higher values, respectively 38% and
33% higher than in Scenario A.
Concluding, as found also by Assenza et al. (2013) and Anufriev et al.
(2013), a monetary policy responding weakly to inﬂation may mislead the (het-
erogeneous and bounded rational) entrepreneurs to take optimal investment
decisions. Hence, in a system characterized by backward-looking components
in the dynamics, a stronger monetary policy seems give the possibility for the
central bank to reduce the waves of optimism and pessimism by reducing the
volatility of output. In doing so, the central bank creates a more stable mac-
roeconomic environment (De Grauwe: 2012).
2.6 Final remarks
Concluding, the BGG model exhibits a ﬁnancial accelerator that links the
external ﬁnance premium and the wealth of the entrepreneur. Through the
ﬁnancial accelerator the model is able to ampliﬁes and propagates exogenous
shocks in the system. Nevertheless, the bankruptcy of the entrepreneur has not
an explicit role in the terms of the ﬁnancial contract or in the ﬂuctuations of
the economy. In the original BGG model, the default of the ﬁrm has no impact
on the relationship with the bank, this is always willing to extend credit. The
version of the ﬁnancial accelerator model which tries to take into account the
losses generates the opposite result. The losses generated by the default bring
to the collapse of the credit market and the total investment. Besides, both the
speciﬁcations are not able to generate endogenously the number of entrepreneurs
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which goes bankrupt and leaves the market but set it exogenously. The reason
for this shortcoming should be found in the representative agent assumption.
Therefore, in section 2.4, the paper develops an agent-based approach to the
ﬁnancial accelerator with heterogeneous agents in order to introduce a proper
role of bankruptcy in the credit relationships. In section 2.5, have been per-
formed some simulations evaluations, ﬁrst comparing two scenarios with dif-
ferent types of agent in the populations, then analysing the eﬀects of distinct
monetary rule on the same scenario. The main ﬁndings of the ﬁrst simula-
tions consist in the rise of bankruptcies and ﬂuctuations in the net worth of
the ﬁnancial intermediaries. Indeed, in both the scenarios, the number of de-
faulted entrepreneurs leaving the market is positive and emerges endogenously.
This aﬀects negatively the purchased capital and the total output. Besides,
the average number of agents quitting the business is reasonable and also the
ﬂuctuations are moderate. These bankruptcies aﬀect the rates of growth of
capital, ﬂattening them and avoiding the existence of huge spikes. Moreover,
the positive number of the entrepreneurs which defaults inﬂuences the wealth of
the ﬁnancial intermediaries and their future credit policy. For every bankrupt
entrepreneur, the ﬁnancial intermediary registers some losses which reduces its
net worth. Then the bankruptcy aﬀects the credit channel, ﬁrstly because the
bank will settle an extra cost to the defaulted entrepreneur ﬁnancial contract
in the following period, secondly because banks with lower ﬁnancial robustness
will ﬁx higher interest rate on loans. From the second group of simulations,
comparing interest rate rules with diﬀerent parametrizations, the model exhib-
its results in line with the standard literature. Indeed, the simulations suggest
that a stronger monetary policy, reducing the volatility, is able to reach both
higher ﬁnal values of output and invested capital and higher average levels. Be-
sides, reducing the ﬂuctuations, the strong monetary policy has a huge impact
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on the share of agents which defaults and leaves the market, even 40% less than
the weaker policy.
Concluding, certainly this is a simple model and in subsequent researches
could be consider several extensions to the this work. First, it would be in-
teresting increase the number of the actors, e.g. the entrepreneurs, in order
to investigate deeply the constrained borrowing scenarios. Second, this model
considers two ﬁnancial intermediaries but does not present a proper inter-bank
lending market. It could be interesting insert in the model a ﬁnancial system
with banks that compete among them or a more sophisticated bank sector, e.g.
divided in more branches (wholesale and retails for deposits and loans). Finally,
this paper restricts the analysis to a time horizon of two periods in the bank
behaviour. It would be interesting to allow to relief debt plans extended for
more than two periods. However, even if this paper does not exploit all these
possible extensions, it is able to generate endogenously the bankruptcies and
takes into account their real eﬀects on the net worth of the bank and on its
credit policy. Moreover, it is able to generate some important stylized economic
phenomena, such as unpredictable returns and volatility clustering.
Appendix A. Complete log-linearized BGG model
This section presents the complete log-linearization of the standard BGG
model. Let lower case variables denote percent deviations from the steady state
and the ratios among capital letters without time pedix denote the ratios of the
steady state values, the log-linearization of the model is:
yt =
C
Y
ct +
Ce
Y
cet +
I
Y
it +
G
Y
gt + ...+ φ
y
t , (A1)
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ct = −rt+1 + Et {ct+1} , (A2)
cet = nt+1 + ...+ φ
cet
t , (A3)
gt = ρggt−1 + ε
g
t , (A4)
qt = ϕ (it − kt) , (A5)
rkt+1 = (1−$) (yt+1 − kt+1 − xt+1) +$qt+1 − qt, (A6)
Et
{
rkt+1
}− rt+1 = −v [nt+1 − (qt + kt+1)] , (A7)
where
φyt ≡
DK
Y
log
µ ωˆ¯
0
ωdF (ω)RktQt−1Kt/DK
 ,
D ≡ µ
ωˆ¯
0
ωdF (ω)Rkt ,
φc
e
t ≡ log
(
1− Cet+1/Nt+1
1− Ce/N
)
,
v ≡ ψ
(
Rk/R
)
ψ′ (Rk/R)
,
$ ≡ 1− δ
(1− δ) + αY/ (XK) ,
121
ϕ ≡
(
Φ (I/K)
−1
)′
(
Φ (I/K)
−1
)′′ .
Equation (A1) represents the log-linearized version of the resource con-
straint, where the variation in aggregate expenditure yt is given by changes
in consumption of households (ct) and entrepreneurs (c
e
t ), in investment it or
in government expenditure gt. The last term represents how variations in mon-
itoring cost (µ) aﬀect the aggregate expenditure but it is a secondary factor.
Equations (A5), (A6) and (A7) are the log-linearized versions of equation (2.11)
(2.12) and (2.13). They represents the ﬁnancial sector and the ﬁnancial accel-
erator mechanism, in particular, equation (A7) incorporates the capital market
frictions, given that the cost of external funds inversely depends on the share of
purchased capital ﬁnanced by the entrepreneur's net worth.
yt = at + αkt + (1− α)Ωht, (A8)
yt − ht − xt − ct = η−1ht, (A9)
at = ρaat−1 + εat , (A10)
pit = Et−1 {κ(−xt) + βpit+1} , (A11)
κ ≡ (1− δ)
δ
(1− θβ)
Assuming that the supply of entrepreneurial labour is ﬁxed, the equation
(A8) represents the production function whereas equation (A9) describes the
labour market equilibrium. In equation (A10) is imposed that the exogenous
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shock to technology follows a stationary autoregressive process. Equation (A11)
characterizes the price adjustment following the stickiness à la Calvo and has the
shape of a standard Phillips curve. Indeed the demand changes inversely with
the markup xt, when the demand is high the retail sector purchases more whole-
sale goods from the entrepreneurs and therefore increases the relative wholesale
price and, by deﬁnition, reduces its markup. It should be underlined that the
slope coeﬃcient κ depends negatively on the degree of price inertia, hence de-
creases if the probability for an entrepreneur to do not be able to reoptimise her
price θ increases.
kt+1 = δit + (1− δ) kt, (A12)
nt+1 =
γRK
N
(
rkt − rt
)
+ rt + nt + ...+ φ
n
t , (A13)
φnt ≡
(
Rk/R− 1)K
N
(rkt + qt−1 + kt) +
(1− α) (1− Ω) (Y/X)
N
yt − xt,
Finally, equation (A12) and (A13) represent the evolution of the two state
variables, capital and net worth respectively. It should be notice that the evol-
ution of the net worth depends primarily on the value of lagged net worth and
by the net return on the investment weighted by the ratio of gross capital held
and entrepreneurial net worth (γRKN ).
This description concludes formally the description of the BGG model and
allow me to proof one of the shortcomings presented in Section 2.3.
Appendix B.
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Figure 10: Scenario 1, percentage variations of output (upper panel) and
total investment (bottom panel).
Figure 11: Scenario 1, autocorrelation function for the diﬀerence in perform-
ance among the strategies.
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Figure 12: Scenario 2, percentage variations of output (upper panel) and
total investment (bottom panel).
Figure 13: Scenario 2, percentage variations of output (upper panel) and
total investment (bottom panel).
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Figure 14: Scenario B: time series of output (upper-left panel), total invest-
ment (upper-right panel), inﬂation (bottom-left panel) and number of entre-
preneurs which leaves the market (lower-right panel). Blue tick line: average
level; grey shadow area: standard deviation.
Figure 15: Scenario C: time series of output (upper-left panel), total invest-
ment (upper-right panel), inﬂation (bottom-left panel) and number of entre-
preneurs which leaves the market (lower-right panel). Blue tick line: average
level; grey shadow area: standard deviation.
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Figure 15: Logarithmic ﬁrst diﬀerence of output. Tick line: weak monetary
policy (φpi = 0.5); dashed line: strong monetary policy (φpi = 1.5).
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Chapter 3
Heterogeneous expectations and
endogenous ﬂuctuations in the ﬁnancial
accelerator framework
Davide Bazzana
Lombardy Advanced School of Economic Research (LASER)
3.1 Introduction
In last decades, the macroeconomic investigation of monetary policy has been
shifting from a Real Business Cycle analysis to the new Keynesian Dynamic
Stochastic General Equilibrium modelling approach.1 This shift of paradigm
1See Mankiw (1989).
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occurred because, considering a market without imperfections, in the RBC the
ﬂuctuations are due to changes in factors productivity; whereas the NK-DSGE
assumes nominal and real frictions but maintains the rational and representative
agent approach. Both approaches do not recognize the importance of animal
spirits for the origin and the propagation of the ﬂuctuation in the economy.
Indeed, the quoted types of models are not able to endogenize ﬂuctuations and
require external shocks to raise variations from the steady state levels of the
variables.
During last years and especially from the burst of the Financial Crisis in 2007
behavioural economics has been developing concrete alternatives to the standard
rational representative approach using models with bounded rationality and
heterogeneous expectations. Keynes already argued that economic ﬂuctuations
are not only determined by fundamentals, but investor's animal spirits and the
market psychology (e.g. euphoria) inﬂuence ﬁnancial market performance.
The recent macroeconomic literature often investigates business-cycle dy-
namics by following two parallel paths: ﬁnancial frictions and heterogeneous
expectations. The goal of this paper is to develop a New Keynesian framework
which will link these two paths together.
The literature on ﬁnancial frictions builds a dynamic general equilibrium
model with imperfections in the credit market2 introducing information asym-
metry, collateral constraints or costly state veriﬁcations (agency cost). These
models clarify that the role of frictions is to amplify and propagate shocks to
the macroeconomy operating like a ﬁnancial accelerator. All of the mentioned
papers use the representative agent assumption and the rational expectation
hypothesis.
On the other hand, the modelling using heterogeneity is based on the as-
2See for example Bernanke et al. (1999), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) or Iacoviello and Neri
(2010).
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sumption that agents have diﬀerent expectations and beliefs about the future
and inserts this framework in a standard business cycle model. These models
show how heterogeneous beliefs may lead to market instability or to strange at-
tractors using rational expectation with other types of beliefs, e.g based on past
performance.3 Other examples of models with bounded rational agents, naive
or biased, can be found in Brock and Hommes (1998) or Branch and McGough
(2009).
There are many reasons why they should be used together. First of all, as
already mentioned, the assumption of ﬁnancial frictions implies imperfections in
the ﬁnancial markets, in other words, these models are assuming that borrowers
have diﬃculty to access to credit or that they can default, therefore there are
limitations in the credit policy with a credit spread (i.e. a premium in the loan
interest rate over the risk free interest rate). This changes according the net
worth (or collateral) of the borrower. The imperfections of the ﬁnancial markets
have been well investigated in the literature and the recent crisis has made them
even clearer.
Secondly, through heterogeneous expectations it is possible to represent ﬂuc-
tuations abandoning the exogenous shock hypothesis, indeed they allow to en-
dogenous ﬂuctuations to the system. The heterogeneous expectation hypothesis
supposes that agents behave in diﬀerent ways and have diﬀerent beliefs on the
future aggregate outcomes or on the future value of the variables; this assump-
tion has been supported by both empirical and experimental analyses like for
example Pfajfar and Zakelj (2011) or Burke and Manz (2011).
Moreover, it seems that the global ﬁnancial crisis has made clear that not
all the agents are driven by rational expectations. As Akerlof and Shiller (2009)
explain, agents can be pushed by animal spirits or irrational euphoria in their
consumption and saving decisions choosing non-optimal solutions.
3See Brock and Hommes (1997).
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There are two other reasons why it is important to develop a model with both
speciﬁcations to better explain the evolution of the business cycle due to shocks.
Firstly because the ﬁnancial accelerator can express the propagation and amp-
liﬁcation of shocks in the system, like it happened in the last crisis. Furthermore,
macroeconomic stability also depends on the set of behaviour strategies of the
agents and on how these react to the shocks, like changes in monetary policy,
or on how changes in beliefs may produce endogenous ﬂuctuations.
This analysis ﬁts into the same research branch of De Grauwe (2012), Mas-
saro (2013) or Anufriev et al. (2013) which has been investigating the eﬀects of
heterogeneous expectations on future inﬂation and output through the invest-
ment channel.
The paper is organized according the following structure: section 3.2 presents
the model with the heterogeneous expectations; section 3.3 proposes a simula-
tion of the system with the aim to investigate some policy prescriptions whereas
the last part (section 3.4) concludes.
3.2 The Model
The baseline framework of the model is a simpliﬁed version of the ﬁnancial
accelerator introduced by Bernanke Gertler and Gilchrist model (1999) with
a new behavioural assumption on the expectations formation mechanism. The
basic structure of the model considers ﬁve types of agents: households, two type
of entrepreneurs, retailers, capital producers and the public sector (the ﬁscal and
the monetary authorities). The households' behaviour is quite standard, they
live forever and have to take decisions on labour supply, consumption, savings
and investment. Indeed, they can choose to hold real money or risk free assets
with the aim to maximize their utility.
The two type of entrepreneurs are the core of the model. Conversely to the
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other agents, they have a ﬁnite horizon: each time a portion γ of them survives
to the next period and continues to produce. This assumption is made to avoid
the possibility of full self-ﬁnancing by entrepreneurs.
In every period each entrepreneur has a net worth composed by proﬁt and
wage of the previous period. With this worth the entrepreneurs purchase phys-
ical capital ﬁnancing the diﬀerence through loans from the bank. There are two
main variables that drive the borrowing decision: the accumulated net worth
and the expectations on the investment return that are heterogeneous among
the entrepreneurs. The ﬁrst variable aﬀects the cost of external ﬁnance and the
agency problem whereas the second drives the agent behaviour.
Following the extending literature4 which proofs that private sector beha-
viours are characterized by diﬀerent degree of heterogeneity and rationality, the
model assumes non perfectly rational agents.
Solved the ﬁnancial problem, the entrepreneurs hire labour to combine with
the physical capital producing output in the following period. This wholesale
output is then sell to the retailers that buy and re-sell the goods to the house-
holds. By assumption, these retailers compete in a monopolistic market, in this
way nominal stickiness is introduced in the economy.
3.2.1 The ﬁnancial intermediary problem
At the end of time t the j-th entrepreneur buys capital to be used in t+1.
The quantity of purchased capital and its price are denoted by Kjt+1 and Qt
respectively. Assuming that capital is homogeneous, the ﬁnancial constraints
apply to the whole capital of the ﬁrm and not just to investment.
The entrepreneur purchases capital goods QtK
j
t+1 using the available net
worth N jt+1 and bank loans B
j
t+1:
4See for example Carroll (2003), Branch (2004) or Pfajfar and Santoro (2010).
135
Bjt+1 = QtK
j
t+1 −N jt+1. (3.1)
Bank loans are extended by a ﬁnancial intermediary (henceforward a bank)
who faces an opportunity cost equal to the risk free gross rate, Rt+1. Entrepren-
eurs are risk neutral and households are risk averse, so the entrepreneur absorbs
any risk. Given the choices of the entrepreneur on Kjt+1, B
j
t+1 and given the risk
free interest rate Rt+1; the optimal contract is characterized by a non-default
ﬁrm-speciﬁc interest rate, Zjt+1, such that:
Zjt+1 =
[
χ+ µ
Bjt+1
N jt+1
]
Rt+1, (3.2)
with µ + χ > 1 and where
Bjt+1
Njt+1
is the leverage ratio. This equation shows the
relationship between the external cost of funds and the ﬁnancial condition of
the entrepreneurs. Indeed, the ﬁrm-speciﬁc interest rate on loans is a mark-up
over the risk free interest rate and it is increasing in
Bjt+1
Njt+1
, or i.e. it depends
inversely on the ﬁnancial soundness.
3.2.2 Heterogeneous expectations and optimal choices of
capital
Given the state-contingent debt contract, the expected return of the entre-
preneur's investment may be written as:
Et
{
Rkt+1QtK
j
t+1 − Zjt+1Bjt+1
}
, (3.3)
where the expectations are taken upon the return on invested capital, Rkt+1,
given that all the other variables are predetermined.
At this point, introducing heterogeneity in the entrepreneurs' behaviour,
136
i.e. in the heuristic forecasting rules, the expectations on the return dynamics
assume a crucial role in the investment decision of the entrepreneur.
Abandoning the world of rational expectations and taking the view that
agents are not perfectly rational and have cognitive limitations or computational
limits,5 we assume two diﬀerent forecasting rules:
Eo,t
{
Rkt+1
}
= Rk∗ + b, (3.4)
Ep,t
{
Rkt+1
}
= Rk∗ − b, (3.5)
where o means optimistic expectation and p represents pessimistic rule.
Equations (3.4) and (3.5) describe biased behaviours of bounded rational agents,
as in Brock and Hommes (1998), where b represents the bias parameter and Rk∗
is the the fundamental (historical) investment return. More precisely, these en-
trepreneurs have a commonly shared belief on fundamental investment return
plus a type speciﬁc bias, i.e. the agents have an approximate knowledge of the
correct fundamental value of the investment return but they disagree on the
real current level. If the bias reduces the expected return we are considering an
agent with pessimistic expectation, in the opposite case she is an optimistic
entrepreneur.
The optimization problem of the j-th entrepreneur of h-Th type is deﬁned
by the following optimization problem:
max
B
Eh,t
{
Rkt+1
}
QtK
j
t+1 − Zjt+1Bjt+1 with h = o, p,
where Eh,t
{
Rkt+1
}
represents the expected return on investment of the j-th
entrepreneur that could be optimist or pessimist.
5Some examples in the growing literature on bounded rationality are Duﬀy (2006) or
Conlisk (1980), whereas on the cognitive limitation of the agents see e.g. Hommes and Zhu
(2014), Hommes et al. (2005) or Branch and Evans (2005).
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From the maximization problem, it is possible to establish a relationship
between capital expenditure and entrepreneur's ﬁnancial expectation measured
by the expected discounted spread between the return of capital with the risk
free rate and the entrepreneurial net worth. The capital/wealth ratio may indeed
be expressed as the increasing function of the premium on external funds and
it can be rewritten as:
QtK
j
t+1 = ψ(st+1)N
j
t+1, (3.6)
where ψ (st+1) = 1 +
Eh,t{Rkt+1}−χRt+1
2µRt+1
.
Through simple substitutions equation (3.6) can be rewritten as follow:
Bjh,t+1 =
Eh,t
{
Rkt+1
}− χRt+1
2µRt+1
N jt+1. (3.7)
Capital expenditure is proportional to the entrepreneur's net worth, with a
proportionality factor increasing in the expected discounted rate of return on
capital. Consequently, agents with higher wedge between expected return on
capital and risk free rate (optimistic entrepreneurs) will have higher incentive
to borrow from the ﬁnancial intermediary.
The entrepreneurs are constrained from raising the size of their ﬁrms by
the fact that increasing the amount of capital borrowed, they also increase the
leverage ratio and therefore reduce the return on investment. Indeed, increasing
debt, the non-fully self-ﬁnanced entrepreneurs increase the leverage ratio and
therefore the external ﬁnance costs. In this way they reduce the return on
capital that will be equal to the ratio between the investment net return and
the total amount of purchased capital as will be explained in subsection 3.2.5.
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3.2.3 Households, retailers and public sector
In this section we will describe the features of households, retailer sector,
government and central bank. As in the standard literature the households
have an inﬁnite horizon, they work, consume, hold money and invest their sav-
ings in ﬁnancial assets which pay the risk free interest rate. The household
maximization problem is therefore:
max
c,h,m
Et
∞∑
k=0
βk
[
ln (Ct+k) + ζln
(
Mt+k
Pt+k
)
+ ξln (1−Ht+k)
]
,
s.t. Ct = WtHt − Tt + Πt + RtDt −Dt+1 + (Mt−1−Mt)Pt , where Ct is the
consumption of the households, Wt is the household wage, Ht is the supply of
labour, T t are lump sum taxes, Πt are the dividends of the retail ﬁrms, Dt are
the deposits held at banks and MtPt is the real money balances between periods.
The ﬁrst order conditions of the problem can be written as:
Ct :→ 1
Ct
= Et
{
β
1
Ct+1
}
Rt+1, (A)
Ht :→ Wt
Ct
= ξ
1
1−Ht , (B)
Mt :→ Mt
Pt
= ζCt
(
Rnt+1
Rnt+1 − 1
)
, (C)
where Rt+1 = R
n
t+1
Pt+1
Pt
−1 and therefore Rnt+1 is the gross nominal interest rate.
It should be remembered that in equilibrium the household deposits are equal
to the total amount of loans of the bank, Dt = Bt. Households consumption
is driven by the consumption Euler equation (Equation A). Assuming the unit
coeﬃcient on the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, the log-linearized ver-
sion of the consumption Euler equation can be written as: ct = Et {ct+1}−rt+1.
The retail sector is characterized by monopolistic competition and nominal
rigidity à la Calvo (1983). The n-Th retailer sells the quantity of output Y t(n)
at the nominal price P t(n). The total ﬁnal goods and their price are therefore
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the combination of the individual retailer sales:
Y ft =
[ˆ 1
0
Yt(n)
(−1)/dn
]/(−1)
, (3.8)
with  > 1 and Pt =
[´ 1
0
Pt(n)
(1−)dn
]1/(1−)
.
To introduce price stickiness, in each period a share of ﬁrms faces the prob-
ability (1− θ) of being able to reoptimize its price. In every phase a retailer
faces a demand curve:
Yt(n) =
(
Pt(z)
Pt
)−
Y ft , (3.9)
therefore denoting with: P ∗t the price set by retailers able to reoptimize and
Y ∗t (z) the consequent demand given this price, the n-Th retailer sets the price
in order to maximize his expected discounted proﬁts:
∞∑
k=0
θkEt−1
{
Λt,k
(
P ∗t
Pt
)−
Y ∗t (n)
[
P ∗t
Pt
−
(

− 1
)
Pwt+k
Pt+k
]}
. (3.10)
In Equation (3.10), Λt,k = βCt/Ct+k represents the consumption based dis-
count rate equal to the shareholders intertemporal marginal rate of substitution,
θk is the probability that the price is ﬁxed for k periods and Pwt is the nominal
price of the wholesale goods.
Given that the share θ of retailers is not able to reoptimize in period t, the
evolution of the price will be:
Pt =
[
θP 1−t−1 + (1− θ) (P ∗t )1−
]1/(1−)
. (3.11)
By combining Equations (3.10) and (3.11) and log-linearizing, after some
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calculations, it is possible to obtain the following Phillips curve:
pit = f1Et−1 {pit}+ f2yt.
Finally, moving to the public sector, government expenditures are ﬁnanced
by lump sum taxes and money creation. Hence the government budget constrain
will be Gt = Tt +
(Mt−1−Mt)
Pt
. Following the standard literature, e.g. Clarida et
al. (2000) or Galì (2008), the main instrument of the monetary policy is the the
short-term nominal interest rate. Hence, the central bank adjusts the nominal
interest rate as stated by the following Taylor Rule:
rnt = ρrt−1 + (1− ρ) (φpipit + φyyt) + εt,
the monetary authority changes the actual interest rate reacting to: the current
inﬂation, the current output and the lagged interest rate.
3.2.4 Aggregation and General Equilibrium
Thus far we have described how the agents behave solving their own maxim-
ization problem. In this subsection these individual choices will be incorporate
within a dynamic general equilibrium framework.
The capital purchased by the entrepreneur is combined with labour in order
to produce wholesale output through the following Cobb-Douglas production
function:
Yt+1 = At+1K
α
t+1L
(1−α)
t+1 , (3.12)
where Yt+1 represents the aggregate production in period t+1, Kt+1 is the
aggregate amount of capital purchased by all the entrepreneurs, Lt+1 is the
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labour input and At+1 is an exogenous technology parameter. At this point, it
should be noticed that the heterogeneous expectations slightly aﬀect equations
(3.12) through the total invested capital, indeed in each time this variable is the
result of the diﬀerent investment choices of agents:
Kt+1 = so,t
(No,t+1 +Bo,t+1)
Qt
+ sp,t
(Np,t+1 +Bp,t+1)
Qt
, (3.13)
where st describes the share of entrepreneurs that uses a speciﬁc rule. For the
sake of simplicity, and given that the aim of the paper is to investigate the eﬀect
of heterogeneous expectations, it will be assumed that No,t+1 = Np,t+1, i.e. the
diﬀerent types of entrepreneurs have the same net worth at the beginning of
period t+1.6
Assuming a decentralized capital market in which the perfect competitive
capital producing ﬁrms act as simple clearing market traders,7 the price of
capital Qt in term of the numeraire good will be
Qt = Φ
(
Kt
Kt−1
)
, (3.14)
where Φ(· ) is increasing and concave and Φ(0) = 0.
Given that entrepreneurs sell their output to retailers which have market
power, the relative price of the wholesale goods will be 1/Xt where Xt =
Pt
Pwt
is
the gross markup of retail goods over wholesale goods. Consequently, the actual
rate of return of capital between two periods can be written as:
Rkt+1 =
(
1
Xt
αYt+1
Kt+1
)
+ (1− δ)Qt+1
Qt
, (3.15)
6This aspect could be modiﬁed in the future extensions in order to introduce more hetero-
geneity in the model.
7In other words we are assuming that at the beginning of the period these ﬁrms sell capital
at price Qt and at the end of period they purchase the undepreciated invested capital of the
entrepreneurs at price Qt+1, clearing the market.
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where the ﬁrst term in brackets is the rent paid to one unit of capital, the second
is the capital gain due to the fact that entrepreneurs resell the undepreciated
capital.
Besides capital, the technology requires also labour as input. The total
labour supply of the economy is composed by households and entrepreneurial
labour (Ht+1 and H
e
t+1 respectively):
Lt+1 = H
Ω
t+1(H
e
t+1)
1−Ω.
In a competitive market the demand curves for labour imply that wage
equates marginal product, therefore it will be
(1− α)Ω Yt+1
Ht+1
= Xt+1Wt+1,
(1− α)(1− Ω) Yt+1
Het+1
= Xt+1W
e
t+1,
where Wt+1 and W
e
t+1 are the real wage rate to the household and the entre-
preneur respectively.
The law of motion of the aggregate entrepreneurial net worth for each type,
Nh,t+2, is described as follows:
Nh,t+2 = γVh,t+1 +W
e
t+1, (3.16)
where Vh,t+1 represents the equity held by the entrepreneurs of the h-Th type.
Remembering that γ is the fraction of entrepreneurs which survives in each
period, γVh,t+1 are the equities held by entrepreneurs still in business in the
following period. This equity is the residual part of the return of the investment
after the repayment of the loans to the ﬁnancial intermediaries.
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Vh,t+1 = R
k
t+1QtKh,t+1−
[
χRt+1 + µ
Rt+1 (QtKh,t+1 −Nt+1)
Nt+1
]
(QtKh,t+1−Nt+1),
(3.17)
where the term
[
χRt+1 + µ
Rt+1(QtKh,t+1−Nt+1)
Nt+1
]
reﬂects the premium for ex-
ternal ﬁnance which has a negative relation with net worth and positive with
debt.
3.2.5 Performance measure and dynamic selection mech-
anism
In order to complete the speciﬁcation of the model, this subsection will
develop how the beliefs are updated over time and how the fractions of the
diﬀerent types change. The evolutionary selection is based upon a performance
(or ﬁtness) measure.
The evolutionary performance measure is publicly available but it is subject
to noise, it could be expressed as follow:
Uh,t+1 = U
d
h,t+1 + 
j
h,t+1, (3.18)
where Udh,t+1 =
Rkt+1QtKh,t+1−Zh,t+1Bh,t+1
QtKh,t+1
is the investment performance of the
entrepreneur following the h-Th forecasting rule. The investment performance
deﬁned in equation (3.18) has the ﬂavour of the ROI index, indeed it is the ratio
between the net return of the investment and the total amount of purchased cap-
ital. The performance measure deﬁned before is not the only possible measure
but it has the advantages to be clear and to avoid that the choice of switch-
ing is exclusively determined by the ﬁrm speciﬁc shock, hence to be randomly
deﬁned. Alternative performance measures could be the diﬀerence between the
ﬁrm speciﬁc investment return and the average of the market or a weighted sum
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between the average investment performance of the class and the just deﬁned
diﬀerence, but it adds more complexity to the system and its eﬀect is left to
future possible extensions.
As in the standard literature, e.g. Hommes (2013), jh,t+1 represents an IID
noise across individual j-th entrepreneurs and the types h = 1, 2 drawn from
a double exponential distribution. When the number of entrepreneurs goes to
inﬁnity, as showed by Diks and Van der Weide (2005) and Hommes et al. (2005),
the probability for an agent to choose the h-Th forecasting rule is given by a
discrete choice model with multinomial logit probabilities:
sh,t+2 = (1− ν)e
ϑUjh,t+1
Zt+1
+ νsh,t, (3.19)
where parameter ϑ represents the intensity of choice, i.e. how the entre-
preneurs are sensitive to selecting the optimal forecast strategy, and Zt+1 =∑H
h=1 e
ϑUjh,t+1 is a normalizing factor.
There are two main insights related to this dynamic mechanism: the higher
is the ﬁtness measure of the h-Th forecasting rule, the larger is the number of
entrepreneurs who switch to this strategy; the higher is the intensity of choice,
the more rational are the agents. When ϑ = ∞ corresponds with the case
without noise, so the deterministic part of performance measure can be observed
and therefore all the agents will switch to the optimal forecast. On the opposite
case, ϑ = 0, the variance of noise term is inﬁnite, thus the diﬀerences in the
ﬁtness measures cannot be observed and the share of entrepreneurs which choose
each forecasting rule will be ﬁxed an equal to 1/H. It should be noted that the
switching model expressed by Equation (3.19) assumes asynchronous updating,
indeed in each period only a fraction (1− ν) of entrepreneur can revise its belief
according to the new available information.
The evolution of the optimistic entrepreneur will be therefore:
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so,t+2 = (1− ν)
exp
{
ϑ
(
Rkt+1QtKo,t+1−Zo,t+1Bo,t+1
QtKo,t+1
)}
Zt+1
+ νso,t+1,
with so,t+2 + sp,t+2 = 1.
3.3 Simulations
This section presents the results of some quantitative analyses aiming to
illustrate how the heterogeneous expectations and the ﬁnancial accelerator are
able to endogenously modify the business cycle without the existence of external
shocks.
Following Clarida et al. (1999), the choice of the parameter value for the
baseline model is quite standard. Looking at the households, their quarterly
discount factor (β) is 0.99 and they have a ﬁxed labour supply elasticity (η) at
3. In the production function the capital share (α) is 0.2 with a depreciation
rate (δ) of 0.025, the household labour share (1− α) (1− Ω) is 0.64 whereas
the correlation in the technology law of motion (ρa) is assumed to be 1.0. The
probability θ that ﬁrms are not able to reoptimize their price within a period
equal to 0.75 and the mark-up of the retail sector with respect to the wholesale
market (X) is 1.2. Looking to the ﬁnancial sector, the rate of the survival
of the entrepreneurs among the periods (γ) is 0.9728 whereas the weight terms
in the ﬁnancial intermediary interest rate setting are µ = 0.7 and χ = 0.6.
Entrepreneurs have a bias of 5% around the fundamental value of the investment
return and, according to the parametrization of Anufriev and Hommes (2012),
in the asynchronous updating mechanism the fraction of the entrepreneur that
can revise its beliefs will be 0.9 with intensity of choice equal to 0.4.
Finally, the simulation are performed for 700 quarters and using 5 Monte
Carlo series, each series diﬀers from the others for the initial level of the main
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variables in t = 0, in a range from 0.1 to 1.5. However, for the sake of clarity
and without loss of generality, the following ﬁgures will show the average of the
series dynamic in 25 or 50 quarters.
3.3.1 Homogeneous and fundamentalist vs biased and na-
ives
Before analysing the comparative monetary policies, it is relevant to under-
line the importance of using both heterogeneity and bounded rationality in the
model. In this subsection we perform simulations with homogeneous funda-
mentalist agents, with and without ﬁnancial frictions, and heterogeneous naive
entrepreneurs applying a ﬂexible inﬂation targeting monetary policy.8 Funda-
mentalist and homogeneous agents have unbiased expectations based on funda-
mental levels of output gap and current inﬂation in the NK-IS curve and in the
Phillips Curve. In other words, they completely believe to the Central Bank's
targets on output gap and inﬂation, respectively equal to 0 and 2%. Conversely,
in the heterogeneous and naive scenario, agents may have optimistic and pess-
imistic expectations on the investment return and they have the same naive
expectation on the current output gap and inﬂation. The entrepreneurs have
biased expectations on their investment return and all the agents in the economy
are naive, basing their expectations on output and inﬂation on the last period
level. The simulation assumes a ﬂexible inﬂation targeting monetary policy sat-
isfying the Taylor Principle. Indeed, in case of weak monetary approach (e.g.
φpi = 0.5 and φy = 0.4) the model presents an explosive path for every type of
expectations rule apart from the fundamentalist one. Hence, the ﬁrst suggestion
is that weak monetary policies seems not able to stabilize the economy. The
8 rnt = φpipit + φyyt, with φpi = 1.5 and φy = 1.
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system shows divergent paths of growth depending on the initial condition. This
may be explained by the dominance of positive feedback, i.e. this policy is not
able to close the output gap and therefore there is a self-reinforcing mechanism
according to which entrepreneurs may become pessimist bringing the capital
and output to lower levels.
Figure 1 plots results of three simulations: a heterogeneous framework with
naive agents and ﬁnancial accelerator and two scenarios with homogeneous and
fundamentalist agents, with and without ﬁnancial accelerator. The baseline sim-
ulations are based on a model with diﬀerent initial conditions for output gap and
inﬂation, so the ﬁgures represent the average dynamics in the three scenarios.
The black line in each picture indicates the evolution in the homogeneous and
fundamentalist model without ﬁnancial accelerator, the magenta line represents
the dynamics in the homogeneous and fundamentalist model with the ﬁnancial
accelerator, whereas the blue line is the heterogeneous model evolution with the
ﬁnancial accelerator. The initial values are higher than the steady state levels
and have the same eﬀect on ﬂuctuations of a standard technology or demand
shocks. As in the original BGG model, the ﬁnancial accelerator magniﬁes and
propagates the shocks. The explaining mechanism is the raise in the cost of loans
associated with higher initial values. This aﬀects the cost of loans bringing to
a fall down in investments. In the next periods, the ﬁnancial accelerator aﬀects
investments in a positive way. Looking at the homogeneous scenarios, invest-
ments increase with a steeper shape in the simulation with ﬁnancial accelerator
allowing an overshooting reaction in the output gap. However, in both cases, the
system converges to the steady state after few periods. Conversely, in presence of
heterogeneity and naive expectations more persistent ﬂuctuations emerge. The
combination of the ﬁnancial accelerator with the switching mechanism ampliﬁes
the oscillations. As in the homogeneous frame, the initial conditions are higher
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than the steady state levels aﬀecting the cost of loans and therefore the amount
of invested capital. The collapse of investment is further worsen by the increase
of pessimist agents. Indeed, by deﬁnition, when the share of of pessimists in-
creases the investment in capital decreases. The convergence of the capital to
its steady state level may be explained with the reduction of the inﬂation rate
which decreases the risk free interest rate. Lowering this interest rate, it in-
creases the spread between the investment return and the interest rate on loans.
All this is translated into a long run positive convergence path to the steady
state for capital and output gap and into a reduction of pessimist entrepreneurs
in the population.
Figure 1: Simulation with ﬂexible inﬂation targeting Monetary Policy; blue line:
heterogeneous entrepreneurs and naive agents; black line: homogeneous and
fundamentalist agents without ﬁnancial accelerator, magenta line: homogeneous
and fundamentalist agents with ﬁnancial accelerator.
3.3.2 Evolution of the system with diﬀerent Monetary
Policies
This subsection expands the analysis performing some comparative statics
on diﬀerent interest rate rules in order to draw some policy recommendations.
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This exercise is motivated by the perspective that central banks can pursue
diﬀerent aims.9 For example, according to EU treaties, the ECB should keep
stability of price and ﬁnancial system, whereas the Fed should also pursue the
output stability. In order to perform comparative analyses, the hypothesized
monetary policies will be:
rnt = φpipit + φyyt,
where the inﬂation parameter (φpi) will be equal to 1.5, whereas the coeﬃcient
on output gap (φy) may be null (strict inﬂation targeting monetary policy) or
equal to 1 (ﬂexible inﬂation targeting monetary policy).
Moreover, the subsection describes how the ﬂuctuations of the economy due
to diﬀerent policies may depend on the composition of the forecasting rules on
inﬂation and output gap. The simulations are performed assuming biased entre-
preneurs and four diﬀerent expectation rules on output gap and inﬂation: naive,
fundamentalist, weak trend-follower and anchoring and adjustment (LAA) rule.
xet = xt−1, (3.20)
xet = x
∗, (3.21)
xet = xt−1 + 0.4 (xt−1 − xt−2) , (3.22)
xet = 0.5
(
xavt−1 + xt−1
)
+ (xt−1 − xt−2) , (3.23)
where x is the hypothetical reference variable, x∗ represents its fundamental
value and xav is its average level.
As in the previous subsection, Equations (3.20) and (3.21) represent the
naive and fundamentalist behaviour respectively. The weak trend-following rule
9In Appendix B are performed some simulations comparing two interest rate smoothing
rules choosing parametrizations above and below the Taylor Principle boundary (φpi = 1).
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(chartist) is given by the extrapolation rule described by Equation (3.22) and it
has been deeply analysed (with laboratory experiments) by Hommes (2011) and
by Frankel and Froot (1990) in their analysis on the trading rules for the ﬁnancial
market. The most sophisticated heuristics is described by Equation (3.23).
Indeed, this strategy exhibits an adaptive learning since the expected value is
anchored to the mean between the past average and the last observation plus the
short-term variation between the two previous periods. The assumption behind
these simulations is that the entrepreneurs have a heterogeneous expectation
on the return of capital, biased around its steady state values, but they have
the same expectations on the ﬁnal output and the inﬂation of the economy.
This is in line with the experimental literature, see for example Assenza et al.
(2013), according which the agents may coordinate on diﬀerent heuristic rules
for diﬀerent variables to forecast.
Having described in the previous subsection the diﬀerences of the system
behaviour among diﬀerent types of expectations, in this subsection, ﬁrstly will
be illustrated the diﬀerences in dynamics changing the policy but ﬁxing the type
of agents in the economy, secondly will be draw some common ﬁnding among
the scenarios. The considerations of the diﬀerence intra-agents are left for the
last part of the subsection.
Figure 2 considers entrepreneurs and naive expectations. Starting from ini-
tial levels which are higher than the inﬂation and output gap steady states, it
is possible to see how in the ﬁrst periods there is an increase in the number of
pessimist entrepreneurs. This can be explained by the fact that these initial
levels imply a risk free interest rate higher than its fundamental and therefore
higher cost on loans. With high external ﬁnance interest rate and relatively low
amount of invested capital, the pessimist entrepreneurs register higher perform-
ance measure than the optimist ones increasing their share. When the number
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of pessimists grows, the amount of invested capital in next period will decrease
aﬀecting also the total output. Over time, the performance of optimistics in-
creases as a consequence of output levels which are lower than the steady state
aﬀecting also the dynamics of the variables which converge to the steady state
levels.
Comparing the dynamics of the system with the two monetary policies, it
is possible to notice how the strict inﬂation targeting monetary policy (the red
line in the graph) yields deeper ﬂuctuations in both the considered variables
(capital and output). These eﬀects may be explained taking in to account that
this policy has not in its aims the closure of the output gap and therefore the
output and the investment can oscillate aﬀecting the return on capital and the
expectations of the entrepreneurs. As a consequence to the fall of the output,
the entrepreneurs become pessimist reducing their investment in the following
period more than in the ﬂexible inﬂation targeting scenario. This chain of eﬀects
is partially mitigated by the reduction of the inﬂation allowing the growth in
capital return and therefore inverting the trends of capital and output around
their steady state values.
Figure 2: Simulation with biased entrepreneurs and naive agents; red line:
strict inﬂation targeting monetary policy, blue line: ﬂexible inﬂation targeting
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monetary policy.
Considering a population with weak trend following expectations, Figure 3
represents the simulations result with both monetary policies. It is possible to
notice how the ﬂexible inﬂation targeting policy (i.e. the blue line) entails lower
ﬂuctuations in the fractions of entrepreneurs. These variations aﬀect the invest-
ment choice as it is shown by the negative path of capital in the ﬁrst periods. As
presented by the graph on the top-left hand side, this evolution has a negative
eﬀect on the output. Besides, there are two separated eﬀects which inﬂuence
the evolution of the entrepreneurs' share: the ﬂuctuations in the inﬂation and
the eﬀect on output variations. The ﬁrst has positive implications on the risk
free interest rate which decreases the spread between the investment return and
the interest rate on loans. Secondly, the negative variations of the output gap
may aﬀect the investment return which will reduce the ROI of the entrepren-
eur. The strict inﬂation targeting monetary policy implies higher undershooting
phenomena due to the excess of negative feedback. This policy, trying to push
the inﬂation to the steady state level, increases the interest rate and reduces
the investment return via the external ﬁnance cost. This result may induce to
large ﬂuctuations in the expectations on the entrepreneurs' investment return
transforming the majority of them in pessimist. The reductions of both invest-
ments and production aﬀect negatively the return of capital and accordingly the
performance measure.
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Figure 3: Simulation with biased entrepreneurs and weak trend following ex-
pectations; red line: strict inﬂation targeting monetary policy, blue line: ﬂexible
inﬂation targeting monetary policy.
Figure 4 displays simulations concerning the fundamentalist expectations
scenarios maintaining the heterogeneity given by the bias in the expectations
on the return on capital. Starting from higher initial values for output gap
and inﬂation than the fundamental levels, we observe that the model converges
close to the steady state after few periods in which the share of pessimist en-
trepreneurs increases. The reason why there is not complete and immediate
convergence may be due: ﬁrstly to the persistence of the bias in the return of
capital expectations which implies ﬂuctuations in the amount of investments,
secondly to the stickiness in the discrete choice mechanism. It is interesting to
notice that with fundamentalist expectation the system does not present any
signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the ﬂuctuations even if there is a change in the monetary
policy.
154
Figure 4: Simulation with biased entrepreneurs and fundamentalist expect-
ations; red line: strict inﬂation targeting monetary policy, blue line: ﬂexible
inﬂation targeting monetary policy.
The last scenario analyses agents extrapolating the next expected variable
level from a reference point,
xAt−1+xt−1
2 .
10 For both the policies, the model simu-
lations exhibit very peculiar results. Indeed, the environment displays persistent
ﬂuctuations with the presence of over and undershooting phenomena which does
not allow the convergence to the steady state in the short period. As showed
by Figure 5, in both the scenarios the central bank is not able to reach immedi-
ately the steady state level. Nevertheless, the ﬂuctuations exhibit a decreasing
amplitude converging to the steady state in the long run. This dynamic can be
explained by the adaptive learning behaviour in the expectations. In each time
the agents update their information on the past realizations of variables, i.e. the
averages, and form their expectations adding a trend-component. Therefore, be-
ing bounded by the average through this updating process, on the one side the
agents reduce the possible range of their predictions aﬀecting also the actual
10 See Tversky and Kahneman (1974) for a thorough dissertation of this rule.
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variables, on the other side the anchor (i.e. the average) acts like a stickiness
delaying the convergence process to the steady state.
Figure 5: Simulation with biased entrepreneurs and anchoring-adjustment
expectation rule; red line: strict inﬂation targeting monetary policy, blue line:
ﬂexible inﬂation targeting monetary policy.
Summarizing the results of these analyses, on the one hand, it is interesting
to notice how the strict inﬂation targeting policy yields deeper ﬂuctuations in
the ﬁrst periods but, when the timing is considered, it is able to stabilize the
economy in fewer quarters. On the one side, these two results may be explained
by the aim of the policy (to stabilize the price ﬂuctuations) and by how this is
pursued. This policy does not take into account the ﬂuctuations in the output
gap, therefore all the related graphs illustrate higher variations for this variable.
On the other side, the ﬂexible inﬂation targeting monetary policy brings the
system to lower ﬂuctuations even though these are more persistent. Replying
strongly to the ﬂuctuations of the variables, this policy generates continuous
and negative feedback on the investment decisions of the entrepreneurs increas-
ing the probability for them to have in each period the wrong attitude, i.e.
the less proﬁtable expectations. On the other hand, comparing the eﬀects of
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both the policies on the four scenarios arises an interesting and counterintuitive
insight: more sophisticated is the heuristic, higher seem be the ﬂuctuations of
the economy.11 Indeed, looking at the average output gap and the inﬂation, the
anchoring and adjustment expectations rule registers the lower average levels
but the higher standard deviations.12 This can be explained by the mechan-
ism driving the heuristic. Indeed, the anchor parameter, i.e. the mean among
the past observations average and the last observation, may be source of a
time-varying bias. Besides the anchor, the LAA heuristic extrapolates the last
variable change increasing the variance of the predictions. Conversely, naive and
weak trend-following scenarios exhibit lower ﬂuctuations. The reason of quite
similar statisticsts between these behaviours can be found in their nature: if the
trend parameter goes to zero, the trend-following rule simpliﬁes to the naive
heuristic. In addition, the trend-following rule exhibits higher (lower) volatility
depending on the pro-trend nature of the heuristic which involves waves of pess-
imism and optimism in the investment decisions and therefore in the output.
Concluding, it should be underlined that the scenarios endogenously gener-
ate the economic ﬂuctuations thanks to the heterogeneity in the entrepreneurs'
expectations on the capital return. Besides, as described in the related literat-
ure on the discrete choice mechanism, it should be highlighted how the results
of these simulations are highly dependent from the initial conditions.
Having showed how the heterogeneity and the bounded rationality rise en-
dogenous ﬂuctuation in the system, the next section will present the eﬀects of
some macroeconomic shocks with the aim to investigate which monetary policy
(between strong and inﬂation oriented) is able to better stabilize the economy.
11Henceforward in the discussion, even if the comments may also apply for the fundamental-
ist behaviour, this heuristic will be excluded given that it does not set a proper computational
rule. Indeed, as explained, this rule of thumb assumes that agents know the fundamental and
steady state value of the variables but it does not specify how they are able to compute them.
12All the statistics are reported in Appendix C.
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3.3.3 Stabilization analysis
The simulations described in this section are hit by three types of macroe-
conomics shocks: monetary, on the supply side and on the production. The
treated population has naive expectations and the model has run for 700 quar-
ters. The ﬁgures show the impact of unanticipated 1% increase in the variable
from its steady state level in scenarios with ﬂexible inﬂation targeting (FIT)
monetary policy and strict inﬂation targeting (SIT) monetary policy.
Figure 7 represents the dynamics with a demand shock. The shock on prices
aﬀects positively the risk free interest rate and it may reduce the spread between
the return of capital and the interest rate on loan. As a consequence, more
entrepreneurs become pessimist on the proﬁtability of the investment and reduce
the purchase of capital causing an output drop down.
Comparing now the magnitude of the ﬂuctuations among the two possible
policies, it can be seen how the FIT policy is able to better stabilize the economy.
The strict inﬂation targeting monetary policy, leaving aside the stabilization of
the output from its goals, yields ﬁve times higher ﬂuctuations than the ﬂexible
inﬂation targeting monetary policy. The huge variations aﬀects also the trends
of capital, given that the return of capital is a function of the production and
the entrepreneurs are willing to purchase more capital only if it is proﬁtable.
Another channel of propagation is founded in the higher ﬂuctuations of the
return of capital bringing to higher variations in the entrepreneur's fractions.
The unanticipated variations in the return of capital modify the spread between
this and the interest rate on loan and consequently the return on investment, i.e.
the performance measure upon which the entrepreneurs base their expectations.
158
Figure 7: Simulation with price's shock; red line: strict inﬂation targeting
monetary policy, blue line: ﬂexible inﬂation targeting monetary policy.
Analysing the responses of an unexpected monetary shock - more precisely
an unanticipated exogenous movement in the short-term interest rate of 1% -
Figure 8 exhibits a drop in output and purchased capital: when the risk free
interest rate increases the cost of external ﬁnance increases as well reducing the
proﬁtability of the investment.
Even if the dynamics in the share types are quite comparable, the increase
in the share of pessimist agents has deeper eﬀects on the dynamics in the SIT
framework. In this scenario, the monetary authority focuses only on the inﬂation
level without stabilizing the output gap. Thus, it is not able to avoid the
propagation in the system of wider ﬂuctuations. The drop in the investment
deteriorates the total output and the dynamic of inﬂation. Consequently, this
fall in inﬂation has positive eﬀects on the risk free interest rate and on the cost
of loans in the following periods. This explains why in the framework registering
the higher fall in inﬂation there are also overshooting phenomena in output and
capital dynamics.
However, it seems that a policy concerning both the stabilization on price
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and the output gap (the ﬂexible inﬂation targeting monetary policy) is able to
better stabilize the system. This is true when the entity of the ﬂuctuations
is evaluated, but the results are not so clear if the goals are the short run
ﬂuctuations. Indeed they seem more persistent, therefore the time required
to reach the steady state is wider. According to Figure 8, the strict inﬂation
targeting policy seems to be closer to the steady state after fewer quarters than
the FIT monetary policy.
Figure 8: Simulation with monetary shock; red line: strict inﬂation targeting
monetary policy, blue line: ﬂexible inﬂation targeting monetary policy.
The analysis concludes investigating the impulse responses to a positive
shock aﬀecting the total output of the economy. Figure 9 shows how this shock
inﬂuences positively the inﬂation in the next period. This dynamic can be ex-
plained looking to the nature of the expectations and how these aﬀect the actual
inﬂation. Indeed, the unexpected and temporary growth of production interests
the inﬂation with delay due to naive expectations. Moreover, it is helpful to
highlight the substantial impact of the monetary policy goals on the convergence
to the steady state. The shock in the strict inﬂation targeting monetary policy
drives the invested capital to an overshooting evolution before it converges to
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the steady state. This dynamic emerges because this policy does not consider
the output gap as a priority. Therefore, in the SIT scenario the increase in
the output positively inﬂuences the risk free interest rate by means of inﬂation
growth, whereas in the FIT scenario it acts by means of both inﬂation and out-
put. As a consequence, the external ﬁnance premium will be lower in the SIT
scenario and the expected net return on investment will be higher as well as the
invested capital.
Figure 9: Simulation with production's shock; red line: strict inﬂation tar-
geting monetary policy, blue line: ﬂexible inﬂation targeting monetary policy.
3.4 Concluding remarks
This paper presents a ﬁnancial accelerator framework to study the eﬀects
of heterogeneous and bounded rational expectations. It uses the heterogen-
eous framework of Brock and Hommes (1997) where the decision to switch the
expectations arises from an endogenous process aiming to the most proﬁtable
strategy. The analysis addresses the investigation of the heterogeneity and ﬁn-
ancial accelerator eﬀects on the investment decisions, indeed the heterogeneity
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of the expectations on capital return brings the agents to purchase diﬀerent
amount of capital.
In this framework, the macroeconomic ﬂuctuations emerge endogenously in
the model thanks to the expectations updating mechanism. Indeed, this result
can be explained by the bounded rationality of the entrepreneurs, i.e. they have
not perfect and complete information. First of all, they have only a common be-
lief on fundamental investment return but they do not know the general feeling
of the market, in other words, the share of pessimist and optimist in the mar-
ket. Secondly, the diﬀerent patterns of investment between the entrepreneur's
types and the consequent unknown amount of total capital aﬀect the return on
investment of every single entrepreneur. This can misplace the entrepreneurs
transforming a former proﬁtable strategy into a non proﬁtable one.
In this model, the ﬁnancial accelerator and the asset price volatility work
to amplify the ﬂuctuations in a signiﬁcant quantitative way, especially in the
investment choices. These channels aﬀect both the single investment decisions
and the future fractions, amplifying the future total investment and the ﬂuc-
tuations of the system. Hence, the model is able to generate some important
stylized facts in many ﬁnancial and economical series, e.g. unpredictable re-
turns. After having found endogenous ﬂuctuations analysing the model with
diﬀerent expectation rules, the paper performed some simple monetary policy
simulations in order to understand if there are some general intuitions on which
policies are better to stabilize the market.
As in the reference literature,13in this framework, macroeconomic stability
and inﬂation dynamics depend interestingly on the set of forecasting strategies
and the types of the policy rule considered. Summarizing, this analysis seems
suggest two policy prescriptions.
On the one side, the core results of these analyses seem to argue that no
13See for example Anufriev et al. (2013) or Massaro (2013).
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monetary policy is able to quickly stabilize the system completely, actually some
ﬂuctuations persist for many quarters. On the one hand, the ﬂexible inﬂation
targeting monetary policies better stabilize the economy yielding smaller ﬂuc-
tuations. The SIT policies allow output gap to register ﬂuctuations higher than
the ﬂexible inﬂation targeting policy. In most of the cases, this output dynamic
implies higher ﬂuctuations in the return of capital bringing to higher variations
in the entrepreneur's fractions. On the other hand, it is interesting to notice
that even if the strict inﬂation targeting policy yields deeper ﬂuctuations, these
are less persistent. As explained, these results may be due to the aim of this
speciﬁc monetary policy. In other words, the FIT policy replies actively to the
ﬂuctuations of the variables and generates continuous and negative perturba-
tions to the investment decisions of the entrepreneurs increasing the probability
for them to switch to the other investment strategy.
On the other side, the stabilizing eﬀect of the monetary policy strongly
depends on the nature of the forecasting rules. Moreover, this analysis seems
suggest a counterintuitive result. Indeed, it seems that in scenarios with more
sophisticated heuristics the ﬂuctuations are higher. In other words, increasing
the decision-making and computational ability of the agents may not increase
both the probability of more performing investment decisions and the system
stability.
Concluding, in a framework with heterogeneity and bounded rationality, it
seems that the Central Banks should take seriously into account the heterogen-
eity and the bounded rationality of the agents when designing monetary policy.
Appendix A: The complete log-linearized model
This section presents the complete log-linearization of the model. Let lower
case variables denote percent deviations from the steady state and the ratios
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among capital letters without time pedix denote the ratios of the respective
steady state values, the log-linearization of the model is:
bht = n
h
t−1+
1
(RK±b−χR)
2µR
(
Q (RK ± b)
2µR
)
(qt−1 − rt−1) (A1),
zht =
χR
χR+ µB
hR
Nh
rt−1 +
µBhR
Nh
[
χR+ µB
hR
Nh
] (bht + rt−1 − nht−1) (A2) ,
qt = ϕ (kt−kt−1) (A3) ,
kht =
Bh
(Bh +Nh)
bht +
Nh
(Bh +Nh)
nht−1 − qt−1 (A4) ,
kt =
soKo
(soKo + spKp)
(
kot + s
o
t−1
)
+
spKp
(soKo + spKp)
(
kpt + s
p
t−1
)
(A5) ,
rkt =
1
αY
XKQ + (1− δ)
[
αY
XKQ
(yt − kt − qt−1) + (1− δ) (qt − qt−1)
]
(A6) ,
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nht =
γRkQKh
γ (RkQKh − ZhBh) +W e
(
rkt + qt−1 + k
h
t
)− γZhBh
γ (RkQKh − ZhBh) +W e
(
zht + b
h
t
)
+...
...+
W e
γ (RkQKh − ZhBh) +W ew
e
t (A7),
Uah,t =
RkQKh
RkQKh − ZhBh
(
rkt + qt−1 + k
h
t
)− ZhBh
RkQKh − ZhBh
(
zht + b
h
t
)−kht −qt−1 (A8) ,
yt = b1 [a1Et−1 {yt}+ a2 (rt − Et−1 {pit})] + b2kt (A9) ,
pit = f1Et−1 {pit}+ f2yt + εpit (A10) ,
rnt = ρr
n
t−1 + (1 + ρ) (τpit + ιyt) + ε
r
t (A11) .
Equation (A1) represents the log-linearized version of the solution of the en-
trepreneur's maximization problem. Equation (A2) is the log-linearized interest
rate on loans and represents the positive inﬂuence of the leverage ratio on the
external ﬁnance cost and represents the ﬁnancial accelerator. Equations (A3),
(A4), (A5) and (A6) characterize the investment demand. Equations (A3) and
(A6) are the standard relations for marginal product of capital and the link
between asset price and investment. Equation (5) represents the total inves-
ted capital and is the weighted sum of purchased capital of the two fractions,
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described by Equation (A5).
The evolution of the entrepreneur's net worth is described by Equation (A7),
this aﬀects the investment decision aﬀecting the cost of loans and their required
amount to the ﬁnancial intermediary. Equation (A8) is the log-linearized version
of the performance measure, the return on investment. Finally Equations (A9),
(A10) and (A11) are conventional for the NK framework.14 Equation (A10
) and (A11) impose exogenous shocks on the inﬂation and interest rates. The
monetary policy rule expressed by Equation (A11) is the more general as possible
in order to leave some degrees of freedom for the dynamic analyses.
Appendix B: Interest rate smoothing policies
This appendix shows the diﬀerent dynamics comparing a strong monetary policy
(φpi > 1) with an alternative speciﬁcations in which the Taylor principle is
violated (φpi < 1) considering the following interest rate smoothing rule:
rnt = ρr
n
t−1 + (1− ρ) (φpipit + φyyt) , with φy = 1.
As Figure 10 shows, if the coeﬃcient of interest rate's autocorrelation is
low (ρ = 0.2), the convergence paths of long run trajectories are in line with
the simulation run with ﬂexible inﬂation targeting monetary policy (Figure 2).
On the contrary, there are ﬂuctuations with higher frequencies in the short
run. This may be explained by the fact that the Central Bank is particularly
active pursuing the ﬁnancial stabilization paying less attention on output gap
and inﬂation. Hence, the interest rate is hit in every period, bringing micro-
ﬂuctuations in the share of the entrepreneur's types which aﬀects the investment
decisions and the output. If the Central Bank increases its eﬀort to stabilize
the ﬁnancial sector (if the autocorrelation of the interest rate grows to ρ =
14See Romer (2012).
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0.8), it will further increase the ﬂuctuations both in the long and short run
because this policy does not ensure the convergence to the steady state level.
Indeed, according to this parametrization, the interest rate rule does not satisfy
the Taylor Principle.15 In other words, the central bank does not adjust the
interest rate with suﬃcient strength misleading the investment decision of the
entrepreneurs. More precisely, the weak response to inﬂation growth, aﬀecting
positively both the expected and the net investment returns, entails expanding
levels of capital and output avoiding the convergence to the steady state value.
Figure 10: Simulation with biased entrepreneurs and weak trend following
expectations; red line: ﬂexible inﬂation targeting monetary policy obeying to
the Taylor Principle, blue line: ﬂexible inﬂation targeting monetary policy with
inﬂation parameter lower than 1.
15It should be noticed that, with an interest rate's autocorrelation of 0.8, the inﬂation
parameter in the interest rate rule becomes equal to 0.3, hence lower than 1.
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Appendix C: Statistics
Scenario Heuristic Y pi K # of pessimist
φpi = 1.5, φy = 0 Naive
-0.0451 0.0238 -0.0759 0.5005
(0.2398) (0.1258) (0.3854) (0.0019)
φpi = 1.5, φy = 1 Naive
-0.0172 0.0584 -0.0719 0.5008
(0.0634) (0.1810) (0.221) (0.0023)
φpi = 1.5, φy = 0 Chartist
-0.0449 0.0243 -0.0739 0.5062
(0.3080) (0.1671) (0.4824) (0.0445)
φpi = 1.5, φy = 1 Chartist
-0.0171 0.0590 -0.0691 0.5008
(0.0784) (0.2395) (0.2838) (0.0028)
φpi = 1.5, φy = 0 LAA rule
-0.0441 0.0194 -0.0733 0.5005
(0.3995) (0.2568) (0.5158) (8.420e−04)
φpi = 1.5, φy = 1 LAA rule
-0.0161 0.0552 -0.0640 0.5008
(0.0923) (0.3047) (0.3065) (6.912e−04)
φpi = 1.5, φy = 0 Fundamentalist
-0.0262 0.0201 -0.0505 0.5004
(0.0296) (0.0276) (0.0246) (7.607e−05)
φpi = 1.5, φy = 1 Fundamentalist
-0.0071 0.0205 -0.0249 0.5003
(0.0286) (0.0276) (0.0255) (7.668e−05)
Table 1: Averages and standard deviations, in brackets, of the simulations
considering diﬀerent policies and heuristics.
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